CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

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CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

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RELIGIOUS PERPLEXITIES
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REALITIES AND SHAMS

CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book contains the course of Stevenson Lectures on Citizenship which I had the honour of delivering, by invitation from the University of Glasgow, in the winter of 1926-1927. The terms of Sir Daniel Stevenson's Foundation require me to publish either the lectures or the "substance" of them. Here I have published the "substance." But I hasten to add that, according to my philosophy, the substance of a thing does not necessarily occupy a smaller space or a shorter time than the thing it is the substance of. It may occupy a larger space and a longer time, and in this instance actually does so. Much that a slow delivery compelled me to omit when addressing my audiences—for I had two of them, one in the University and one in a public hall—I have here included as belonging by right to the "substance" of my lectures. To some extent also I have rearranged the matter of them, a change which is often necessary in passing from oral delivery to the printed book. One chapter I have added which was never delivered at all—that

which bears the title "An Example of Trusteeship." But as this only exemplifies a theme which ran through the whole of the lectures it may be regarded as belonging to their "substance," though to a part of it which was unheard.

L. P. J.

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CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

I

CONSTRUCTIVENESS

I CANNOT conceal from myself that the title chosen for these lectures, "Constructive Citizenship," is ambitious and provocative; ambitious, because it suggests that the lecturer fancies himself qualified to play the distinguished part of a constructor or builder-up of new worlds; provocative, because there are so many constructors active in the social field, because the profession of world-builder, one might say, is already so crowded, that a newcomer is not unlikely to find himself an unwanted intruder and greeted with "half a brick." Perhaps I should have lacked the courage to commit myself to a title which has almost the air of usurping the prerogative of the Creator had I not long been convinced, for reasons that lie outside the scope of my present subject, that life consists in the facing of risks, of which the "half bricks," just mentioned, though not to be ignored, are by no means

the most terrifying. Some of life's risks, including the last, are worth running and some are not, a sound philosophy being the wisdom that distinguishes the one from the other.

Nowhere else are the risks of life more numerous, critical, and worth running than in that form of life which bears the name of "thinking." These increase in gravity in proportion to the worth of the object thought about, being gravest when we think about the values that are eternal, with which values our citizenship, since it has a heavenly as well as an earthly aspect, is not unconnected. Pascal, you will remember, supports me in regarding these risks as the gravest. And the number of them is at least doubled when we not only think about them ourselves but attempt to communicate our thoughts to others, as I am to do.

There is the risk of our own fallibility to begin with, an enormous one which no stringency of logic can protect us from, since our logic may easily stray from its proper sphere; and, beyond that, there is the risk that our thought, even when it succeeds in hitting the truth, will be misunderstood by those to whom it is addressed, for they too are fallible like ourselves; and then, beyond that again, lies the gravest risk of all—that our thoughts, even when true and rightly

understood, may be misapplied both by those to whom they are addressed and by ourselves. Whoso plays for safety in that department plays for what, from the nature of the case, is impossible. "Safety first" is no motto for the thinker. There are such things as "safety" matches, "safety" bicycles, "safety" guns, but there is no safety catch on the thinking faculty, no lightning conductor on the house of thought. Indisputability, the position of perfect intellectual safety, has been the goal of many logicians and philosophers, and still remains so, in spite of the lesson which experience teaches, by striking examples, that nothing in the heavens above or on the earth beneath, not even the determinist philosophy itself, is strictly indisputable so long as there exists among men, as there always does, the will to dispute it. Of all vocations, I name the vocation of the thinker as the most dangerous and, for that very reason, the most worth while, the most in accord with the kind of life offered by the universe, and perhaps designed, for its creature, man. So the lecture-room has its risks as well as the battlefield, and they are certainly not light when the subject lectured upon comes before the audience under a title so ambitious and provocative as "Constructive Citizenship." Fortunate the man who comes through

such an adventure with an unbroken spirit, with an undamaged reputation, or even alive.

No doubt there exists to-day a widespread and even clamorous demand for what is known as constructive thinking, not only in regard to "citizenship," but to everything in which great issues are involved. But the lecturer who flatters himself that by wearing the constructive mantle he carries a passport to universal favour may find that he has fallen into a snare. That the modern demand for constructive thinking is wholly actuated by disinterested motives seems to me doubtful; I suspect that it springs in part from the desire for something fresh to destroy, which is ineradicable from human nature, even in the more respectable specimens of it; for it is clear that, if the constructors were to cease constructing, the destroyers, who form a considerable fraction of the educated public, would be deprived of a very interesting occupation. Never were the constructors, and the reconstructors, more active than they are to-day, especially in social affairs; but it should be noted that their critics also are having a busy time. High tension, as we shall see more fully later on, is a characteristic of modern life, and the points where it is most acute seem to be the very points where the constructive spirit raises its

flag and challenges its critics. So the path of the constructor, in these days, is not an easy one; behind every bush, behind every turning of the road, groups of "highly developed individuals," a class in which most of us claim membership, and of which I shall have something to say hereafter, are waiting in ambush to destroy him. I know not how it may be with you in Glasgow, but in the University of Oxford, with which I am better acquainted, these highly developed individuals, who are much in evidence there, are by no means always in the humour to let the would-be constructor pass on his way without challenge. In my time, owing to special circumstances, I have had much to do with "constructive minds" in various departments, but neither in Oxford nor elsewhere have I been struck by the warmth of the reception accorded them by the thinking public.

I observe, moreover, that the constructors, considered as a body, are by no means like-minded among themselves, nor inclined to love their fellow-constructors as they love themselves. No antagonisms are more bitter than those which break out between rival constructors in the same field. Like the sinister boy in "Jude the Obscure" who first hanged his half-brother and sister, and then hanged himself, they per-

ceive that "we are too many," "too many" to be comfortable, "too many" to be manageable—the feeling sometimes provoked, even in benevolent bosoms, by the spectacle of the human race as a whole, "the overstocked profession of man" as somebody has named it. It is a noteworthy fact, and one that gives an aristocratic touch to the humanitarianism of our time, that lovers of mankind are becoming more and more unwilling to extend an undiscriminating welcome to every chance newcomer on the planet and to any conceivable multitude of such. They are beginning to demand that the number of these unbidden guests, and their quality into the bargain, shall be put under control. "Constructive proposals" for that purpose are now much in evidence. Though the methods propounded for restricting the population are less horribly spectacular than those of Mr. Hardy's boy, they are far more efficacious and equally motived by the belief that "we are too many." The champions of Christian ethics will have some difficulty, I imagine, in reconciling their creed to the principles of this new propaganda, for it seems clear that "the love of man," in this aristocratic phase of it, no longer takes the form of universal hospitality to anything that knocks at the door of life in human shape. A situation that gives

rise to many thoughts, of which perhaps the most pertinent is this: that if these "constructive proposals" had been launched in the time of our progenitors, instead of now, many of us who are here to-day for the study of constructive citizenship would have been spared our introduction to the bewildering contradictions, fiery trials, and consummating splendours of this amazing universe. I count it a sobering reflection, but must forbear to enlarge upon it further.

Except for these passing moments, when the common dislike of newcomers gives them a united front, constructive minds are notoriously a quarrelsome generation. Such unity, however, the unity of constructors in wiping out the newcomer, the unity of mankind in resisting its own increase, is not of a nature to suggest that constructors necessarily believe in constructiveness or that the love of man is a quality without limitations—as it should be for those who adopt the motto *nihil humanum mihi alienum puto.*

Rash as my choice of a title must in any case be, I am not without hope that the doom I am invoking may be somewhat lightened, though it cannot be altogether avoided, when you have become familiar with the real nature of my attempt. What I am here concerned to offer is a method rather than a programme,

a spirit rather than a system, a motive to endeavour rather than a promise of victory. Indeed I would persuade you, if I can, to turn aside for a little from social programmes, systems, and promises and attend to matters which seem to me of greater moment even than they.

As to programmes—I refer, of course, to the social variety—we all know they have a way of not getting themselves rehearsed; for my part I cannot think of one that has done so, not even when I review the long ages that have intervened between Plato and Mr. H. G. Wells. As to social systems, I feel myself as incompetent to construct a new one as I am to construct a new skeleton for the human body or a new process for the circulation of the blood. As to promises, they are the stock in trade of every demagogue, whose activities seem to be divided between promising what he cannot fulfil and blaming his opponents for the non-fulfilment of what he promised when last he addressed his constituency. Our civilization, as we shall study it in these lectures, will be regarded throughout as a perilous adventure for an uncertain prize, not the less but the more perilous for having passed from the "military" to the "industrial" stage, an adventure to be worked out according to the skill and valour of

the participant citizens, in their singularity and in their masses. One thing only can be "promised" with certainty—hard work and hard fighting (not necessarily with carnal weapons) to the very end.

What the end will be let no man dare to say. It may be that the ultimate goal, or final privilege, which the universe holds in store for the human race is nothing more, and nothing less, than the opportunity "to die like gentlemen," after the manner of Captain Oates. Does not the moon shine in the heavens to warn us that our proud civilization is under the universal doom of death? So much science can predict. But no science can predict the *manner of dying*. Mankind will certainly perish, but not necessarily like the brutes. It may die as a "gentleman" should. And this, to the valorous soul, would be infinitely worth while, though the lotus-eater, who lurks in the breast of every man, will not be attracted by it.

All hope, then, being abandoned that the word "constructive" will serve me as a passport to the favour of experts and lead me into regions where criticism is dumb, I will now describe, as well as I can at this stage, the method of thinking—of thinking about citizenship—which I am about to recommend to your acceptance.

To describe it as a "new" method would be far from true. Nothing that calls itself a method of thought could be less of a novelty. All persons employ it who have retained the unsophisticated use of the intellect; children, whose judgments on certain matters have been said to echo the judgments of God, seldom employ any other; while art, which is full of thought, and might even be defined as "thinking beautifully acted," adopts it throughout. Before the ascendency of mechanical science our method was not uncommon in the high places of philosophy, and still has advocates there. *Time-thinking* is the name I propose to give to it, a name not usual perhaps in this connection and yet not altogether novel. This time-thinking is the method I shall recommend to you as the most appropriate to all human affairs, a class to which citizenship unquestionably belongs.

The method to which time-thinking stands contrasted, though not necessarily opposed, is, of course, space-thinking. Space-thinking is insufficient whenever the meaning of human life, whether civic or otherwise, is in question, because human life, though it displays itself as a *spectacle* in space, goes on as a conscious *experience* in time. But no one, who is familiar with the social literature of our day, will

doubt that space-thinking, in spite of its inappropriateness in the ultimate reference, is there dominant. It is the *spectacle* of human life, as a phenomenon spread out in space, and having such-and-such visible features as the eye might see in a diagram or picture, such-and-such point-to-point relationships, industrial, civic, political, national, and international—it is this, the spectacle of human life in space, rather than the conscious experience of it in time, that mainly occupies our social literature.

I count space-thinking a grave defect of method in dealing with these subjects, though possibly a defect incident to great qualities in the present age: the consequences of it will become more apparent as we proceed. The defect originates in large measure from the ascendency of mechanical science, which began to assert itself about three centuries ago, and has since invaded not the realms of our actions alone, where it has the right to be ascendant at certain points, but the realms of speculative thought, where its proper function is not to rule but to serve. Against the immense benefits which mechanical science has conferred on human life, it may be set down as a countervailing injury of some significance that it has confused and perverted our thinking about human life itself. It has

imposed its artificialities, which have immense value in their proper place, on the mind which has created them, and so made the mind into the slave of its own instrument.

The ascendency of space-thinking may be assigned to a yet deeper cause, a cause which mechanical science has exploited and made the most of. I allude to the fact that the *eye* happens to be the leading organ of sense. Owing to this fact the human mind, in all ages, has shown a tendency to think under the leadership of the eye, the very language of thought, even in its abstract flights, being largely based on metaphors borrowed from the *visible* world, thereby creating many illusions and perversions which only a profound philosophy can see through or correct.

Now the eye is the organ which deals with the world as spread out in space—a world in which, meanwhile, the conscious life of man goes on in *time*. Thanks to the dominance of the eye even philosophy sometimes presents itself to the mind as a vision or spectacle displayed on an extended screen, so that we speak familiarly of a "world *view*" (Weltanschauung), and of philosophers as having this *viewpoint* or that. We say also that "to see is to believe"—a statement which, if taken literally, is as far from the

truth as any statement could possibly be, and would be as good a reason for disbelief as for belief; and when we want to declare our understanding of a thing we say "we *see* it." "I see that now," says the pupil when the master has successfully explained the *pons asinorum*. Such is the leadership of the eye, the space sense *par excellence*.

In young children we may observe this leadership of the eye gradually disengaging and asserting itself from among the competing claims of the other senses, which are less concerned with space than it. For hearing, smell, taste, and touch, though they are not unrelated to space, are on a more intimate footing with time; they tell us more of what is *going on*. Smell especially, perhaps the most atrophied of all the senses of man, shows signs of having once been in the main a time-dealing sense; everybody is familiar with its power in reviving the memory of the past; and I have heard a rumour of certain recent speculations in Germany to the effect that the human mind has missed a vast amount of interesting knowledge by trusting to sight rather than to smell as a means of finding its way through the universe. Dogs, it is said, think in time. Certainly, if dogs think at all they do so in no other way. Their keen noses, with thinking powers

to back them, would make them great historians and dangerous predictors of the future. Even as it is they seem to be not ungifted both in history and prediction. My own dog is a great performer in both departments. When once introduced to a stranger he will pick him out from a crowd when I have long forgotten him; and when I am going away from home he begins whining days beforehand.

I may say in passing that our time-method is not unconnected with the modern doctrine of Relativity, a revolutionary doctrine, the full significance of which has not yet sunk as fully as one day it will into the minds of philosophers, to say nothing of the public at large. But I am not going to trouble you with the Doctrine of Relativity, nor with the technical interpretations it gives of Space and Time, matters extremely difficult to expound, but which, when understood, merely confirm the natural intuitions of sensible men—as the profoundest philosophy always does.

II

TIME-THINKING IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS

As everybody knows who will take the trouble to interrogate his own experience, the value of everything in life is essentially bound up with its *lastingness*. If the highest good in the universe were given to a man, but only to vanish—to vanish even from memory—the instant it appeared, gone as soon as come, it would have no value, and having no value it would have no reality. Duration, lastingness, in some form it must have, though perhaps only in memory, like Dante's momentary vision of God; otherwise it might as well not have been. That which comes only to go does not come at all; it would be as true to say that it goes as that it comes; and truer still to say that it does neither. If coming and going are simultaneous that which comes is nothing, and so is that which goes. The reality that does not *last*, though but for a moment, though but in memory, is a roundabout description of the unreal—of nothing. True, the memory of the

highest good is sometimes the deepest sorrow; but that again is another way of saying that the highest good *lasts,* in such cases, as a pain—not thereby necessarily losing one tittle of its goodness. If the highest good went so soon after it came that we were given no time to recognize and enjoy it as the highest, what would it be but a mockery, a disappointment and an evil?

This is the truth—it is the profoundest truth of our conscious life, and familiar to everybody—that space-thinking takes no account of and that time-thinking alone cannot grasp. The relevance of it to our social studies is immense and omnipresent. With space-thinking alone to guide us we are apt to think our work done when we have devised a social scheme, system, or envisaged-diagram in which men and forces are *placed*—note the term—in right relationships to one another. Time-thinking immediately asks—how long will these men and forces stay where you have placed them, how long will the relationship *last?* Space-thinking shows you a picture, perhaps a Utopian picture, of human beings caught by the eye at a happy moment, photographed, so to speak, in the state of social behaviour the space-thinker considers most desirable. "How long will these people keep it up?" asks the time-thinker. What will they be doing

a year hence? In a recent argument a space-thinker put forward the opinion that the social system devised by Karl Marx was eminently practicable. "I agree," answered a time-thinker. *"But it would only last one day."* The space-thinker reveals a *goal* or point of arrival. The time-thinker asks for the *direction* of movement.

An illustration of this point, which space-thinking Utopians, and reformers generally, should take to heart, may be found in the notorious fact that no one, so far, has succeeded in describing the conditions of heaven in a form that would justify its claim to be the abode of everlasting bliss. No matter how wide the space-thinker spreads out his picture of heaven (or of Utopia) on the canvas, no matter how gorgeous the colours he lays upon it, no matter how attractive to the eye the scene may be as a passing incident for the soul to experience or to contemplate, no human being can tolerate the thought of its endless duration, neither the sinner nor the saint, neither the carnal nor the spiritual. These mental visions of human bliss, whether it be a reward to be enjoyed in another world, or the result of "social equilibrium" to be attained in this, begin to crumble from the moment time-thinking gets to work upon them, and warn us, by their col-

lapse, that the "solution of the social problem" is not to be sought on those lines.

It happened to me once that I was inspecting a picture by Fra Angelico—one of those lovely visions of angels in Paradise, which he is said to have painted on his knees—my companion being a boy of nine or ten years old who was paying his first visit to a picture gallery. Lost in my study of the adoring and radiant figures, I had forgotten the boy at my side, when suddenly he broke into my reverie with a question for which I was not prepared. "How long," he asked, "will the angels *keep on* saying their prayers?" "Oh," I said, "a long time. You see they are very happy." "But won't their knees get tired?" "Well, if they do," I said, perhaps not very wisely, "they will get up from their knees and take a walk in that beautiful meadow you see at the back of the picture." "And what will the angels do *next*—after they have walked in the meadow?" "Then," I answered, and the answer was most unfortunate, "I think they will come back to where they are now and go on with their prayers." At this the child burst into tears. "I don't want to be an angel," he cried between his sobs. He had been thinking in time, as children are apt to do, the natural form of human thought, but now much

obscured by the artificial method of thinking in space, which mechanical science has imposed so strongly on our modern minds. I have to confess that the question which startled me in the picture gallery, and led to such feeble answers on my part, and to such disastrous consequences for the questioner, has often disturbed my philosophic reflection when studying those pictures of Utopia with which we are now so abundantly supplied; those "snapshots of the millennium" which are said to be efficacious in sustaining our faith in social progress. "What," I find myself asking, "will these angels do *next?* How long will they *keep it up?* Perfectly practicable, no doubt. But will it all, as the time-thinker said of the 'social system' designed by Karl Marx, be good only for one day? Are these smiling, jolly, hand-shaking Utopians equal to the heroic task of maintaining what they have got by carrying it upwards and onwards to something better—the only way in which any good thing can keep its footing in the universe? Or have they dug themselves so deep into the stagnant underworld of pleasure that they can never get out of it even for change of air?" At these questions the bright vision fades and the heart of the time-thinker grows heavy within him.

The building of social systems that would "last only

one day," and the jerry-building of material houses, now so extensively promoted under public schemes and by public money, to the shame of good workmanship, and with the certainty that many of them will be slums in another generation, are, I venture to think, operations that spring from a common root. Both illustrate, and may be said to originate in, an over-developed faculty for thinking in space, and an under-developed or perhaps decayed faculty for thinking in time, which I reckon among the deepest characteristics of the modern mind. Both assume "constructive" airs and use "constructive" language; but constructive citizenship cannot be content with either of them. Our system builders are intent on a just social order, meaning by that an order where everybody *stands* in his proper place and right relationships—the space side of the matter. But how seldom are we reminded that a just social order is one which the citizens must "win for themselves afresh every day" by making it still juster; or that justice is defined not by the positions and relationships in which people *stand,* but by "what they do next" when they get into those relationships—the time side of the question.

Our jerry-builders in like manner are well informed and voluble on the space side of their operations; the

houses are to be so big, there are to be so many of them, they are to cost so much, the ground plan is to be such-and-such, and so on—all space considerations. But not often do we hear a word said about the *quality of the workmanship* that is to be put into them—which is the time aspect of the affair. I have attended committees and public meetings on the "Housing Question," but I do not remember to have heard this subject much alluded to, and when I have myself pleaded for quality of workmanship, as the prime consideration, it has been supposed that I was airing some fad—how, indeed, could it be otherwise since neither the House of Commons, nor the trade unions, nor the demogogues, nor the voters, nor the vote-catchers (space-thinkers most of them) take any interest in that side of the question; and when I have told these committees, quoting Carlyle, that their houses ought to be built "so as to *last* to the Day of Judgment" (that day being every day), they have thought that I was making a feeble joke.

At this stage I will say but little more about time-thinking, lest I should be led into metaphysical regions beyond the range of my subject. You will gather more fully what it means from numerous examples as we proceed. But that you may recognize our method

when you encounter it, I will mention one or two of the marks by which it may be infallibly distinguished from the space-thinking to which it stands in contrast.

You can tell in which region you are—space-thinking or time-thinking—by the kind of metaphors which thinkers use to express themselves. Look out, then, for metaphors borrowed from the sense of sight, not forgetting that "look out" itself is one of the metaphors in question. Thus, on opening a book in philosophy, I find the following definition of the human understanding: "to understand things is to see them as necessary." But why "see"? The language, of course, is a metaphor, but why should the metaphor of sight be chosen rather than any other? Why not say "to understand things is to *hear* them as necessary," or "to taste them as necessary," or "to smell them as necessary"?[1]

The word "necessary" suggests another mark—one that will be found almost infallible for identifying the space-thinker when he comes our way. Space-thinking leads inevitably to the conclusion that the universe is a machine ruled by necessity in every part.

[1] "Understand," of course, is also a visual or space metaphor. What equivalent the dogs would use for "understand" is a point, I confess, that baffles me.

The space-thinker is entirely right from his own point of view when he says that "to understand things is to see them as necessary," for the simple reason that you cannot *see* them in any other way, since to see them as *not* necessary would be equivalent to seeing them as *not there*. Sight is pre-eminently the necessity sense, because it is the space sense. If, therefore, one happens to have been born a pure space-thinker, or become perverted into such by the accident of the times in which he was born, he will almost certainly be a "determinist"—that is, one who understands things by *seeing* them to be necessary. But if he is a time-thinker he will understand them quite differently. For the time-thinker not only sees things, but hears them, tastes them, smells them, handles them, and tries them out in all sorts of ways before concluding of what nature they are—like the Psalmist, who bids us "taste and see that the Lord is good," putting the tasting before the seeing. And in thus passing from one sense to another, from sight to hearing, from smell to touch—for the time-thinker's mind is ever *on the move*, following things through their changes, or rather riding, as it were, on the very back of change itself, so that his "point of view" moves with the everlasting movement of the universe and is, there-

fore, no mere *point* at all—in thus moving, I say, from sense to sense, and then out beyond the senses altogether, the time-thinker discovers that necessity is *not* supreme, that what is necessary to seeing things is unnecessary to hearing them, what is necessary to hearing them unnecessary to smelling them, and so on throughout. "To understand things," he says, "is not to see them as necessary, but to *share their freedom.*" Which is another way of saying that his interest in angels (or in devils) is not confined to what they happen to be doing at the moment when the eye catches sight of them at their devotions or their fiendish tricks, but extends also to "what they are going to do *next*"; his mind not being content with the vision of what the world will be like on the day when the system of Karl Marx or anybody else gets itself established, but driving incessantly forward to the day after and to the endless days after that. Time-thinking is, after all, a very natural mode of thought. By some it has been named "the historical mind"; a good name, provided it be understood that history deals not only with the past but with the present, and with the present as the growing point of the past into the future.

Another distinctive mark, which minds with a

literary turn may find helpful, is revealed in the different styles by which space-thinking and time-thinking respectively express themselves. Space-thinking, for the most part, runs to prose, as its natural vehicle of expression; time-thinking to poetry. If the space-thinker resorts to poetry (as he sometimes imprudently does) his verses are invariably stiff and wooden; but there are no limits to what he can do in the meaner eloquence of prose. To the time-thinker prose is a hampering medium; he finds it inadequate to the movement of things, adopts it reluctantly, and when compelled to adopt it through his lack of the singing faculty he blames the gods for not having made him a poet. With time-thinking at its very best even poetry fails as a conveyor of the meaning, so that the best of time-thinkers would be utterly dumb were it not that music, which is poetry with the words left out, comes to his aid. Music is the time-thinker's art, his own peculiar way of interpreting the universe, which he no longer *sees* as necessary, but *hears* as free.

What it comes to, then, is this. All "views" of things (and what word could be more significant of space-thinking) whether of the universe, of society, of human nature, or of anything else, so long as they are nothing but "views," are inadequate to reveal the

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nature of what we are viewing. Nor is the matter mended by substituting "theories" for "views"; for theory is nothing but "view" done into Greek. Doing our thoughts into Greek is a frequent device for disguising their superficiality.

The immense importance of this to the student of society will become apparent, I hope, in the sequel. For there can hardly be a doubt that in our day social study has been captured by the space-thinking to which mechanical science has committed us, while time-thinking, which has its proper home in the social sciences, and is most needed there, has been driven from the field.

Human bodies, it is true, are extended in space; they exist in space; and if society were composed of human bodies, of mechanically actuated corpses, space-thinking would tell us about human society most of what we need to know. But while everybody *exists* in space, nobody *lives* in space. We live in time, so far, that is, as we are conscious at all; and time, which is the essence of life, whether social or personal, is that which cannot be "viewed," which cannot be "understood" by seeing it as this, that, or anything else. It follows that a method of social study which aims only at forming correct "views" of society, or theories

about it (for there is no difference) will miss the human significance of every "problem" it attacks and end in superficiality. Yet such is our habit. In no field of study are "views" so extensively sought after and of so little value when found. A machine can be understood by being adequately "viewed"; a man cannot, still less a society of men. The eye, after all, tells us very little about our neighbour, and still less about ourselves; otherwise a photograph of a man would be as significant as the man himself. If we could only *see* ourselves, though it were "as others see us," what phantoms we should be! And phantoms are all that space-thinking, when it borrows nothing from time, can produce. "Abstractions" is another name for them. One such phantom, or "view," I shall present for examination in the next lecture.

Before closing I will give an example of time-thinking in regard to a matter which challenges the interest of all good citizens. I refer to the League of Nations—the one great human project which has emerged from the War.

We certainly miss the significance of the League when we think of it as an organization in space, whereby the different areas on the map, called countries, are to be joined together into a single area for

the administration of international law. If that were all, the battle for the League would be won when the scheme had been rightly drawn out and the covenant signed by the various governments in existence at the moment.

But that is obviously not all. The question immediately arises how long will this agreement be *kept?* How long will it *last?* The answer obviously is: it will last just so long as the parties to it *are animated by the spirit of mutual loyalty.* It has been solemnly ratified by the governments in existence at the moment, backed, it may be, by the public opinion of the moment. Good. But what will happen when those governments have been succeeded by others composed of different individuals, holding different views, and when public opinion has changed its mood, as it so frequently does? Will mutual loyalty survive these changes? If it fails to do so our League will simply add one more to the long list of treaties, once solemnly ratified, but now turned into "scraps of paper." Clearly our League is of little value unless we can depend on the continuous loyalty of the members, and on the continuous confidence which their loyalty inspires in the world at large. The theoretical perfection of it as a mere arrangement in space, the momentary equilibrium it exhibits among

the conflicting interests of nations, is nothing to the purpose unless we can assure ourselves of the lastingness of what we have set on foot.

We are now thinking of the League in terms of time, and the effect of so doing is to change the matter from a mechanical to a living form—the effect which time-thinking always produces. We begin to see that the success of the League depends on the presence in it of a certain human quality called mutual loyalty. And with that there comes a corresponding change in our idea of the kind of *men,* of agents, to whom the working and guidance of the League should be entrusted. Before all, they must be men who inspire continuous confidence. They must be steadfast men, loyal men, men with moral staying power, and, so far as the brevity of human life permits it, they must be *continuous* men, devoting to the service of the League, not the brief period of political office at home, but appointed for life, as our judges are, or for long periods, so as to give them *time* for stamping upon the League the traditions of an incorruptible character. Is it not a fact that the strength of the law in our own country reposes, in the last resort, not merely on the theoretical perfection of what stands written in the Statute Book, but on the incorruptible

character of the judicial bench? How else can it be with the League of Nations? The lastingness will depend on the *men* who administer it.

Time-thinking has brought us to that point. It has shown us what it always shows us when we apply it to social affairs, that no institution or system, no matter how theoretically perfect, will last, will survive the accidents of time and the fluctuations of human desire, unless we can find for the working of it, the guidance of it, the administration of it, that type of character described by the familiar word "trustee." The more perfect your system is, as a thing worked out in space, quantity, and arrangement, the more unimpeachable must the trusteeship be to which you commit its working as a thing in time, quality, and value. The League of Nations, interpreted in time, is a challenge to the world's capacity for trusteeship.

And the same is true in its degree of every arrangement or system we may choose to consider—political systems for the distribution of power, economic systems for the distribution of wealth, educational systems for the distribution of culture. Without trusteeship at the back of them they will not *last*—time will destroy them all.

III

SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

HAVING confessed already to my lack of qualifications for the rôle of the social system-builder, or general world-mender, which the title of this course might otherwise have suggested I was about to assume, I will now indicate the quarter where some consolation is to be found for those of us who suffer from that disability.

It lies in the reflection, natural to an advocate of time-thinking, that system-building, though always interesting and sometimes valuable, plays a smaller part than space-thinkers are apt to assign it in determining the course of human affairs. And perhaps the same applies to world-mending in general, which often displays the characteristic error of the space-thinker, that of putting new cloth on old garments; for the world, as we all must admit, is exceedingly old. Many social systems have been "constructed," others are being constructed now, and though most of them have had some influence on human conduct, none of them, so

far as I know, has ever taken visible shape on the earth. Human society is not a constructed thing, but a living organism. That being so, our powers of constructing or reconstructing it are narrowly limited. Perhaps it is true that we can *destroy* society, in the sense that we can destroy ourselves; some, who talk of "race suicide," think we are actually engaged in doing so at the present time. But were society once to be destroyed no system or programme could bring it to life again; because, for reasons more obvious still, the system-makers would have perished with the rest of us.

Our systems and programmes have a living society for their background; they originate in the life of society; they need its vitality to carry them out; and the more daring they are the more alive and vigorous must society be to undertake the enterprises of reform to which they invite it. It follows that we are adopting a false method of reform when we begin by operations that weaken society, either morally or materially, by lowering its vitality, by plunging it into gloom and despair about itself, by inducing the atmosphere of the sick room, and then, when its courage and resources are at a low ebb, expecting it to perform some mighty feat of self-reformation. A society thus weakened

and discouraged will not only lack the vigour that it needs to reform itself, but will betray its weakness by adopting weak and short-sighted methods of reform. Such methods will lead to divided counsels, and the energies needed for united effort will be spent on internal strife and mutual recrimination.

In these lectures I shall plead for a method the reverse of this. As you will have gathered already, I use the word "constructive" not for the purpose of introducing a programme, but for the humbler one of indicating a spirit—the spirit of constructiveness. What the word describes is a temper, not confined to a few sanguine or specially instructed individuals, but a common impulse in the community, or at least capable of becoming so. Constructive citizenship is marked throughout by the resolve to make the best of things as they are, by hopefulness, by self-confidence, by enterprise, by the pursuit of excellence in all human employments and vocations, and by its general perception of the fact that there is no limit to the real and abiding values that may be drawn from the universe by the co-operative efforts of men in society, inspired with ideal aims and conducted under business-like methods.

I cannot think that very much is to be hoped for

from any system or programme which has originated in social despair, or in social bitterness, or in men's distrust of one another, in the atmosphere of the sick room, or in that of the cockpit. I am afraid that some of the systems and programmes that are now being offered us betray marks of having originated in that way. Some are based on the assumption that men are untrustworthy, stupid, or sickly beings, who need to be coerced, policed, watched, or dosed and coddled in order to bring them to the point of dealing fairly by their neighbours. Proceeding on that assumption they soon lose their constructive or onward-moving character, and end by becoming instruments in the hands of oppressive majorities. Systems of this character, built on the assumption that the citizen is not to be trusted to do his social duty, but needs to be coerced or coddled, stand exposed to incessant opposition from free men, who are turned by them into mutineers; they betray a low vitality in any society that adopts them, and lack the inner strength to enforce their own decrees. In other words, they do not last.

The policy of coercing, coddling, or bribing the citizen to do his social duty is confronted to-day with a situation often encountered before, but never on the scale to which modern industrialism has expanded it. In the

earlier stages, when society was passing through the military phase of its evolution, its existence mainly depended on the willingness of the citizens to *fight* for it, and accordingly we find that the governments of such military societies invariably arm themselves with powers of one kind or another for compelling the able-bodied citizens to turn themselves into an effective fighting force. But as the military phase is passed through, and the industrial age entered upon, the existence of society comes to depend less on the willingness of the citizens to *fight* for it and more on their willingness to *work* for it. How to combine the citizens into an effective *working* force now becomes the obvious question on which the fortunes of an industrial society may be said to hinge.

Here it is that the method of legal coercion which has proved so surprisingly successful in compelling the citizen to *fight* seems to be breaking down. An industrial state whose citizens need compulsion to make them *work* effectively is obviously doomed. Nor is such a state much better off when it tries the plan of bribing the citizens in order to get work out of them, because the citizens invariably make the discovery sooner or later that they are paying for their own bribes. The law, indeed, may decree that a man shall not eat unless

he works, but human ingenuity, stimulated by the pangs of hunger, will always find means of turning such a law into an empty threat. If we consider, for example, what would be involved in forcing a million unwilling men to dig coal, not for one day only, not for one week or month, but year in and year out all through their lives, the sheer impossibility of the attempt becomes plain enough. With fighting it is different. However unwilling the conscript soldier may be to fight, the military state can always trust him to fire his musket at the enemy when he observes that the enemy is about to fire a musket at him.

There are in the world to-day a number of industrialized nations whose very existence depends on *labour*, but which, at the same time, have no means of compelling the labour their existence depends on, no means of ensuring a continuous supply of it in the amount and quality needed for the maintenance of the social organism. It is a new situation in history. And, I think, we may observe all over the world a growing perception of the facts of the case and a growing bewilderment in the presence of them.

Some thinkers have explained the rise of Fascism as due to this cause—Fascism being obviously a movement towards a new form of social compulsion. On

the other hand, I recently heard a distinguished German professor explaining the growth of political Labour movements all over the world in the same way, the idea at the back of these movements being, according to him, that when Labour is governed by Labour it will always be willingly and efficiently performed. It is an interesting speculation. Whether it would work out according to theory depends on a multitude of complicated factors, most of them connected with human nature, the action of which no man can predict. Labour, moreover, is a highly heterogeneous entity, the elements of which are by no means all of one mind.

I shall have much to say about industrial civilization as we proceed. But there is one essential fact about it for which I should like to gain your assent, or at least your consideration, from the outset. It differs from the civilizations which have preceded it by the lower degree in which it depends on coercion and by the higher degree in which it depends on the good will of the citizen. No form of society, indeed, can flourish without some measure of good will in the members of it. But industrial society, reposing, as it does, on the unforced willingness of the citizens to contribute their due share of the labour which supports them all, has good will for the principle of its existence. The strong

arm of the law can enforce many things, but there is one thing it cannot enforce. No matter what social system may lie behind it, the laws cannot compel an unwilling citizen to do his *best* in the portion of common labour that falls to his lot, for this reason, if no other, that it ceases to be his best when he does it under compulsion. His best is the offspring of his good will, and no other parent can ever be found for it. And his best, and nothing short of his best, is what industrial society asks of him.

With this marked dependence on good will for the maintenance of its life current, industrial society offers a large place for what I shall call fiduciary institutions—for institutions, that is, which presuppose the personal trustworthiness of those who conduct them. All the activities of constructive citizenship, as I shall describe them, have for their ultimate object the promotion of good will and of fiduciary methods for organizing it.

In our studies of society we are notoriously apt to pay too much attention to social machinery and too little to the living tissue of which society is composed. Social machinery, as it is designed by the makers of social systems, naturally attracts our interest because, being machinery, it presents itself to our minds as a

thing which we can make, unmake, or remake according to our notions of what is best for the common good, and which, when we have constructed or reconstructed it according to theory, can be controlled by simple methods and relied upon to produce the results we desire.

But the idea of machinery, when applied to any part or aspect of the social organism, is misleading. Strictly speaking, nothing in the life of society can be reduced to purely mechanical terms. Even the skeleton framework of it, as defined by the social system in being, or by a written constitution, is a living thing and functions as a social skeleton only so long as it is vitalized with the rest of the body. Framework though it be, it cannot be taken to pieces and rearranged on a new model by experts. Beyond *energizing* the existing structure, a thing vastly worth doing by itself, there is not much that social reform can accomplish on the "framework of society." No doubt a wooden leg is better than no leg at all, and there are times when whole societies, maimed by war or revolution, are reduced to makeshift appliances of that kind. But wooden legs, whether they take the form of protective tariffs, trade union restrictions, unemployment doles, and suchlike ingenious devices, are poor substi-

tutes for the natural limbs of society, mechanically inferior though these may seem to be. We live in an age of such contrivances, the age, one might call it, of the artificial limb. There are obvious limits to the use of that article.

But even when the organic and vital conception of society has displaced the mechanical, two ways still lie open before us, and a great difference will be made to the character of our present study according as we take the one or the other.

In the first place, the conception of society as a living organism may tempt us, as it has tempted not a few of our most eminent philosophers, to concentrate attention on the sicknesses, the disorders, the miscarriages, the pains, fevers, and distresses to which, as a living thing, the social body stands exposed and often manifests. If temperament inclines in that direction—and temperament has something to do with this matter—society will present itself to our minds as essentially a sick patient needing the attention of the social physician, or sociological specialist, and the "duties and responsibilities" of the citizen will then resolve themselves into finding and applying the appropriate remedies and—though the physicians do not always show a good example in this respect—in swallowing

the prescribed doses himself. His rights, *per contra,* will resolve themselves into the summary right to "treatment," whether free or not, for the maladies which he, in common with his fellow citizens, suffers from. This may be termed the pathological view. There is no denying that it has a strong hold on the social propaganda of our time.

The writers who adopt it can generally be distinguished by the frequent use in their writings of the word "diagnosis." Mr. Bertrand Russell is especially fond of this word. His own diagnosis reveals a condition of social disease so desperate and manifold that he confesses himself tempted at times to wish the human race could be wiped out by some passing comet. "At present," writes Mr. Russell, "the economic part (of social life) needs our thought, because it is diseased"; the "disease" in question apparently resembling a broken leg, for the sentence concludes as follows: "just as, when a man's leg is broken it is temporarily the most important part of his body," [1] possibly a case for an artificial limb. In other parts of the book the disease or diseases appear under various names, such as capitalism, commercialism, nationalism, and other "isms," socialism being the cure for all of them. Mr.

[1] "Prospects of Industrial Civilization," p. 49.

R. H. Tawney shows himself on the same side in a pamphlet called "The Sickness of Acquisitive Society." [2] Dean Inge is equally outspoken; but the deadliest of our social diseases, according to him, is not "acquisitiveness," as it is for Mr. Tawney, nor any of the "isms" favoured by Mr. Russell, but "sectionalism"—though perhaps a deeper analysis would show that all these words, Mr. Russell's, Mr. Tawney's, and Dean Inge's, are names for the same disease. Dealing with "sectionalism," which he regards as specially virulent in England, the Dean writes as follows:

"We are in presence of a grave disease of the body politic, a disease which may even prove fatal. A writer who has rashly undertaken to portray the condition and prospects of England at the present time must try his hand at diagnosis . . . and in order to do this in a scientific spirit he must put away all feelings of disgust at the patient's symptoms. . . . The origin of this social disease seems to me not less obscure and mysterious than the predisposing causes of cancer."

[2] Since included in a book published under the simpler title "The Acquisitive Society." I gather that "acquisitiveness" is the "sickness" Mr. Tawney diagnoses and prescribes for.

Across the Atlantic, again, a book has been written and widely read, called "The Malady of Europe," in which Europe is exhibited as in the last extremity of disease; and not long ago I noticed an article in a leading American review bearing the title "The Malady of America," which the writer, oddly enough, describes as "boredom." Thus, on the one side of the Atlantic we have Europe sick to death, and on the other America bored to death—not a pleasing picture, especially when Oswald Spengler stands at our elbow predicting the general "downfall" of the West. Evidently the pathological point of view has a strong fascination for modern thinkers. How often are we reminded by such thinkers of Matthew Arnold's well-known lines:

> "He took the suffering human race,
> He read each wound, each weakness clear,
> And struck his finger on the place,
> And said, 'Thou ailest here and here.'"

And here one cannot help being struck, and perhaps astonished, by the curious fact that in the first two writers I have quoted, as in most writers of the pathological school, this diagnosis of society as profoundly diseased does not seem to have impaired their faith in the general soundness of the democratic principle—

the principle of "government of the people, by the people, for the people." No one in his senses would dream of suggesting that the patients in a hospital should elect their own doctors and control the treatment of their diseases by the method of majority voting. Yet that, or something perilously like it, is what democracy comes to if we accept the view urged upon us by these writers that society is thoroughly diseased. Self-government is the last thing which a diseased society should be deemed capable of. A sick society is a society composed of sick citizens, and the more of them you bring to the polls the sicker will their self-government become. If freedom is already theirs, the best use the sickly voters can make of it will be to surrender it to those who are wiser than themselves, in other words, to specialists in social pathology, arguing, as I am told the Fascists in Italy do argue, that unless the people are free to surrender their freedom to higher guidance, on finding they are only making a mess of it, they are not free at all. I cannot find that this aspect of the matter has occurred either to Mr. Russell or to Mr. Tawney. With Dean Inge, of course, it is different. Whatever he may think of democracy in the abstract, he has a very low opinion of it as it now exists, regarding it (not without reasons

given) as an organized system for the plunder of minorities. Of the three writers I have named, Dean Inge seems to be the least inconsistent at this point, though his bedside manners, as a social physician, are equally severe.

A reconciliation of pathological with democratic principles is obviously needed. And I find that another distinguished writer, Mr. Alfred Zimmern, has recently attempted it, in language, too, which is so downright that one can hardly believe it to be merely figurative or analogical. Though less alarming in his diagnosis, Mr. Zimmern is even more outspoken in his adoption of the pathological point of view. "Politics," he declares, "is medicine, transferred from the human body to the body politic. As the art of the physician consists in the skill to diagnose and to treat the maladies of the individual sufferer, so the art of the statesman consists in the skill to diagnose and to treat the maladies of the body politic." [3] Here the conception of society as a suffering patient and of politics as the art of diagnosing and curing its diseases is very plainly stated, and the question naturally arises of how this self-governing patient is to play the part

[3] "The Intellectual Foundations of International Co-operation," p. 4.

of physician to itself. This Mr. Zimmern proposes to accomplish by a method of training the citizens which would turn them virtually into medical students of the body politic and equip them with what he calls in a neighbouring sentence, "clinical (Greek for 'bedside') experience." All are to study the "diagnosis" of social disease and so acquire sufficient knowledge of the matter in hand to inform the more highly qualified specialists—the statesmen—of what they "really need" and to exercise a wise control over the ensuing "treatment." "It is on this power of diagnosis," writes Mr. Zimmern, "widely diffused among the general population and exceptionally developed among its chosen leaders, that the system of democratic self-government reposes. . . . It is because he (the plain man) knows precisely what he needs from the specialist that he retains his power to control him." Here, then, we are invited to view society under the figure of a hospital in which all the citizens (including, I suppose, the specialists as well as the plain men) play the double part of patient and physician according to the degree of their graduation in social pathology—a self-diagnosing, self-treating community of sick freemen, and in that sense a self-governing democracy. Such is the reconciliation. One cannot help being reminded of the

answer given to his doctor by Sidney Smith when advised to take a walk on an empty stomach—"*whose?*" For it seems obvious that the double part of physician and patient could hardly be played without some "confusion of substance." Among the more highly qualified practitioners, especially, one would expect a tendency to forget that they too, on democratic principles, must reckon themselves patients: their "power of diagnosis" must not blind them to that. Indeed, one may see such a tendency already in operation.

These examples—and many more might be given—reveal the hold which the pathological conception of society has acquired over leading minds. Differing in their diagnosis and in their treatment, they agree in being, primarily, pathologists. By transferring the control of civilization from the legal to the medical profession (even though it be only in a figure) their procedure is not without merit, and the excuse for it is, of course, obvious.

But disease is not the whole truth, and perhaps not the essential truth, about modern society, and there are dangers in treating it as though it were.

One danger is lest society, constantly confronted with the tale of its diseases, should fall into low spirits

about itself, a condition not conducive to the recovery of the patient. Another lies in the profitable market, which this melancholy temper creates, for the vendors of questionable patent medicines and for social quackery of many kinds. Another, growing out of this, is that the public may become so preoccupied with the quarrels that go on among the practitioners that the true physician gets no hearing at all, while the quack walks off with the fees. A fourth lies in the temptation offered, to a certain class of writers, to seize upon social disease as the outstanding phenomenon of modern life and exploit it in the interests of a decadent "realism" and of morbific literature in general. This, perhaps, is the greatest danger which attends an excessive indulgence of the pathological temper.

Fortunately, there is an alternative.

In spite of the alarming state of disease revealed by the diagnosis of our pathologists, the reassuring fact confronts us that society manages, somehow, to carry on. The more the diseases are emphasized and the longer the list of them grows, the more does our wonder rise that an organism so unhealthy, so crippled, so mutilated, so infected is able, notwithstanding, to hold on at all.

What is the explanation? Surely there can be only

one. To sustain a burden so terrible, and to carry on in spite of it, there must be, somewhere, an enormous fund of vitality in the social organism. The social pathologists have proved too much. Were the truth, as they reveal it, the whole truth, the continued existence of society would be incomprehensible.

Struck by this reflection, the student of citizenship may conclude that his wiser course is to find out, if he can, the sources of existing vitality and to strengthen them by every means in his power. In these lectures I shall do my best to encourage his researches in that direction and in that temper. His primary interest will now be to reinforce the social body at the points which show signs of healthy life: doctoring the centres of disease will become secondary. Nay, he may even entertain the hope that if reform succeeds in the primary aim of reinforcing the general vitality, society will then throw off a good many of the diseases revealed by the pathologists with the minimum of recourse to drugs, stimulants, or artificial limbs—whether constitutional or revolutionary.

IV

THE THREEFOLD AIM OF CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP

THE gentleman of Dr. Johnson's time whose aspirations to become a philosopher were defeated by his tendency to be cheerful, would certainly find himself ill at ease among the social philosophers of our own day. On the whole, they are a gloomy generation, and, if we may judge by the immense circulation of their gloomiest productions, such as Oswald Spengler's "Downfall of the West," the public seems to take a gloomy pleasure in listening to what they have to say. And the same holds true of fiction, deeply coloured as this now is by the prevailing social philosophy. Dickens, whose cheerful belief in an overruling Providence (natural to an age when England was growing rich by leaps and bounds) led him so to arrange the "accidents" of his plots as to bring on a happy ending to most of them, is now read only as a back number, while Mr. Hardy, whose "accidents" are contrived for the purpose of spoiling everything, is a

"Youth's Companion" wherever good literature is in request. As "philosophies of accident" neither of these methods is above criticism, the strings of "accident" in each case being obviously pulled by the designing will of the artist; but for some reason or another, for which, perhaps, the social philosophers of the time are not without responsibility, Mr. Hardy's maleficent accidents are more congenial to our present temper than the beneficent variety favoured by Dickens. Mr. Hardy's novels and Spengler's "Downfall of the West" are pervaded by the same atmosphere of coming doom, the former working in minute particulars, the latter in vast generalizations. In both we may discern the social pathologist busy at his somewhat depressing task.

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And yet we can ill afford to be low-spirited in these days, and are certainly treading a dangerous path when we indulge in low spirits—and some of us do—as an intellectual luxury or a theme for eloquence. For the mighty instruments of good and evil which science is now placing in our hands are such as can only be rightly used by a high-spirited, good-tempered, cheerful and valiant generation. One trembles to think of the fate in store for humanity if these tre-

mendous forces should fall into the hands of an age made timid and nervous about itself by the revelations of social pathology, deprived of self-confidence by morbid self-analysis masquerading as psychology, deceived into a factitious gloom by literary exploiters of the dark side of life (always a profitable occupation), and believing it "the correct thing" for an enlightened spirit to get up depressed every morning and go to bed despairing every night.

In urging you to base your study of citizenship on what is healthy in the social organism rather than on what is diseased, and to remember always that there are goods to be developed as well as evils to be remedied, and that the likeliest path to the remedy of the evils, many and monstrous as they are, is the development of the goods—in all this I am aware that such procedure is not fashionable among political operators in these days. For the fashion now is to mend the world by "putting a stop"—words that have space-thinking on the face of them—to the evils and misdemeanours which mar the spectacle of social life and obviously need "stopping." A "stop" must be put to war, to competition, to acquisitiveness, to the drinking of alcohol (as in America), and so on through an endless list of evils for which prohibition of one sort

or another seems the only remedy. Many of my young and ardent friends, when closely questioned on the matter, have revealed to me the interesting fact that their minds, as reformers, are dominated by this notion of "putting stops" to things that need "stopping." They are prohibitionists after their kind.

But a society or civilization of which the best you can say is that a "stop" has been put to all its evils, by due majority voting or suchlike, is not, in itself, a very exhilarating phenomenon. We all know how, at a certain stage in the development of morals, represented by the Ten Commandments, the method of enforcement was to erect a "thou shalt not" at the dangerous points, as a means of "putting a stop" to such things as theft, murder, adultery, covetousness, and lying; and how, at a later stage and under higher guidance, these "thou shalt *nots*" were displaced in favour of "thou *shalts*." Now, what I am concerned to recommend to you here is a precisely similar change from negative to positive in our conception of civic duty—those "duties and responsibilities of the citizen" to which the Stevenson lecturer is enjoined to address himself. I would urge you to conceive your civic duty, to begin with, in terms of giving impulse to goods rather than in terms of putting "stops" to evils. Im-

pulse-giving is pre-eminently the time-thinker's way of going about the business, as stop-putting is the space-thinker's. I feel sure that impulse-giving to goods, if rightly directed, will achieve much in the way of stop-putting to evils which the professional stop-putter fails to achieve. Such, in broadest outline, is the social ethic I would recommend to the citizen.

It assumes, of course, that enough goods are in existence for the citizen to practise upon. And that may possibly expose our ethic to the devastating charge of optimism—now become a term of reproach.

But what is an optimist? And what is a pessimist? An optimist, it has been truly said, is one who sees an opportunity in every difficulty. A pessimist is one who sees a difficulty in every opportunity. Well, there is no concealing the fact that the difficulties in the way of constructive citizenship are enormous. I invite you to construe them as opportunities. Man's nature, as I have learned to understand it, is designed throughout for the conquest of great difficulties, and man is never so truly himself as when he is engaged in grappling with them. His nature, when rightly understood, abhors an easy life, and for the same reason that nature in general abhors a vacuum. The tasks of constructive citizenship are eminently suited to a being

whose nature is designed for the conquest of great difficulties.

Where, then, shall we look for the secret of the social strength, for the sources of this amazing vitality in virtue of which our civilization, notwithstanding the diseases that weaken it, the maladies it suffers from, and the crushing burden of social evils it has to bear, manages to maintain itself as a going concern from day to day, so that the "massed millions" of citizens, whether they live well or ill, are somehow enabled to live and to go on living as social beings? For this continued life of society, this inexhaustible "go," which carries it over obstacles so immense and through calamities so destructive, is after all the outstanding and astonishing fact. How shall we explain it?

The answer lies in the obvious, but sometimes forgotten, fact that human societies are organizations in *time*, carrying within them the gathered momentum of centuries, it may be of millenniums. Their strength is to be measured, not alone by the extent of their power as measured in space, but far more, by their depth in time; not alone by the number of voters composing the electorate, but far more by the habits and traditions the said voters inherit from the past; not alone by the spread of their branches under the firmament, but far

more, by the length, tenacity, and ramifications of the roots they strike into the earth. Were it true—and we sometimes argue as though it were—that society is composed exclusively of the human individuals who happen to be alive at the moment, the space conception of it, it would swiftly perish, like a tree that has been torn from its roots; nor is there any social system devisable by the wit of man that could keep it alive. The living present is nothing without the living past, and the greatest majority that ever got recorded at the polls would be a helpless minority were it not that forces, created by the wills of the buried generations, are there for it to draw upon. Even an organization that is world *wide* will not last if world *width* is all that it can claim. It must be world *deep* as well—a point for the League of Nations to consider.

Unless we bear in mind this fact of gathered (and gathering) momentum, this drive from the past incessantly reinforced by the efforts of the present, the continued life of society, in face of the "diseases" that afflict it, becomes an unintelligible phenomenon. Remembering it, we shall understand that and much else. It will help us to a right perspective in our approach to the whole question of social reform. It will teach us that social reform is not an operation per-

formed on a stationary object, named society, that merely exists in space, but on a moving, changing organism that functions in time. It will save us from the common mistake of regarding society as though it were a ship laid up in dry dock to be reconstructed or repaired by theorists at their leisure, and remind us, rather, that we are dealing with a ship under full steam in the midst of the perilous waters.

That, obviously makes a difference to what is possible. Methods of reform, mechanical adjustments, and such like, which were practicable enough when society had the simple structure of a boat becalmed on the water, are not to be practised when it has acquired the magnitude and complexity of an ocean liner and is driving through the storm at thirty knots an hour. Even the most infatuated mechanist must admit so much. And the reminder is the more salutary for the hint it gives the reformer that he, too, is a passenger in the ship and not a mere spectator observing it from the shore, dependent for his very life on the maintenance of the driving power it carries within itself. Let him have a care what he attempts in the reforming line, or he and his "programme" will presently be found at the bottom of the sea, along with the rest of us. The world of our day, in spite of "improved com-

munications," is not easier to reform than the world of a century ago. By virtue of its vastly increased and ever increasing momentum it has become more difficult to reform, and needs wiser and stronger men to reform it.

Such, in its most general form, is the answer that time-thinking gives to our question—how is it that civilization, in spite of the appalling diseases which social pathology reveals in it (and I accept the revelation) manages to survive at all? It survives by reason of the driving power that is in it, the "go" that history has given it, the accumulated momentum of an age-long past.

But is this momentum to be thought of as a mere brute force? Or can we analyze it to elements of human significance, and so assure ourselves that what we have here to do with is not brute force but human vitality—the vitality of man's intelligence, of his creativeness, of his loyalty, of his moral will? I think we can.

History shows—and history has no deeper lesson to teach—that the institutions that *last* longest, that link human beings together in the most abiding and beneficent fellowship, are those that rest upon a *fiduciary basis,* those that embody a tradition of trustworthy

service, those that gather to their service a continuous succession of honourable and loyal men—an historic church, for example, a university, a scientific fraternity, the medical and legal professions, and, in the field of economics, such institutions as banking and mutual insurance. These are the institutions which, while not exempt from decay, last longest, gathering vitality as they go, becoming not weaker with age, but stronger and more beneficent, in contrast with institutions that rest on force or coercion and begin to decay from the moment they are set up. There is a correlation between the lastingness of an institution and the fiduciary character of its service.

Guided by that hint I will now proceed to specify what seem to me the three main elements in the staying power of human society.

We find the first in the immense capacity for skilful work which civilized man has acquired and passed on down the course of the ages. We may call it the capacity of his intelligence. The second, in the possession, by large numbers of men and women, of certain high qualities, in virtue of which they act faithfully as *trustees* for the general interest and in the accumulating traditions that gather round their service. We may call this the moral capacity of the citizen. The

third, in the creation and continuous improvement of certain scientific methods for harmonizing conflicting claims and for turning human relations, which would otherwise be mutually destructive, into relations of mutual helpfulness. We may call it man's organizing power.

Skill, trusteeship, scientific method, these three, which are obviously related to one another, indicate the main sources of strength in modern civilization. Taken together, they constitute a magnificent endowment deeply based in the past, maintaining the civilization of the present, and inviting development in the interests of a better civilization yet to be.

With these words before us, skill, trusteeship, and science, we discern three converging lines on which constructive citizenship will operate. It will aim at the development of skill in every variety of socially valuable occupation, at the training and multiplication of trustees, at the perfecting of the scientific methods by which conflicting and dangerous interests can be brought into harmony and oppositions transformed into co-operations.

The three aims obviously involve one another. For example, constructive citizenship achieves nothing by scientific methods of organization unless at the same

time it can produce trustees to administer those methods when created; perhaps less than nothing, because scientific methods are the most dangerous of all when the administration of them falls into untrustworthy or incompetent hands. Nor is the skill of the worker of value to society unless the worker make use of his skill as a trustee for the common good. As to science, we have often been warned of late of the dangers attending the progress of it; of how discoveries that might be turned into beneficent channels are liable to be used as instruments of destruction. Exactly the same is true of social science. The more perfect we make our social organization, whether in the form of the scientific state or any other, the more essential it becomes that the fiduciary spirit should be operative through the entire body of the citizens. The training and multiplication of social trustees is the pivot of the entire operation before us.

Nor is the attempt at all a hopeless one. The basis for it already exists. In all departments of our social life—in politics, in finance, in commerce, in labour, in education—there is, at this moment, a significant multitude of men and women who are performing fiduciary functions in an admirable manner. There are traitors also; but these sinister exceptions leave us the

more impressed by the general faithfulness. I do not hesitate to say that of all the phenomena industrial civilization displays, the most significant and the most encouraging is the presence in all professions and ranks of industry of the type I am here indicating—of persons who show that they can be relied upon in positions of high and delicate trust, without being watched, spied upon, or policed. The capacity of industrial civilization to evolve this type of citizen is perhaps the best thing that can be said in its favour. There is no reason why the type should not be multiplied to any extent that may be needed.

From all this it follows that constructive citizenship has a strong leaning to educational methods. The development of skill, the training and multiplication of trustees, the perfecting of scientific method and organization are all enterprises in education. They call for a new study of the meaning of education, of its relation to the work of mankind, and of the connection between work and play, between labour and leisure—all of which we shall consider more fully later on.

It follows also that constructive citizenship does not confine itself to purely political methods. There is a large class of institutions in society, mostly economic, which depend for their just working, not primarily on

legislative enactment, but on the personal loyalty and faithfulness of those entrusted with their management. We may call them fiduciary institutions, scientifically constructed and thoroughly businesslike in their mode of operation, but resting ultimately on good faith rather than on law. Constructive citizenship looks largely to that type of institution—the fiduciary type—as a means of promoting solidarity and co-operation. It aims at a world-wide application of fiduciary methods—for they alone are world-deep—taking its point of departure from fiduciary institutions already in existence, and seeking to extend these in such a manner as to cover the dangerous tensions that now exist between rival nations, rival classes, and rival interests. Scientific organization under fiduciary control, based on a suitable training of the citizen in competence and trustworthiness, is the summary aim.

This last is, perhaps, the most important of all the questions we shall have to consider. What is the type of citizen that our training aims at? Constructive citizenship answers the question by one word—the word "trustee." The type of citizen our civilization is calling for, and without which it cannot be maintained, is the type which accepts a vocation, whatever that may chance to be, as a trust committed to it, and which can

be trusted, and freely trusted, to carry out the work it undertakes with the utmost skill and fidelity the case admits of. The opposite type, which needs to be coerced into doing its duty, which neglects its duty unless social pressure or legal penalties compel the performance of it, may have sufficed when the citizen was regarded as a "subject" of the ruling power, but is utterly inadequate to maintain the life of a free community composed of responsible individuals and dependent on the willingness of each individual to do his best. Our civilization, if it is to survive at all, must produce and train a different type of personnel from that of the unwilling "subject" who needs to be coerced, and must produce it not in isolated instances only, but as a characteristic of citizenship in general.

Think, then, of some person known to you—and such persons are known to most of us—in whose hands you would feel your own interests to be perfectly safe, a person incapable of betraying your trust, or exploiting it to his own advantage, and you have before you the very ideal of citizenship which all methods of education and systems of "civics" should aim at realizing; no man to be accounted "educated" unless he be a man whom his neighbours can trust, the type needed, not only in the high places of power, but in every rank

and level of industrial activity, in every workshop or office where goods are produced or services exchanged. Difficult—who doubts it?—but not to be called impossible until a resolute attempt has been made to train citizenship on those lines, which has not been done as yet.

We have now before us the threefold object of constructive citizenship as I propose to expound it here: first, to develop the citizen's capacity for skilful work; second, to extend the use of fiduciary methods in dealing with all the conditions under which work is done; third, to train the fiduciary type of character in all ranks of the community.

In pursuing this threefold object we take our departure from things as they are, from institutions as they are, and from men and women as they are. The ideals we deal with are not new inventions which have to be imposed on a reluctant civilization. They are not patches of new cloth for mending an old and rotten fabric. They are ideals which industrial society has already acknowledged, which industrial men have shown their capacity for realizing, and which may be seen to-day in actual operation at numberless points of industrial and professional activity, in the shop and the factory, in the office and the bank, in mines and shipyards, on

railways and on ships. Beneath the businesslike character of these familiar operations we may discern a certain ideal tendency making in the direction of mutual service and humane relationships. The object before us is to strengthen that tendency, by making it more conscious of itself, and by rendering its actual operations not less but more businesslike than they are.

A word that is being freely used to-day in another connection, may serve to make this clearer—the word "sublimation." Sublimation is the process by which a thing of low value may be transfigured into a thing of high value by developing the tendencies that are latent within it. Sublimation applied to social conditions is the characteristic business of constructive citizenship. It sees opportunities for sublimation where social pathology points to disease, and the space-thinker can only cry, "Stop that."

And now to sum up. Constructive citizenship is the citizenship that constructs; or, if I must pick my words carefully, the citizenship that creates. It creates out of things as they are with all their imperfections. It looks round on social life and picks out the promising elements, leaving the unpromising ones aside for the time being, for the pessimists to enlarge upon. It pitches,

for example, on the capacity for skilful work lying undeveloped in the millions of the people, and says: "Here is a grand asset; here is an element we can make something of; let us see what can be done." It observes certain beneficent methods in operation, and says: "Let us extend the beneficence of those methods. Let us make their operation world-wide and world-deep."

Constructive citizenship has no panacea for the ills of society, which society must either take or perish for not taking. It has no summary formula for mending the world. World-mending is not the vocation of constructive citizenship. It aims rather to make than to mend, and to cure by vitalizing. It is a diligent searcher-out of the vital spots in society, of the spots where healthy life is seen to be stirring. All its hopes are centred there, all its efforts directed to strengthening the life that is there stirring. It does not ask for the rapid and simultaneous conversion of the world to any social theory, knowing that until the general vitality is greatly increased there will be no effective agreement about anything that really matters. It has little use for oratory as a means of reforming the world, but much use for skill, science, high character, and silent heroism. Its efforts are not spectacular, nor its

hopes extravagant. It is content to assume that a moderate degree of happiness is the utmost the human race can ever attain to, believing the human enterprise on this planet to be still worth while even when not exuberantly happy. On the question as to whether society is radically diseased, constructive citizenship holds its peace, but points to the reassuring fact that society is alive after many thousand years of troubled existence. The philosophy of it may be summed into this: "Let us make the best of things as they are."

V

SOCIAL VALOUR

In the last lectures I called your attention to the tendency of our time to give the conception of social disease a dominating place in political thought, a tendency which some of the best writers encourage and the worst invariably exploit. I offer the opinion that this has been overdone, and that it has the evil effect of lowering the vitality of the social atmosphere, of turning it into the atmosphere of the sick-room—not a good condition at a time when enterprises of great pith and moment, such as the League of Nations, are summoning us to attempt them.

Yet the fault I am venturing to find with the pathological mode of statement is not that of exaggerating the responsibilities of the citizen. It leads to a misconception of their nature which is, at the same time, an underestimate of their scope and depth. The intention, no doubt, is to exalt the importance of social science, which is, in itself, a good intention; but it misconceives social science by making it essentially *thera-*

peutic in application. So conceived, the Art of Citizenship is reduced to an affair of *curing* and *mending*, while its creative aspect, which is far more important, is apt to be lost sight of. As well might you train an architect on the assumption that his function is the repair of dilapidated buildings. We represent the duties of the citizen, and the training he needs for them, as easier than they really are when we define them in terms of learning to diagnose and to treat the various diseases of the body politic.

Incidentally, also, that mode of statement leads us to pay too much attention to what is wrong with other people and too little to what is wrong with ourselves. For the citizen is not, primarily, a doctor of his neighbours' ills; no feebler conception could be given of his vocation, of his rights and duties, than that which encourages him to think so. Yet who will deny that this conception is widely prevalent among the social operators of the present day; and who can fail to see that wasteful strife is the inevitable consequence of it—the strife between those, on the one hand, who are ambitious to play the part of doctors, and those, on the other, who will fight to the last ditch rather than be treated as patients by tyrants masquerading as physicians?

The essential point, lost sight of in this controversy between would-be doctors and would-not-be patients, is the *dangerousness of the enterprise in which all the citizens are engaged together.* Our civilization has now reached a point of advance, which measures the degree of its peril, when its survival depends on the willingness of the masses of the citizens in all nations to stand loyally *together* as comrades in a great adventure, "one equal temper of heroic hearts" inspiring them. The League of Nations is the symbol of that outstanding fact. Co-operation, both world-wide and world-deep, has become the supreme necessity of the present age, the "downfall" of civilization being simply the alternative to that. There is no "party," however strong, there is no "ism," however enlightened, that can bear the burden and direct the fortunes of the modern world, or of any great nation within it. To meet these conditions something more is needed than social science, something more than ability to diagnose and to treat the maladies of the body politic. Valour is needed, valour on an immense scale, valour with a united front bound together in mutual loyalty, and so made world-deep as well as world-wide. The "progress" of civilization does not consist, as some would have it, in gradual advance to the point of safety. It

consists much rather in a growing perception of the common risk and the growing willingness to face it *together*. The unity of civilization is the unity of that high resolve.

I would urge you to beware of social doctrines, and of religious doctrines, too, for there are such, which obscure the necessity of high courage, individual and collective. I would urge you to interpret the duties of your citizenship, primarily and essentially, as the duties of men and women who are called upon to make a valiant contribution to the work of their generation, by taking their share in the dangers and sufferings of the common enterprise as well as in the fruits and the profits of it. Be prepared, I would say, for high demands on your courage, your resolution, and your skill. Except as the valiant spirit inspires it constructive citizenship is nothing at all. Let the training of the citizen, in all its stages, be conceived of accordingly.

A large measure of danger is inseparable from the good life, whether in the social or the individual form. The good life, in either form, is not merely difficult (as Aristotle insisted it must be) in the sense that it means hard *work*, but difficult in the deeper sense also that it means hard fighting, with the possibility of frustration and defeat always at hand. From the point

of view of those who value most their happiness or their skins the good life cannot be described as "safe" either for individuals or for societies. By its very nature it is dangerous. Nietzsche's revolt against the current morality of his time seems to me, in this respect, to be fully justified, and it remains to be carried into the domain of social ethics.

The dangers of the good life are to be reckoned evils only when we allow them to alarm us unduly or when we run away from them. A condition that we may justly call diseased is created whenever the dangers frighten us into distraction and deprive us of our resolution and self-mastery—for fear is a disease of the human soul and never so deadly as when the soul of a community becomes infected by it.

As I see the matter, the meeting-point of danger and courage is the growing-point of the social virtues—as perhaps it is also of the individual's. The Comte de Ségur relates of Napoleon that once in the middle of a battle—I think it was the Battle of Borodino—while he was deeply studying a map of the battlefield, an excited aide-de-camp came galloping up to him with the news that the line was giving way and the enemy breaking in. Napoleon turned upon him fiercely: "Go away!" he said, "you disturb my calm." In the same

way a valiant civilization will not allow itself to be "rattled" when writers like Oswald Spengler fill the air with the cry of impending "downfall." The condition of an advanced civilization is always critical. And this condition we must learn to regard not as a doom but as a challenge, and as a good rather than an evil. For we men are fearfully and wonderfully made. The day of crisis is the birthday of our virtues.

The thing, then, is no accident. In virtue of conditions deep as the universe, civilization is always facing a crisis; always has done so, always will do so; in which respect it resembles religion. Civilization, like religion, maintains its values only so long as the valour of mankind responds to the growing tensions of an evolving world; for there is a connection, deeper than etymology, between the values that are in the universe and the valour that is in the soul. By no conceivable "measures," remedial or otherwise, can civilized society attain a position where it can "dig itself in" under any conditions of perfect safety. "Dug in" under any conditions whatsoever, the fibre of the race would inevitably decay, and the pleasanter the stagnation was, the more swiftly would time turn it to putrefaction. Nor do "the stagnant civilizations of the East," which are not all as "stagnant" as they

appear to be on the surface, prove anything to the contrary.

"Safety" and "progress" are ill-assorted ideas. What a progressive society has to expect is not a gradual diminution of the forces that oppose its "happiness" or its "welfare" until nothing remains to endanger them, but an increase in the opposition proportioned to the value of the "happiness" or the "welfare" attained. It should never be forgotten that the same "law of evolution" which carries the best to higher levels operates in like manner on the second best; and the second best, as everybody knows, is always the most active opponent of the best, the opposition of the "worst" being a trifle in comparison. And, besides all that, the life of a progressive society exposes itself at every step of its advance to the impact of new forces, not under the control of man, which have their origin in the unfathomable depths of the universe; not under his control, and yet capable of being converted by his valour into forces that work on his side. Again, involved in these conditions, there is the ever present danger, inseparable from the nature of man as a free agent, inseparable from the drama of history as free agents must always play it, that traitors may be found in the camp. The richer society becomes

in goods material and spiritual, the more difficult it is to ensure their just distribution and the easier for the thief to capture them under the plea that when once they are his he will "distribute" them justly. Along with this growing appeal to the predatory instincts of human nature there goes a parallel development in the art of sophistry, whereby the spoiler, when accused by his conscience or his fellowmen, can always disguise his motives from himself and from others under the cloak of an ethical terminology. I reckon this among the subtlest and not the least deadly of the perils an advanced civilization has to face. The revolt of Lucifer in Heaven is the legendary example of it, as the Great War is the historical example, the magnitude of that conflict corresponding, on the one hand, to the value of the booty which the spoiler hoped to make his own, and, on the other, to the highly elaborated sophistry which enabled him to give an ethical colour to his motives. We are reminded of the answer given by the devil when somebody—I suppose a disciple of Herbert Spencer—had explained to him that under the beneficent working of the law of evolution social equilibrium would presently be attained and his reign come to an end. "You forget," said the devil, "that I, too, am evolving."

Reluctant, as most of us are, to learn wisdom from so questionable a source there is no denying that the devil's answer points to a vital truth which more respectable philosophers sometimes overlook. Along with the process which we call the "development of the moral ideal," there goes on in society a parallel development of the forces which oppose the realization of it and challenge the valour of its champions. These are not necessarily evil forces; indeed, we misconceive the nature of our warfare if we name them evil because we find them resisting the ideals we would affirm. As often as not the forces in opposition to the highest represent a degree of enlightenment and of morality not much below the highest itself; they are those "second bests" I mentioned a moment ago. But the highest has to resist them, as they are resisting it; and the tensions that thus arise, from the conflict of goods that are almost on a level, are among the acutest our civilization has to sustain. They are repeated at every stage of the moral hierarchy from the best to the worst; repeated and transmitted through the social fabric as a whole, the moral life of society deriving its vitality from the valour that sustains them all and affirms itself by means of them.

These considerations preclude us from supposing that

the "unity of civilization," when once attained, would leave mankind confronted with an easy "walk-over" for the rest of its pilgrimage through time, so that history thenceforward would be a mere record—and a rather dull one, surely—of a happy world-holiday from toil and strife, from suffering and catastrophe. In a united civilization the quest for ease, and for the "happiness" supposed to attend it, would be abandoned in favour of something more worth having. For ease and happiness, whatever value they may otherwise possess, are not the conditions of unity in human life; as objects of desire they are active sources of division; and though it is conceivable that a weak and devitalized society might concentrate what strength it had on the "production" of these pleasant commodities the "distribution" of them would inevitably produce discord. We have no means for measuring the exact values of our own "happiness" or of our neighbours', and none, therefore, of ascertaining whether our portion of it is "equitable" in relation to theirs.

Indeed, if we are seeking for a ground on which civilization could unite, the comon endurance of pain would serve the purpose better than the common enjoyment of pleasure. The former appeals to what is strong and steadfast in human nature, the latter to

what is weak and unstable. Moreover, we may be well assured that until the world ends, or suffering and death are abolished meanwhile, the common endurance of pain, which is another name for the bearing of one another's burdens, will be a necessary element in the social ideal. At every stage of human progress, low or high, the willingness of men to suffer together remains the indispensable condition of being glorified together.

The silly cult of happiness, which still keeps a hold on the general mind, unshaken by philosophical exposure, and turns whoever takes it in earnest into an imbecile or a nuisance, obscures all this. Among the products of a sickly idealism none is more repulsive than the picture of human destiny as a universal "soft job" with "happiness" evenly distributed by the automatic equity of a social system. The unity of civilization does not lie in that direction. The "job" that awaits the human race is a hard one, and destined to become continuously harder as the ages advance. The only "unity" which civilization can ever attain is the unity which springs from a clear perception of the dangers and difficulties of the common task backed by a common resolution to get the work done with the utmost excellence it admits of.

Of all the truths our generation needs to learn I know of none more urgent than this. I would make it basic in the training of the citizen. Questions of pleasure and pain will fall into their proper places when the citizen has taken to heart, as our ill-instructed democracies have not yet done, that his right to share in the common good is strictly conditioned by his willingness to share in the common pain. On no other basis is human co-operation possible. A world where everybody is entitled to a share of his neighbours' profits, but leaves him to face his losses as a private discipline; where the pleasures, so to speak, are socialized and the pains individualized, certainly strikes the mind as a somewhat one-sided conception of the co-operative commonwealth of mankind. Yet it seems to be popular. "On the lines of my policy," says the demagogue —I am quoting from a recent political speech—"you have everything to gain and nothing but your miseries to lose. Put your votes in the ballot-box and the thing will be done!" Attractive proposal, but claptrap pure and simple. Compare the following:

"There is a city builded and set in a plain country and full of all good things;

But the entrance thereof is narrow, and is set in a dangerous place to fall, having a fire on the right hand, and on the left a deep water;

And there is only one path between them both, even between the fire and the water, so small that there could but one man go there at once.

If this city now be given unto a man for an inheritance, if the heir pass not the danger set before him, how shall he receive his inheritance?

And I said, It is so, Lord. Then said he unto me, Even so is Israel's portion."

This, I need hardly say, is not a quotation from a recent political speech, but from the seventh chapter of the Second Book of Esdras.

VI

MISLEADING TERMS

THERE is a close correlation between the degree of *unity* that society exhibits at a given moment and the general vigour of its moral vitality. Schemes of organization effect little or nothing if the staying power needed to maintain the organic relationship be absent or if the common will fall into laziness and self-indulgence. For unity, whenever the human will is in question, is not merely a condition to be attained, but, far more, an activity to be continually exercised. Here, again, the time-thinker's method is essential. The civilization that would be united must be prepared to win its unity afresh every day. There is no automatic delivery of the goods.

Obvious as such truths must be to those who have acquaintance with the realities of human life, so obvious, indeed, that some may think it unnecessary to dwell upon them, they are greatly obscured by a multitude of phrases that have now become the stock-in-trade of social discussion. Thorough criticism of this

phraseology, especially that part of it which reformers make use of, is much needed in such studies as those which now engage us. Certainly there is no field of thought, not even theology, where our minds are more apt to get bemused under the influence of mere words.

Even "social science," as a general name for this class of studies, has its dangers. It has led many persons to suppose that there exists somewhere a body of exact knowledge and demonstrated formulæ, a sufficient mastery of which would enable its possessors to manage mankind on infallible principles—a delusion harmless enough were it not that it opens the way for quacks and scientific blackguards of every denomination to set up as Messiahs, practise on the credulity of the public and play havoc with the social inheritance. Needless to say the body of knowledge which goes by this name has neither the unity nor the exactitude of a positive science, and is not to be applied to human affairs as though it had without serious consequences to the body politic.

Perhaps we ought to credit our social pathologists with the perception of this. By construing social science as *pathology,* a notoriously inexact science, they show at least their sense of its inexactitude, thereby warning us not to expect too much when pathologists

become kings—a warning we should do well to heed. For social science, used as a short cut to "health and happiness," as a safe path to a world where we have "everything to gain and nothing but our miseries to lose" is not only futile but highly mischievous. Apart from the social valour that is needed to sustain it, unsupported by a common will vigorous enough to practise self-denial and face the discipline of self-mastery, social science may even prove the undoing of mankind —like the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden. "In the day that ye eat thereof ye shall surely die." The "downfall" of any civilization which has developed social science at the expense of social valour, so that the first is made to do duty for the second, may be confidently predicted. The "scientific state" erected on that basis, or even Utopia itself, would collapse immediately.

Another term of common usage urgently in need of criticism from the same point of view is "self-government"—the watchword of democracy. There is no magic in self-government, no short cut to the objects of human desire. Over against the scientific simplicity of it there stands the moral difficulty of it, the theoretical statement of the principle giving no indication of the dangers that await its application, and perhaps

even obscuring them. No citizen can play an efficient part in the self-government of his country unless the part he so plays reflects a control acquired over *himself*—a point that needs to be urgently pressed home in these days of enormous electorates and universal franchise. When this aspect of the matter is neglected, and it tends to be so, self-government turns itself into the tyranny of majorities—a very different thing. And this in turn leads to "the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is not a method of *self*-government at all, but a method of governing *other people;* to wit, the minority dictated to, thereby ensuring a permanent body of rebels waiting an opportunity to turn the tables on their oppressors.

The desire to take part in the government of other people, especially when their proceedings seem to threaten our own interests, is no doubt a clamant force in human nature. But extensions of the franchise made as concessions to that desire are not in the direction of self-government, which demands, before all else, that no man (or woman) shall be given a vote if he is unable or unwilling to govern *himself*. In this, I cannot but think, lies the true test of the citizen's qualification to take his part as a graduated member of a self-governing community—in this, and not in any

proficiency he (or she) may have attained in the social sciences which enable him to "diagnose and treat" the diseases of the body politic, valuable as such attainments may be when combined with the primary qualification. A self-governing community composed of citizens individually expert in the social sciences and eager to apply their knowledge to the government of their neighbours, but individually incompetent to govern themselves, may be dismissed at once as a Bedlam conception. Yet it seems to be a popular notion, while some of our philosophers, by the strong emphasis they lay on social science as the substance of the citizen's training and the slight emphasis they lay on this other thing—amounting here and there to complete oversight—come dangerously near to giving it their support.

This explains, perhaps, why democracy so often degenerates into the rule of the demagogue. For demagogy is the art of persuading the citizens they are governing themselves, which is a difficult operation and possible only to a high degree of social valour, when, in reality, they are being led by the nose to the claptrap tune of "everything to gain and nothing but misery to lose." Never is self-government so fatally misconstrued as when we thus represent it as a short

and easy cut to the land of our dreams. It were truer to define it as government of the valiant, by the valiant, for the valiant, "having a fire on the right hand and on the left a deep water"—the best government for the strong, the loyal, and the hard-working, but the worst possible for the weak, the mutinous, the predatory, the self-indulgent, and the slack. Which seems to me a much needed emendation of Abraham Lincoln's famous definition.

In this connection it is interesting to note the change which our age has witnessed in the popular conception of leadership, a change much lamented by Carlyle in an earlier generation, but grown more definite and conspicuous since then.

If we study the epic literature of the ancient world, of which the Bible affords some of the finest examples, one of the first facts to strike us is the pre-eminence of courage among the qualifications looked for in the leader of men. No other qualities, however brilliant and dazzling, were acknowledged as sufficient unless this was present as the foundation of them all. Skill in oratory, for example, which has now become a sure passport to public leadership, both in politics and religion, counted for very little unless the orator were the kind of man who was willing to take his life in

his hands at any moment and able to inspire his followers—by his example rather than his eloquence—to do the same. The leaders of the old world, as depicted in this literature, were sometimes orators, but, if they were so, always brief, pragmatic and imperative, ceasing to talk as soon as there was nothing more to be done. Of scientific equipment, which we can recognize as such, they had next to none and were not expected to have very much. Their chief qualification was that when work had to be done or death confronted they could do it better than their followers, and were quicker and steadier, though only by a little, in facing the risks of it. Such was the old conception of a leader. We encounter it not only in the heroes of the epic but in the historical pioneers to whom we owe the foundations of our liberty and of our culture. To bring off an event like Magna Charta or the first House of Commons without advertisement, publicity, the applause of public meetings, the assistance of the Press and of the limelight, and when social science was as yet unborn; to launch the protestant Reformation without the aid of a single textbook on the psychology of religion, or the Revival of Learning with the Dark Ages immediately behind the revivalists—these were very considerable achievements, betokening, both in

those who led the way and in those who followed, a degree of courage equal to the most daring experiments. If it may be said without disrespect to social science, which I am far from intending, the deficiency of the great pioneers in that particular does not seem to have greatly impaired the value of what they have bequeathed to us, nor to discredit their claim to be reckoned as leaders of mankind.

In our modern estimates the relative importance of courage and scientific equipment, as measured by our stout forefathers, seems to be reversed. Our modern leader is no longer one to whom we look, whether in religion or politics, to lead us forward on a dangerous adventure, "with a fire on the right hand and on the left a deep water," taking our lives in our hands as he, manifestly, takes his, but one rather who performs his functions, thanks to his equipment in social science, by finding for us *a safe way*, where—if I may quote the foolish words once more—we have "everything to gain and nothing but our miseries to lose." And along with this change in the conception of our leader there goes, of course, a parallel change in the conception of ourselves as his followers and of what following him involves. We think of ourselves no longer as his comrades on the battlefield, but as his disciples, if it is a

case of religion, or his "supporters" at the next election, if it be a case of politics. We become his followers by adopting his particular "solution of the problem," putting our vote in the ballot-box accordingly, and waiting for our beatitude to come out at the other end of the machine.

The prominence in social discussion—and, indeed, in all the discussions of our time—of the two words I have just mentioned, "problem" and "solution," affords a striking indication of this changed temper of mind. I am informed by philologists that "the rise to power" of these two words, as the dominating terms of public debate, is an affair of the last two centuries and especially of the nineteenth, having synchronized, so they say, with a parallel "rise to power" of the word "happiness"—for reasons which doubtless exist and would be interesting to discover. Like "happiness," our two terms, "problem" and "solution," are not to be found in the Bible—a point which gives to that wonderful literature a singular charm and cogency, and may be commended to modern theologians as showing that none of these terms is essential to the launching into the world of a great religion. In these days, however, "problem" and "solution" have broken the seclusion which once confined them to their true home

in the mathematical and physical sciences, and become the stock terms of every man's vocabulary, household words whose sound is hardly less familiar, though much less significant, than the ticking of the clock, so that no surprise is caused if on opening the newspaper we find, as I found the other day, a reference in one paragraph to the "problem of bobbed hair," and in another to the "problem of civilization."

Applied in this indiscriminate way to anything that happens to turn up, and with a different meaning in each application, the words run a serious danger of losing all meaning whatsoever and becoming mere claptrap. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred they are the thinnest of metaphors, giving to our speech the semblance of exact science, but with no trace of its exactitude. Sometimes we call a thing a "problem" because we have been struck by the queerness of it, and sometimes the word indicates a mere vacuum in the mind. On the whole the influence of these words has been malign, and becomes increasingly so. They have deluded poor men with Messianic expectations, far vainer than their ancient counterpart, which are fatal to steadfast persistence in good workmanship and to well-doing in general, the quack Messiahs of the various "isms" undertaking to get all that done by

turning the handles of their respective machines. Banished entirely from our social vocabulary these words are not likely to be, but their total banishment would be a lesser evil than their present indiscriminate employment. I venture to recommend a more sparing use of them. Let the valiant citizen never be ashamed to confess that he has no "solution of the social problem" to offer to his fellow-men. Let him offer them rather the service of his skill, his vigilance, his fortitude, and his probity. For the matter in question is not, primarily, a "problem," nor the answer to it a "solution."

And now, perhaps, we begin to discern where the connection lies between the modern cult of the "problem" and the parallel cult of "happiness." Both are characteristic products of an age which has overdeveloped its faculty for thinking in space and underdeveloped its faculty for thinking in time. Both illustrate a way of thinking dominated by the space concepts proper to mechanical science.

If you make a *picture,* essentially a space-thinking operation, of a state of society satisfactory to all men, you have no alternative but to paint it in the colours of happiness. You must catch the human race at some happy moment of its existence when the barometer is

at set-fair, summer over all the land, the sun shining, the flowers in bloom, youth in the ascendant, toil suspended, danger absent, death hidden, the lovers loving kindly, the haters nowhere to be seen. All that you will *fix* by your lines and your colours as the kind of thing you would have, the kind of thing that must be perpetuated if you and your neighbours are to be satisfied. Your "solution," in fact, of the social problem! Challenged to solve the problem by producing the picture of a *state* society, a *stasis,* as Aristotle called it, what other kind of picture could you draw, what other kind of *stasis* could you exhibit? You have no alternative. If the life of men in societies is to culminate in any kind of scene, vision, spectacle, "stasis," or fixed state of things, this is the only kind of scene, vision, spectacle, "stasis," or fixed state of things that will satisfy.

Clearly, if human life is to *stop* anywhere, and rest for ever at the point of stoppage, none but a madman would have it stop anywhere else. You have no alternative but to make your picture of the "end" just as pleasant as you can, if picture-painting be the business in hand. So the artist, painting his picture of a battle that lasted all day and passed through innumerable phases and vicissitudes, selects from this flux of change

the moment he considers most significant and *stops* the battle there, nay, begins it there as well, so that we see Trafalgar as though it were for ever at the moment when Nelson has just fallen on the deck of the *Victory* —falsified in respect of time by the very art which makes it true in respect of space. How Keats, apostrophizing the joyous figures on the Grecian Urn, has expressed all this no lover of great poetry will have forgotten:

> "Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
> Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
> Bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
> Though winning near the goal—yet, do not grieve;
> She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
> For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!"

But human life—and it is the same whether we are thinking of the individual or of society—*ends* nowhere, but incessantly moves onward to its *next* phase, to its *next* experience, passing through the moment of highest bliss with the same irresistible drive that carries it through the moment of deepest agony. Hence it is that all these picture-visions of the end leave us with a profound sense of something lacking. As a point of arrival, as a goal we may reach only to find ourselves arrested in it, fixed in it and tied to it, there is nothing on the earth below or in the heaven above

that can content us. What offends us, I think, is not the over-pleasantness of these pictures, the sense of something too sickly sweet, though that is offensive in its way; nor is it that we demand a different sort of "happiness" from that which the picture is offering us; it is rather the notion, implied in all these visions of the "end," that we have been sent into the world to furnish onlookers with an agreeable spectacle. In like manner society, as a mere *scene* of perfect conditions, has no attraction for us, because our life itself is not primarily a scene, but a process. To be consciously alive is to be unfixed in any condition, incessantly moving *out* of every condition we find ourselves *in*, so that it were better to be moving from happiness into misery than not to be moving at all.

If the question be asked, what alternative to "happiness" as our "being's end and aim" can be suggested, and what better substitutes can be found for "problem" and "solution" for giving the right direction to our thoughts, I would answer, in reply to the first question, that the search for an "end" be abandoned in favour of the search for a "beginning." Let us get rid of this botheration about the "end." For the only "end" which the human mind can even tolerate is the end which serves as the beginning of something better

than itself. Short of this, every "end" that our philosophical ingenuity can conceive will be found on examination to be another name for *death,* and death all the more horrible when painted in gay colours to look like life.

As to "problem" and "solution," I am well aware that it were better for a man, in these days, to "speak disrespectfully of the equator" than to turn his back on them. Yet, since the words are unquestionably misleading us, I will venture to suggest that "challenge" as a substitute for "problem," and "experiment" as a substitute for "solution" would often be a change for the better in our social vocabulary. With "challenge" and "experiment" in place of "problem" and "solution," we should be nearer the central truths the citizen needs to learn concerning the real nature of his pilgrimage through the labours, the fiery trials, the fierce tensions, the tragic interruptions and the consummating splendours of an awful and mysterious universe. For our citizenship, as these earthly cities circumscribe it, is not to be understood until we view it in the setting of that immense perspective. I give you "challenge" as the keyword of our cosmic citizenship, and I suggest that, if you listen attentively, you will hear it echoed and repeated in every "social

problem" that confronts you, in every city and workshop, in every church and parliament, in every university and school.

"Experiment" naturally follows as the substitute for "solution." Strictly speaking, no human institution ever passed beyond the experimental stage, its values, whatever they may be, having no assured existence save as they are supported by the continued wisdom, skill, fidelity, and courage of its appointed guardians and administrators. By none of them can the automatic delivery of the goods be guaranteed. They challenge the valiant qualities of the human will, and fall into swift ruin when there is no response.

In all this I have doubtless invested our "rights and duties" with something of a warlike character. I am not averse to doing so. The wars of mankind, hateful as they are, and more hateful as they become with the application of mechanical science to the service of that industry, are, like most of our vices, perverted expressions of man's true vocation and of his right relations to the universe. Not in a shallow swashbuckler sense, but in the profound sense of religion and philosophy, "man is a born fighter," his civilization in his highest forms being only another name for the organized warfare of his spirit.

"Dieser ist ein Mensch geworden,
Und das heisst ein Kämpfer sein."

But a fighter against what? Against whom? Not, I take it, against "dead matter and brute force," not against Nature, thought of as the blind assemblage of such things, but against an Opponent wiser than man who, because of his superior wisdom, because of his superior strategy, perpetually evokes from us the highest we have to give, our beautiful enemy, and, therefore, our friend. Concordant with this is the assertion —not very acceptable, I am afraid, in these days of sentimental religiosity—that love between man and man, rightly exalted as the highest thing in the world, is no mere benevolent impulse to make other people "happy," nor any kind of passionate affair between these others and oneself, but the calm devotion of the loyal warrior to his loyal comrade, which has its source in the loyalty of each to the flag that waves over both—a far higher thing than any bilateral relationship or passion.

No man can abhor more than I do the vile uses to which armies and navies have often been put by ambitious conquerors and military governments. Yet these same armies and navies have great lessons to teach, even to those of us who are not martially minded.

How is it, one may well ask, that we have so far failed to get in our civil life the spirit, the esprit de corps, *the high traditions of the service,* that characterize a fine army? How is it that in armies you can induce men for a few shillings a day and their keep to put out exertions, to face hardships, and to show qualities for which the biggest salary you could offer a man, and the highest wages you could pay him, would be considered an insufficient inducement in civil life? The spirit of cohesion, the spirit of unity, the spirit of comradeship, the spirit of promptitude, the spirit of competence, the spirit of discipline, the spirit of devotion to the cause—are these things for armies and navies alone? Is there no room for them, no call for them in civil life? Are our military and naval colleges the only colleges where *the traditions of the service* can take root? Are they out of place in a university, or even in a primary school? Would it be an absurd thing if a man were to go into business, or into any kind of industrial work, as men go into the army, with the feeling that there is a flag above his head that he must not dishonour, a standard of excellence which he must on no account fall below? Would young men and women make themselves ridiculous if, on choosing their vocation, they regarded themselves as

having *joined the colours?* Ought not every vocation to have its flag? Why should "tempting offers" be so necessary in civil life and not at all necessary in military life? Carlyle asked these questions long ago, and they are still unanswered.

VII

SKILL

Our last subject was Social Valour as the fundamental virtue of the body politic. That, I said, and not "power in diagnosis," should be considered the first condition of a healthy social life. The summing up of the matter would be this: that the best "social system" is one which enlists, and is actuated by, the Greatest Valour of the Greatest Number—valour "in widest commonalty spread," lacking which, as the foundation of everything, there will be little "joy" to dispose of, no matter how theoretically perfect your system may otherwise be.

In the ideal society, as I invite you to conceive it, valour is no departmental virtue, the exclusive property of the "governors" or the "soldiers," a point where I think both Plato and Aristotle tended to go wrong; it is a popular virtue, the outstanding characteristic of the people at large, the active principle of democracy. Theoretical perfection in a social system, far from cancelling the need for valour, calls for the highest

degree of that quality, and effects nothing, or worse than nothing, when there is no response. Except as a system for the organization and discipline of the people's valour, which some call "the common will," your social system has no driving power. In the perfect social system the will-to-work, which is valour at its best, in contrast to the will-to-escape-from-work, which is cowardice at its worst, would be raised by organization and discipline to the pursuit of the highest excellence, and the system would be perfect for that reason. Creative achievement would be the measure of its perfection.

Thus democracy, which is the best form of government when the disciplined valour of the people informs it, becomes precisely the worst under the contrary condition of slackness, disloyalty, indiscipline, and cowardice. It then degenerates, swiftly and inevitably, into mob-rule or into predatory socialism, under the leadership of demagogues, who make it their business to enchant the credulous multitudes with promises of "happiness" that can never be fulfilled. Public opinion is then industriously engineered; arts are elaborated for that purpose, and the majority flattered by the astute or violent minorities that have captured it into believing that it rules. The good that his vote

does to the voter is often dearly paid for in the harm it does to the man voted for.

To be exploited by political adventurers and charlatans is the invariable fate of all weak-willed democracies, the theoretical perfection of the system only serving to facilitate the operation, and the width of the franchise to increase the number of the victims. Nothing, therefore, could be further from the truth than the common habit of regarding the possession of the vote as though it placed all the citizens on a footing of equality. It were truer to say that it introduces a new range of inequalities, by exposing the mass of less intelligent voters to victimization under the subtle arts and fluent oratory of those who are cleverer than themselves. And the process of victimization (much of it unconscious on both sides) becomes all the easier in an age which has fallen under the malign spell of the word "happiness"—the one object of human endeavour in regard to which men in general are the worst judges and the readiest to be made fools of. From the moment that a community of human beings adopts "happiness" as the end and aim of the common life—sure sign that valour is on the wane—the way is open to the enchanter, corruption begins, and the demagogue has things his own way.

In this lecture I am to speak of another quality of our citizenship which stands very closely related to valour, so closely, indeed, that at certain points it almost seems to be another name for the same thing. *Skill* is to be my subject, skill not merely as the prerogative of artists, or even of a special class called skilled labourers, but an essential ingredient of civic virtue and a qualification for citizenship in general.

Whatever degree of skill a man's vocation involves measures also the courage that he needs to play his part as a social unit. To acquire his skill in the first instance he must be strong enough to " scorn delights and live laborious days," and when he has acquired it he must be master of himself throughout the whole process of putting it into operation. He must be the ruler of his body and his spirit, his limbs and his senses must be under command, and he must be ready to defy convention, if need should be. Even the demagogue and the enchanter conform to these conditions, and to that extent the Devil may be given his due, his being the arts, mainly of the lying tongue, which flourish most when the hands of his victims have lost their cunning and the other arts have fallen into decay. For the corruption of the best is ever the worst. Is it not written in the wise old books that the Devil

himself was once an angel and got his education in heaven, graduating with honours, so it would seem, in that high university? How else could he have become the formidable personage he is?

Whatever else a work of art may be there is always daring in the conception of it and self-mastery in the execution of it. None but a high-souled and self-mastering people could have planned or built the Parthenon; none but a hero could have painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. And so through all the lower forms of human labour we shall find that in whatever degree skill enters into it, to that degree is the worker put upon his mettle and the moral qualities that make a man of him called into action. "If you would be a man choose a vocation that puts you on your mettle by challenging your skill" were a wise precept to hold before the eyes of the young citizen from the time he enters the elementary school to his graduation, with honours, in the university. "Beware of soft jobs, and remember the fall of Lucifer" would be a fitting appendix.

Dreadful as the heresy may appear in the eyes of some theologians, I must here interpose to say, as the summing up of the philosophy I have to offer in this connection, that the true vocation of man in the uni-

verse is to exercise skill in one or other of its innumerable varieties—not merely to "work," but to work skilfully—that is, manfully. Without some skill to exercise and devote himself to, man remains a half-grown, stunted and essentially miserable object, irrespective of whether he lives in a palace or a slum, and no conceivable "reconstruction of society" on economic or political lines can make him anything else. Furnish him with skill, train him for some skilled occupation, and you give him his best chance to become a *man*—that is, to get as near as the contradictions of the world permit to being master of his fate and captain of his soul. A "good social system" will do that for the citizen first of all. Nothing else that it can do for him will amount to much if that is not done.

What, then, is skill, and how shall we frame the definition of it? Skill, I take it, is wisdom in action, knowledge completing itself by doing the thing that it knows, reason cultivating itself as will; not a supplement to the pure reason, but the sublimation of the "pure" into the "practical" by a development from within. To reason in its purity, to knowledge as a thing to be valued for its own sake, to wisdom as the sages have glorified her, let due homage be paid; but

let this be added, that till reason has become practical and knowledge acted itself and wisdom grown into a wise doing, it is not *fully there* for any man to reverence. Till that stage is reached it is a thing conceived and curiously fashioned in the secret parts of the earth, but as yet unborn to the light, and the hour has yet to come when it shall walk abroad in majesty and power.

Wisdom, reason, knowledge; let no man suppose that these three, which are one in essence, come into being at the moment they get themselves spoken by a voice or written in a book, vociferated from the house-tops, published in printer's type, preached from a pulpit and learned by rote by those who hear or read. Of all the errors that have blighted education and arrested the spiritual development of man I know of none more noxious than this. To Wisdom, as I hear her in voices or read her in books, my homage shall be conditional only, as to a shadow and promise of good things to come; not till the Word has become incarnate, not till the King's Daughter walks forth from her inner chamber and stands before me alive in the beauty of visible expression shall it come to a love affair on this side. Nay, of religion itself is it

not true that she must *march* as a Church Militant and shine as a Church Triumphant before any man can say religion is here?

All which is another way of saying that any educational system which fails to issue in the skill of the educated is a system that ends half-finished. The knowledge it has imparted is half-knowledge, more likely to be dangerous to its possessor than otherwise, and that no matter whether the substance of it be the sciences or the humanities, literature, philosophy, theology, religion, or what you will. A head crammed with knowledge which it has never learned to translate into any kind of skill is a head, strictly speaking, that knows nothing thoroughly, but only the beginnings of things that have never lived, or the ghosts of things that were once alive. Alas! there be many such heads among us, both among the old and the young, and the main "fault of our educational system," as I read the matter, is that it tends to multiply them.

Nor is there any difference if we substitute "science" for "knowledge." No one, I suppose, would object to the statement that science completes itself in finding its "applications." But what are the proper applications of science? In one of the books that discuss these matters I find it solemnly stated that

science is "the mighty instrument which enables man to conquer Nature and develop her resources for his own advantage." This, no doubt, is the conception of science now most in favour; none is more popular than it, unless, indeed, it be the corresponding conception of Nature—as that, namely, which exists for the sole purpose of having its resources developed by man "for his own advantage"—the distillation of the universe into human "happiness." So long as either of these conceptions prevails we may cease to wonder that theologians find a difficulty in reconciling science and religion; for both are mean, shallow, and profoundly irreligious conceptions, whose ultimate effects, if we persist in them, can be nothing else than to turn us into a race of "scientific blackguards," on whom, we may be sure, outraged Nature will know how to revenge herself—as, indeed, if we consider the matter attentively, she has long been doing.

None the less, a grain of truth lies hidden in these blasphemous commonplaces. For among the resources of Nature waiting to be "developed," by far the greatest in potential value are the latent capacities for skill which Nature has lodged in every human being. Of all the "advantages" man may win for himself in the universe, none is to be compared with the ad-

vantage to be won by developing *them.* And who can doubt that science was given to man precisely for that end—not to develop the resources of Nature as a thing apart from man, the *corpus vile* of his exploitations, but to develop *himself,* by the skilled performance of what he knows—the means appointed to man for clothing his work with excellence and beauty and the value that endures, whereby he becomes a living soul and a child of Nature after her own heart, made in the image of God?

Short of this final "application," our notions of applied science are incomplete. If science be nothing more than a short-cut to our ends, a labour-saving device, a means of satisfying the desire for "happiness" with the minimum of effort and personal skill, till man's vocation as a worker becomes a mere affair of pressing buttons and turning switches—if that be all, then I for one will say: "Let the hour stand accursed when science was born into the world." But the matter will not end there. If, in the first phase of its history, science has been the destroyer of art—"this killing that," as Victor Hugo has it—in the next it will become the founder and the diffuser of art, completing itself in the practised skill of men, deprived of their birthright now, restored to it then—the final

reconciliation of "the sciences with the humanities" and of "science with religion." Of all our undeveloped assets, who can deny that the greatest is the skill of the people? The drudge, the hooligan, the prostitute, the rich fool—what are they but skilled workers that might be, lost to themselves and to the world? Education is already beginning to look to it. When will "Labour" take it up?

VIII

THE GREATEST SKILL OF THE GREATEST NUMBER

When the Labour Party came into existence as a political entity, not many years ago, there were some of us, then in the fond fervours of our youth, who hoped that it would take the line indicated in the last lecture. It has taken another. It has become the champion of the political and economic "rights of labour," but has been strangely silent about the first of all labour's rights—*the right to skill.* Of all the "wrongs" that have ever been done to labour, I count that the greatest which came into being when the efficiency of the machine took the place of personal skill as the foundation of industrial prosperity. A greater calamity has never fallen on the human race, and perhaps it were wiser to name it a calamity rather than a wrong.

It is quite true, and should never be forgotten, that mechanized industry has called out new varieties of skill, on a great scale and in many directions, of which

the invention and construction of machinery is probably the chief. But in other directions, and on a far greater scale, skill has been stamped out; or, to speak more accurately, millions of human beings have come into existence for whom the acquisition of skill, in the degree that would educate their manhood, is an impossibility under existing conditions. I recently asked an Indian Professor visiting Europe for the first time: "What strikes you as the outstanding fact in the social conditions of the West?" He answered immediately: "The devitalization of labour through the loss of personal skill."

This, I am more and more convinced, is the true account of that "deprivation of their birthright" which the mass of our workers have now to endure—though not many of them seem to realize it. And, be it observed, the phenomenon is by no means confined to the millions who are commonly described as "unskilled labourers." All classes display it, the middle class, perhaps, most conspicuously, and in the abodes of wealth it is no less obtrusive than in the slum. Here as there the axiom has come to prevail that the values of life reside not inside the day's work, as they do whenever skill enters into the performance of it, but outside, in the satisfactions that can be purchased with

the money obtained as "wages" for performing it, "wages" being the *compensation* we get for doing work that we would avoid doing if we could.

That mass production is teaching us social lessons of immense value, lessons that could be learnt in no other way, and that *must* be learnt before we can take the next step forward, I do not doubt; but in the meantime the fact must be faced that the ideal of skill has ceased to dominate our conception of work. Work is now interpreted as a money-making process, with the inevitable result that society is rent with quarrels over the distribution of the "money" so made. Doubtless the quarrels also are teaching us lessons we need to learn, for it seems to have been ordained by the powers above that the way to peace should lie through conflict.

True it is, also, that the treatment of labour as a marketable commodity and the evaluation of it in terms of money is not a novelty peculiar to our age. That way of thinking has always had disciples and practitioners, and the marks of it stand visibly written on every page of social history. But this does not render it a true way of thinking, and it may well be that industrialism, as a stage in human education, will not have fulfilled its mission until the falsity of it is

universally acknowledged. Whether a man sells his labour to the State, as employer, or to the private individual, makes no difference at all from the human point of view. So long as he or his employer values his labour solely for what it will fetch in the market it has lost its human significance and ceased to function as an educative force, be the buyer or seller who he may. To have labour justly priced and paid for is no doubt better than the opposite, and there may be some advantage in selling it to the one kind of employer, public or private, rather than the other; but the real value to society of the labour done, of the industries carried on, lies in none of these things. It lies rather, if ethical considerations are to count at all, in the degree, quality, and distribution of the skill which industry demands of those engaged in it.

I would especially emphasize the distribution of skill as more important, from the ethical point of view, than "the distribution of the product." Considered ethically the concentration of wealth in a few hands is the lesser vice of industrialism, and the concentration of skill in a few hands is the greater. To some extent this concentration of skill is inevitable, just as it is in the parallel case of wealth; in every industry there will always be points of maximum skill

and points of minimum, with many gradations between the two. But the ideal industry would be one which furnished every grade of worker, down to those at the minimum level, with sufficient scope for his personal skill to make his day's work a valuable education.

In addition, then, to "a minimum wage sufficient to furnish the worker with a reasonable subsistence"—and, I think, prior to it—we have to insist on "a minimum degree of skill sufficient to furnish the worker with a reasonable interest in what he is doing." For labour is essentially and primarily a human function, and a marketable commodity only in the second place and by the accident of the times. As a human function the value of it resides in the excellent performance of it, and not in the extraneous reward which follows. As a marketable commodity, labour is undervalued and misvalued no matter how high the price may be that it fetches in the market. It follows that no conceivable "solution of the labour problem" is attainable on the lines of "shortening the hours and increasing the pay," while the substitution of the State for the private employer makes no difference at the essential point.

To the contention sometimes put forward that it will be time enough to consider the "right to skill" when "the right to a just share of the product" has

been satisfactorily settled the answer is obvious. The concentration of reform on the latter question, which has now a long history behind it, has not had the effect of bringing the former into the greater prominence, but, on the contrary, has thrust it into such obscurity that for the Labour Movement in general it seems to have lost significance; while, concurrently with the improvement of the worker's economic condition, the scope for his personal skill has been steadily declining. His hours have shortened, his wages have increased, but he himself tends to become more and more a cog on the wheel of mass production. Profit-sharing is good; but skill-sharing would be better. With that ideal before it Labour would begin to transform itself from the political movement it has become into the educational movement God intended it to be.

To those of us, therefore, who accept the principle that labour is the chief instrument for the education of mankind, and the determining factor in whatever may be meant by "happiness," and equally so whether the body or the soul be in question—to those whose philosophy of labour takes that form the present tendencies of the Labour Movement will be matter for profound disappointment. A movement which aims at the progressive emancipation of the worker on eco-

nomic lines, but remains indifferent to the progressive destruction of his personal skill which goes on meanwhile, is not in the direction of human freedom. While breaking the fetters of economic slavery (or what it regards as such) it allows the fetters of a far deadlier slavery to be riveted on the worker—the fetters of slavery to the "machine."

With the argument that whatever slavery the worker may have to endure in his labour can be reduced to insignificance by shortening the hours of it, and so leaving him abundant leisure "to cultivate his soul as a free man," I shall deal at length hereafter. At this point I will only call attention to the fact, which lies open to common observation, that the process worker, as we now know him, however well-paid and short-houred, shows little disposition to spend his leisure time in cultivating his soul, the destruction of his skill in the main department of his life often causing him to forget that he has a "soul" to cultivate; little disposition, I say, to do that, but a very strong disposition to place both his wages and his leisure at the disposal of "consumptionist" operators who are waiting to capture both by multiform offers of "happiness" the moment he knocks off work.

This form of exploitation, more deadly to his free-

dom than any the worker suffers at the hands of his employer (whether the State or the individual), has been too little thought of by the friends of Labour. It is a sinister phenomenon, peculiar, and indeed inevitable, to an age in which the skill of the masses is on the decline, making its presence felt in all ranks and classes, and not least among the well-to-do and leisured. Which phenomenon, in that phase of it, is the more significant when we consider that many of those people have themselves become rich and leisured by "consumptionist" tactics, such as the advertisement of unfading loveliness to the users of their "toilet preparations," or celestial bliss (with the female factor pictorially hinted at) to the buyers of their whisky or their cigarettes.

Taking it all in all may we not say that the restoration of the lapsed skill of the people, in all their vocations and gradations, as the surest safeguard against the social degeneration that threatens us, and, indeed, the only alternative to that, is a task to which all statesmen, educators, humanitarians, and suchlike doers of good to others (whether of the vocal or the practical order) are very cogently summoned by the signs of the times, and which any Labour Movement that

understands the meaning of its own name should forthwith undertake?

But while the industrial age has witnessed (with the exceptions already noted) a most lamentable decay of skill in the mass of the workers, rich and poor, and the appearance in the world of vast multitudes with no skill to lose and no prospect of ever acquiring any—while, I say, our age has been the witness of this tragedy in the world of work, there has been no decline of skill in the world of play. Nay, rather, an increase of it, and a diffusion of it, there. Driven from the workshops and factories, skill has found a refuge in the playing-fields. That such a refuge should exist, and that it should be wide open to multitudes is, from the ethical point of view, a reassuring fact, because, to whatever degree skill may be cultivated in any form, there always goes with it some measure of self-control, either of mind or body; and that is the foundation of the virtues. For which we may well thank God.

To accuse a man in these days of disobedience to the categorical imperative, or of neglecting the precepts of Christianity seems no longer to be an effectual mode of bringing him to a state of repentance. But to accuse him of "not playing the game" is to launch

a bolt at the very bull's eye of his self-respect. And I observe that when the question is of finding a working model for civic virtue, even distinguished philosophers, who themselves have long forsaken the field of athletics for a less muscular occupation, are much given to choosing the team work of a boatrace or a football match as the readiest example to hand of unity in difference, reciprocity in obligation, self-effacement for the common good, and suchlike heavenly principles. What would become of British morals, were they suddenly to lose the standards, models, idealisms and vitalities that are lent to them from the world of sport, is a question which no Christian man can ask without a sinking of the heart. For what Christian man can doubt that, in respect of practical obedience to the Golden Rule, the world of sport, with its standards of fair play, compares very favourably with the world of "business," trade union politics, parliamentary manœuvring, and red flag demonstrations; that the behaviour of gentlemen (the essence of Christianity) is more consistently maintained in the first than in the second; nay, more, though this is another story, that the inhumanities of the battlefield are, on the whole, less shocking to the moral sense than the proceedings, of both sides, in the "class war," with its

lying propaganda, soul-destroying passions, poisonous quackeries, and hypocritical citations from the New Testament. Even under the disfigurement of betting, which has its code of honour, I cannot but think that God finds his own image less marred on some of our playing-fields than in those neighbouring fields where the jerry builder, with public money to back him, is setting up his rotten kingdoms. And the reason is that in the former province skill is honoured at its proper worth, and cultivated as the true vocation of "players," a dignity from which it has fallen among jerry builders; nor can I, for one, look with hope to the future of industrialism until that same delight in excellent performance which now takes the people in their thousands to the Boat-Race, the Cup-Tie and the Derby has found its way into the daily work of the world, and become an inspiring force in the labour of those multitudes.

To the sportsman, then, and to his more accomplished brother, the artist, who, as I conceive him, is a sportsman raised to his highest power and become thereby indistinguishable from a workman at his best—to these two let every Christian man present his homage. They are helping to conserve real values, which the jerry builders and their kind are betraying, until the day dawns when the City they are building shall

be the city where all men dwell and where the law of skill "in widest commonalty spread" shall cover the whole work of the world.

On "the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number," that "paltry speculation," and on all the improvements, refinements, logical adjustments, verbal emendations, metaphysical reconciliations, æsthetic substitutions and other modes attempted by philosophers for disguising its paltriness—on all this the time has now come for good men definitely to turn their backs. Not that way does the path lie that man is appointed to tread. If the "greatest number" is to figure in our dreams at all—though, for the time-thinker, numbers are never the first consideration—the Greatest Skill of the Greatest Number is the better formula for constructive citizenship to march under, the Greatest Skill involving the Greatest Valour for the reasons that have been given.

And herein, perhaps, we may discern the hint of a coming time, or, at least, of a condition to be hoped for and sought after by all good men, when those two master-currents of social history, militarism and industrialism, so often opposed in their line of action, shall join forces and flow as a single stream; when the worker shall say to the warrior: "Thy valour shall be mine, and the skill wherewith thou wieldest thy

weapons will I put into my tools"; and when the warrior shall answer the worker: "On thy fields shall my warfare hereafter be transacted; thither will I transfer my discipline, my loyalties, my tactics and strategy, my willingness to do and die, my worship of the Lord as a man of war; I will don thy uniform, O worker, and thou and I, with valour in our hearts, and skill in our fingers, will march together, sharing 'the woes of combat' as brethren should; against the kingdom of shoddy, of jerry-building, and all acted lies will we march; garments will we weave that wax not old, and houses will we build that shall be there to answer for the builders when the trumpet sounds for the Last Assize." The transformation of industrialism from prosperous drudgery into excellent performance, achieved, not by the destruction of the military spirit, but by the absorption of it as a precious asset of civilization, by the universalizing of it as a driving force in the day's work—I know of few "constructive proposals" better worth attending to than *that*.

And here again, we may observe, the time-thinker will be asserting himself. "Let us build a house," says Space. "Let us build a house that will *last*," says Time. "Here is my system," cries Space. "Where are the valour and the skill to maintain it?"

asks Time. "Time," said Napoleon, "is the dominating factor in every battle." He was speaking, of course, of the battles that are fought in space, of the wars that arise when the life of nations is thought of as a spatial transaction on the map of the world, and are fought for the purpose of changing it, the positions won on the battlefield enabling the victors to give themselves new positions "in the sun," and so map the world more to their liking. But if time is the dominating factor *there,* how much more does it dominate when the battle is fought not for width of territory but for *depth of life*—the secular battle of the human spirit for the values that endure. For the life of man, being a mobile thing, is intolerant of maps, which are fixed things. No wonder, then, that all the efforts of conquerors and their attendant cartographers, from the age of Alexander to the Treaty of Versailles, to get the world finally mapped (and is not this what the system makers are after also?) have not succeeded in producing a world-map which can be guaranteed to last "for more than one day." The Kingdom of Ends is not a world rightly mapped in space, either in the matter of geographical boundaries or social relationships—not that alone, but *a spirit rightly directed in time.*

IX

THE HATEFULNESS OF LABOUR

THE foregoing considerations have made clear, I trust, the conception of the citizen on which all I have to say in these lectures concerning his "rights and duties" stands founded. The citizen, as here conceived, is essentially *a worker*, working for himself, for the benefit of his own body and soul, when you view him in isolation, and working for others and in turn being worked-for by them when you view him in his social relationship.

This conception of the citizen as essentially a worker I now propose to carry from the field of his Labour, where it has an obvious warrant, into the field of his Leisure, where many persons might be inclined to say it has no warrant at all. The good citizen, I shall endeavour to persuade you, does not shed his "rights and duties" at the moment he "knocks off" from the day's work, so as to become for the rest of the day an irresponsible amuser of himself. He takes on new rights and new duties, in some respects more interesting

than those which governed his official working hours, but yet essentially of a piece with them. If he works for "wages" in the first period, he works for something other than wages, and perhaps more worth having, in the second, but still works. His leisure has a positive social value, and the content of it is work—raised, it may be, to that high degree of excellence which converts it into joyous and beautiful play. An austere doctrine on the face of it, but not so when we understand it more deeply, as we shall presently endeavour to do.

From this conception of the citizen there emerges a corresponding conception of society as an organized association for co-operative work, finding its satisfactions in the quality of the work done, as this may be measured, on the one hand, by the skill and valour of the citizen workers throughout the whole range of their vocations, on the other by the real values, in wisdom, beauty and truth, of the goods turned out and the services rendered.

And here again I have to urge that the co-operative work of society includes the occupations of Leisure as well as the occupations of Labour so called, the current practice of dissociating the two being responsible for some of the most deplorable features of our

present social life. The co-operative work of society is not a thing that breaks up every afternoon at five o'clock and resumes itself next morning at eight. It is not suspended during the holidays. It functions continuously, and at no hour of the day are the organic filaments of it more active with life and more deeply fraught with the issues of social destiny than when the shops have put up their shutters and the factories locked their gates. In an advertisement before me I see the name of a certain "Association for Co-operative Holidays." The phrase strikes me as profoundly significant. It may be that the secret of human co-operation will ultimately be found at the leisure end of the day. Of unsocial conduct in the field of Labour there is, of course, plenty, but there is infinitely more of it in the field of Leisure. It is in the pursuit of their "pleasures" that men injure one another most deeply and fill the world with "pain." "An Association for Co-operative Holidays" would be a good description of the Kingdom of God. In the Kingdom of Beelzebub everyone takes his holidays at his neighbour's expense.

I call this the industrial conception of citizenship. Even of societies in their earlier and simpler forms it holds fundamentally true. But in an age of high in-

dustrial organization, such as the present, it has an appropriateness that admits of no mistaking.

In the literature which deals with the Training of the Citizen, abundant in these days, a different conception seems to prevail. There you will find the citizen regarded as though he were, primarily, a *political* person, whose functions come to a head in the process of voting or being voted for, while the conception of him as a worker and worked-for is allowed to fall into the background, or perhaps overlooked. Under this conception the object of his training in citizenship is to equip him with such knowledge that, when the time comes, he may wisely record his vote or wisely exercise his political functions as voted for. For the training of such a political individual, a helper in the making of the laws and a subject of the laws he helps to make, political philosophy with the attendant sciences, economic and historical, forms, no doubt, the necessary groundwork. Such, in fact, is the type of training sought after by most of the "workers" who rise on the ladder of education, and is duly provided for them by the colleges and universities which minister to their demands.

I am far from underrating the value of such a training in citizenship, having devoted much study to the

subjects of it in my own lifetime and exerted myself to promote it among my fellow-citizens, though I cannot but observe that a mere smattering of knowledge in those provinces, which is all that most men have the time to acquire, may prove more misleading in practice than no knowledge at all.

But before we conclude that the political type of training, however amplified and thoroughgoing, is adequate for the education of the good citizen, several considerations must be borne in mind.

In the first place, we effect very little by bringing the citizen to the point of wisely recording his vote, and all that that implies, unless at the same time there is something to offer that is really worth voting about. In other words, it is to little purpose that we confer upon every adult citizen a franchise which enables him to take his part in fashioning the common good, unless the common good be conceived in terms sufficiently high to give him the sense that in helping to fashion it he is performing a function of real value. If, for example, the common good be another name for some kind of fools' paradise, or if the conception of it be pitched on a level which only a community of rogues could be expected to acknowledge—and such conceptions of the common good do sometimes prevail in

human communities—participation in the fashioning of it can hardly be accounted a great privilege. Extensions of the franchise, therefore, which, like all mere "extensions," is fundamentally a space process, must not be counted a step forwards unless it be accompanied by the time process which raises the value of the objects, or common good, to the promotion of which the tides of voting power are invited to direct themselves. And that is a process of education.

For this purpose, training in political and economic science needs to be supplemented, and perhaps corrected, by another kind of training which shall aim at instructing the citizens not only in the wise use of their votes, but how to set things moving in directions that are really worth voting about, for or against. A democracy which develops by mere extension, but fails to develop in the direction of intensifying values to vote about, is not truly progressive; indeed, it may be confidently asserted that extensions of the franchise which coincide with decline in the public standard of real values are definite steps on a downward path.

Whether democracy, in the modern forms of it, is alive to the danger confronting it at this point may well be doubted. The danger has been obscured by the conception of the citizen as, primarily, a political

individual and by the concentration of his training, which follows from that conception, on political and economic science. That the citizen has the duty of voting wisely, and of influencing others to do the same, I do not, of course, deny; that he needs training for all that is equally obvious; but behind these, his political duties, lies his industrial duty of contributing by the excellence of his workmanship, in whatever capacity, to the creation and building up of real values as the substance and content of the common good to be voted about. As *worker,* he stands in the rank of good citizens or falls into the ranks of bad ones; and if he falls as worker his standing as voter counts for little. Primarily, and in the modern world most clearly so, the citizen is an industrial individual, with industrial duties as a worker and with industrial rights as worked-for. His political significance is contingent on that.

Political virtues are no remedy for industrial vices, but seem rather to obscure them when exclusively advocated. Of all the delusions that have obstructed the effort to make the world safe for democracy, one of the most clearly pernicious lies in the belief that by the wisdom of our voting we can make good the values lost by the devitalization of daily work. The present

practice, which concentrates the training of the citizen on "political and economic science," as though our civic salvation were to be found on that alone, is doing much to confirm the belief and little, that I can see, to disperse it.

Conceiving of the citizen, then, as essentially an industrial individual, which is only "worker" writ large, his political significance being secondary to that, what type of training suggests itself as most likely to develop the good qualities of citizenship and repress the bad? On what lines should we devise the curriculum for the industrial individual?

I have no hesitation in answering that the basis of it—the intellectual basis of it—should be laid in a right understanding of the meaning of *labour*. To understand the human significance of labour, and perhaps its divine significance as well, as a source not alone of economic value, the point at which economic science so disastrously stops, but of all the real values of life, the universal passport of man into whatever kingdoms of the spirit are waiting for him—that, I would say, is the great illumination for which an industrial age is waiting and towards which the training of the industrial individual should be vigorously directed.

Now such a philosophy of labour would have, as its necessary counterpart, a philosophy of leisure. When once the true nature of labour has been clearly exhibited, a single step brings us to the conclusion that leisure is simply another, and perhaps a better, opportunity for excellent performance, no matter whether we call it work or play, so long as skill be the key-note of it and excellence achieved in the result. Such, from the other side, is the great illumination for which industrial civilization is waiting—the unity of labour and leisure in a common principle pervading them both.

Within the frame of this principle the training of the citizen would be articulated. Applied to education in general, it would act, negatively, in the gradual abandonment of methods which result only in arrested knowledge—knowledge, that is, which the pupil can put to no purpose that is socially valuable and personally enjoyable, and which, in consequence, he soon forgets, and perhaps learns to despise. Positively, it would lead to a vigorous searching out of human aptitudes and to a development of these on the lines of all the arts and crafts, both of the body and the spirit, which add to the significance and value of human life, and give to the possessors of them the consciousness, the lack of which is misery, of being personally valu-

able to the world. Such a training, far from restricting the range of human knowledge, would immensely extend it and deepen it; far from lowering the standard of culture, it would raise the standard to heights undreamed of and impart an immense impulse to every science and its attendant art.

I am well aware that such a philosophy of labour will find itself brutally challenged when it stands face to face with labour as it is actually carried on under modern conditions of mechanized mass production—in much the same way as the doctrine that man is essentially a noble being finds itself brutally challenged when confronted with the day-to-day doings of any human being. And if that is all the word "labour" connotes, if the meaning of labour has been revealed when we have watched the monotonous activities of the process worker minding his machine or repeating his stroke, then I would be the first to admit that all the curses are fully justified that have been heaped upon it from the book of Genesis to the last number of the *Labour Leader*.

"Do not any of us be blind to the fact," says a writer in that outspoken journal,[1] "that most men and

[1] I take this quotation from a lecture by Professor W. R. Lethaby on "Labour and the Notion of Art."

women simply hate the ordinary forms of labour, and flee from manual labour as from the plague as soon as opportunity offers. The cant which the politicians, parsons, and others are always preaching, that labour is a blessed thing, is a lie. God and nature gave man brains for the purpose of easing life and making our sojourn on earth not a time of worry and discomfort, but of peace and happiness."

Mr. Bertrand Russell, whose humanitarian repugnance to mechanized labour is hardly distinguishable from an aristocratic contempt for it, holds the same view. "Boredom" is the best name he can find for the labour which furnishes civilization with the necessaries of life. "It is very rare," he writes, "that a man has any spontaneous impulse to the work which he has to do in a modern industrial community. He works for the sake of the pay, not because he likes the work. . . . I do not think that, if industrial methods survive, we can hope to make the bulk of necessary work pleasant. The best we can hope is to diminish its amount, but there is no doubt that its amount could be diminished very greatly. . . . [Our aim] will be realized by making the hours of industrial labour as short as is compatible with the production of necessaries, leaving the remaining hours of the day

entirely untrammelled. Four hours' boredom a day is a thing which most people could endure without damage; and this is probably about what would be required." [2] He means "required" under the form of socialism that he advocates.

Four hours' boredom a day, and the rest of the day entirely untrammelled—such is Mr. Russell's formula. As to the "four hours' boredom" I would go further than Mr. Russell and propose that "our aim" should be to reduce boredom to zero. Indeed, we should find it starkly necessary to aim at that. For the effect on most men of having twenty hours out of the twenty-four left on their hands "entirely untrammelled" to follow their impulses and instincts would be to leave them at the end of it so enervated, corrupted, coarsened, undisciplined, fatigued, and stupefied or, if they happened to be men of another stamp, so refined, elevated, and devoted to the objects of "a free man's worship," that they would flatly refuse their four hours' boredom and devote their energies and their money (if they had any of either left) to hiring somebody else to do the disgusting business on their behalf. I doubt if the four hours' boredom, on the one hand, and the twenty "untrammelled" hours, on

[2] "Prospects of Industrial Civilization," pp. 171-2.

the other, could be kept in water-tight compartments. They would react on one another in manifold ways. The twenty hours of go-as-you-please would undermine the discipline and efficiency of the four to be spent on machine-minding and under regimentation. And the four hours of machine-minding, to the accompaniment, no doubt, of much cursing (to the tune of the *Labour Leader*), swearing, thinking of the way to the nearest public-house, and the indulgence of other spontaneous "impulses and instincts" would not put the unwilling victims into the best of tempers for making a profitable use of the abundant leisure that was to follow. Moreover, it would be necessary to arrange—though how you could *arrange* anything if the time were to be left entirely "untrammelled" is difficult to understand—that the twenty hours should not be spent in consuming goods and demanding services, for example, in riding about the country in motorcars and char-à-bancs, or even in smoking cigarettes; for in that case it is obvious that somebody would have to work more than four hours a day in furnishing these holiday-makers with the means of enjoying themselves in accordance with their instincts, to say nothing of the strain on the police in regulating the traffic and generally keeping them out of mischief—a vicious circle

which Mr. Russell appears to have overlooked. Indeed, at this point he shows precisely those limitations which characterize space-thinking in general and which come out the more clearly in him, being, as everybody knows him to be, a space-thinker (or mathematician) of the highest rank. He has treated his division of the social day into four hours' "boredom" and twenty hours' leisure as though it were a division in space; whereas it is plainly a division in time and therefore, strictly speaking, not a division at all, the twenty hours forming a continuity with the four and the virtues and vices of each interpenetrating the virtues and vices of the other. What kind of an entity society would become if the members of it were organized for four hours' work and left to go as they pleased for twenty hours' leisure, is a question which must be left to those whose minds are capable of entertaining it. My own is not.

If ever there was a case in which time-thinking is necessary, it is surely this. Should the day ever dawn, as I fervently share Mr. Russell's hopes that it will, and as, indeed, it is now beginning to dawn, when the hours needed for mass production and mechanized labour, will fall so low as to leave the leisure hours the major quantity for all classes of workers, the effect of

this will assuredly be to shift the task of social organization in such a way that the chief weight of it will be thrown into a new field—the field created by the abundant leisure of the citizens. Even now the amount of leisure which all classes have at command has increased to an extent which makes the question of its employment, of the way the leisure hours are spent, of paramount importance to the statesman and the educator. As time goes on the whole character of industrial civilization, the trades that flourish or decay, the quality of the work that is done, the conditions under which it is done, economic and other, and the value of it as an educative force or otherwise, are being more and more determined by the way in which the masses of the citizens spend their leisure time, by the pleasures that attract them, by the amusements they demand, by the luxuries they consume. Mass production itself is largely engaged in ministering to the demands of leisure, and becoming more so with the passage of every year. To leave a people uneducated for leisure, at the mercy of instinct and impulse from the moment they knock off work, is to invite disastrous reactions on the value of whatever work they do.

X

VITALIZED LEISURE

MUCH of the social degradation we see around us is the result, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, of uneducated leisure. "Consumptionism" (the creation of new desires as a means of stimulating trade), with its host of attendant evils, physical, intellectual and moral, flourishes on the fact that millions of people with money in their pockets and time at their disposal have no rational notion of what to do with the one or the other. "Untrammelled," in the sense of having room for creativeness, leisure hours should certainly be, and so, too, should be the hours of work; but if "untrammelled" means that leisure is a region without law, where the restraints of reason become inoperative and no distinction exists between wisdom and folly, who would hesitate to say that to leisure so "untrammelled" many a civilization has owed its downfall in the past, and that our own may ultimately perish from the same cause? I name education for leisure as an outstanding need of the present age.

I submit, therefore, with due deference to the Book of Genesis, to the genius of Mr. Russell, and to the well-intentioned violence of his ally in the *Labour Leader,* that any philosophy of labour which sets labour and leisure in contrast and opposition to one another, cursing the first and blessing the second, is radically false. As against the view that labour is cursed employment and leisure blessed unemployment, I would advance the doctrine that employment covers both of them, that the two are fundamentally one, to be governed and directed by the same ideal—the ideal, namely, of excellent performance, which Aristotle long ago laid down as the proper function of man. The only reason which a wise man can give for preferring his leisure to his labour is that the former offers him an opportunity for the more excellent performance, for the doing of better work; but if, as often happens, notably to artists and to creators of real value in general, the hours of labour call for the greater skill, then it will be in labour rather than in leisure that such men find their greatest joy.

Whether labour be a curse or a blessing depends on the kind of labour you engage in and the aims and spirit you bring to the performance. But observe that precisely the same holds true of leisure. Devitalized

labour—the labour, that is, from which personal skill has been banished—is unquestionably a curse, blighting the body and soul of him who performs it, let the "wages" for it be what they may. But so, too, is devitalized leisure, the leisure in which skill has no function. Of the two evils, devitalized labour and devitalized leisure, both sufficiently conspicuous in these days, I count the latter as far the wider spread and the more formidable. Nay, even as the root evil, for there cannot be a doubt that the most degrading forms of mass production now extant in the industrial world are those which minister to the imbecilities of people in their leisure time, those which furnish leisured fools, both rich and poor, with the means of making themselves a nuisance to their fellow-men and a danger to themselves. The labour of the tired barmaid who stands all day behind the counter pumping beer into glasses, and the leisure of the soaker who stands in front of the counter drinking it, are related to one another as effect and cause. For my part I see no great difference between the general worthwhileness of the two operations. I suggest the picture as furnishing a kind of formula for explaining the way in which devitalized leisure and devitalized labour reciprocally imply and promote one another throughout the whole

fabric of industrial society. Of all the games men play in their leisure time none is so costly from the social point of view as the game of playing the fool; the fool at the leisure-end means a slave at the labour-end.

A thoroughgoing study of devitalized leisure, as the twin curse to devitalized labour, and of the relation that obtains between the stupidity of the one and the "boredom" of the other, is urgently needed at the present time. It would probably form one of the gloomiest chapters of our social history, for there is nothing in which the modern man is so "unhappy" as in his pleasures. But it would prove no less instructive than gloomy, and would help us to understand many features of the labour "problem" which are quite unintelligible without it, nay, perhaps, might even give us the long-sought key to the "problem" itself. Here, of course, it is not possible to attempt even a partial survey of so vast a field. But there is one of our leisure occupations, now become so popular among all classes and so deeply characteristic of modern society, that I cannot forbear the mention of it.

I refer to the occupation, if occupation it may be called, which goes by the name of "sightseeing." Ours is pre-eminently a sightseeing age, an age much

given to looking at things or "to going to see what things look like," all men with money in their pockets putting themselves into locomotion for that purpose and incessantly travelling by rail, road, or air to such distance from their place of abode (now rapidly becoming a mere point of departure) as the length of the aforesaid pockets and the amount of their disposable leisure render possible. The space-thinking which dominates our habits of work has its counterpart, appropriate enough, in the "sightseeing" which fills our holidays and our leisure hours. It dominates even our habits of play, which the many "go to look at," and the few to engage in.

To the lust for "sightseeing," in general and view-hunting in particular, never absent, indeed, but comparatively feeble in simpler societies, an enormous impetus has been given by modern facilities of locomotion and transport. From the urchin at a picture show, the crowd at a football match, the streams of impetuous Americans in an Italian art gallery, the multitudes on the race-course, the million tourists converging on the "totality belt" for the solar eclipse, to the philosopher in quest of a "view" of the universe, we have become, to an extent unparalleled in earlier ages, a race of sightseeing nomads. Of old the traveller set

forth on his toilsome journey from other motives; to learn a craft or practise one, to hear a teacher or to teach, to pay his devotion at a shrine; *did* something significant in the place he arrived at; gathered wisdom as he passed on his way and left it behind him; then came back a wiser man. By travellers such as these were the arts disseminated, the learning spread, the religions taught which have civilized the world. Alas, for one such traveller to-day there are ten thousand whose business is done when they have paid their fare and hotel bills and seen the "sights"; carried about, lodged and fed, at great expense in fuel, road-wear, and human labour; contributing nothing save cash and astonishment to the life of the places they visit and receiving in return—sights, victuals, change of air, and locomotion.

An example, this, chosen out of thousands, but deeply characteristic, I think, of what leisure has come to mean for a space-thinking, eye-serving, nomadic age, a process, namely, of *killing* time more or less agreeably by looking at things, to the ruin of that other form of leisure which *vitalizes* time by creating things and doing them, and which I am about to recommend as by far the more enjoyable and worth while of the two.

"Beware," said a voice which some of us may have forgotten, "beware lest your leisure become a nuisance to your neighbours and a boredom to yourself. Travel as widely as your means allow; to Epping Forest or to Blackpool; to Venice or to New Zealand; but never for the sole purpose of seeing the world or men; for the world considered as a mere spectacle is hardly worth looking at, no, not even when Mount Everest stands before you, while men, as you see them in the field of vision, are the most uninteresting objects imaginable. Travel to look *into* these things, but never, merely, to look *at* them. There is no joy in scenery when it is scenery and nothing more, and a change which is only a change of scene can never be other than insignificant. When you plan to visit a place—Hampstead Heath or the Alps—ask yourself first: 'What am I going to *do* when I get there?' . . . If it is the mountains, learn to climb them and to find your own way amid their solitudes; if it is the sea, learn to swim in it or to sail your boat on the perilous waters; believe me, you will know the mountains better by climbing a small one than by looking at ten thousand big ones, and the sea better by swimming twenty yards than by circumnavigating the world, first-class, on an ocean liner. Claim not to know a foreign country unless there are

at least six individuals in it whom you can call your personal friends. Seek most the places that furnish you with interesting occupations and vital contacts with mankind; shun those, let the 'scenery' be what it will, where you have nothing to do. . . . As to *rest,* I counsel you to take it in plenty; but unless 'home' be the place where you can rest most peacefully when you are tired and recover most rapidly when you are sick, then, let me tell you, that 'home' of yours is not all that it should be. . . . I end in sadness. When my doctor says to me, 'You want rest; go away from home,' he seems to be passing sentence not on my 'home' alone, but on the whole civilization which has produced it; and my heart aches anew for the people in the slums."

And here I will introduce another quotation in the same vein, but more fantastically conceived, from a long letter recently written by a young and ambitious friend of mine whose mind, in regard to these matters, I can claim to have had some part in forming.

"When I become a candidate for Parliament," writes my young friend, "which you assure me will turn out 'a disastrous enterprise,' I shall stand as a member of the Leisure Party. This Party I intend to found, to begin with, in flat opposition to the Labour

Party now in existence, but with the view of ultimately absorbing it, together with the Conservative Party, now noted for its misunderstanding of Leisure as the other is for its misunderstanding of Labour. They are natural allies, though they don't know it. I shall point out to my opponents, repeating what you quoted in your last letter from the *Labour Leader,* that by putting a curse on Labour and declaring their hatred of it, they have, both explicitly and by implication, put a blessing on Leisure and declared themselves lovers of that; which done, I shall next invite them to call themselves henceforth by the name of the thing they love, bless, and want more of, which is Leisure, and to cease calling themselves by the name of the thing they hate, curse, and want less of, which is Labour. This, I imagine, will be the easy part of my propaganda; the Conservatives will be with me to a man, while Labour, though conceding the main point, will only be held back by a suspicion that I am pulling its leg.

"The next stage, however, in which I shall have to reveal what I am after, will come as a shock to both Parties. For I shall now have to explain that this Leisure Party of mine is not founded in the interests of people who desire to have nothing to do or to go on the dole, but in the interests of people who love

work and desire to have something better to do than they have been doing heretofore—that is, in the interests of mankind at large, and especially that part of it called 'the workers of Great Britain.' I shall say that the deep cry of these workers, machine-minders for the most part, which the extant Labour Party has never learned to interpret, is not 'give us more wages and more time to play the fool in,' but rather this: '*In God's name give us something better to do*'—the cry of humanity through the ages, the cry of industrial civilization, the cry of the process worker, of the hooligan, of the criminal, of the prostitute, of the rich fool.

"In soberness and seriousness (all suspicion of pulling the Labour Party's leg having by this time evaporated) I shall go on to point out—I got it from you—that the increasing leisure of the people, achieved by shortening the hours of mechanical labour, which my Party will eagerly promote, is the coming opportunity, long waited for by wise statesmen and educators, *for developing the skill of the people,* which is, as you so often insist, the greatest of our undeveloped national assets. That, I shall say, is the lost road to human 'happiness,' which our civilization must recover or perish for not recovering; the one sure means to the life that is personally enjoyable and socially valuable;

the salvation of the 'industrial individual'; the dawning of the age of noble work.

"The Conservative Party and the Labour Party solidly converted to these principles, all cursing of labour hushed for ever in both of them, and the Leisure Party fairly launched, the next step will be 'to introduce the Bill.' It will be called 'A Bill for the better Education of the People in a sensible Use of their leisure Time,' or more briefly as 'A Bill for promoting the Skill of the People,' and I imagine that posterity will know it as 'the second Magna Charta of British Liberty.' For the object of it will be to liberate the mass of the people, rich and poor, from the intolerable exploitations of their 'consumptionist' oppressors, so that no man hereafter, save through fault and weakness of his own, shall be led by the nose into spending his money on goods that he does not need and his leisure in boring himself to death or in plaguing other people till they pray the devil to fly away with him. This my 'Bill' will do by enacting, as the law of the land, that henceforth no boy, no girl, shall be suffered to leave school until, to quote your last letter, 'the book knowledge there imparted has been brought to the point of completing itself in some kind of recognizable skill,' at once enjoyable to the possessor and

serviceable to mankind, though it be only that of speaking his mother tongue with intelligible audibility and correctness of articulation, the 'final examination' always consisting in a proof given that the pupil is able to *do* something of human significance with the knowledge he has acquired; that all schools, colleges, and universities in receipt of public money, or enjoying the privilege of Royal Charter, shall gradually transform themselves into Academies of Skill, in default of which the said public money to be withdrawn and the said Charters cancelled.

"This for the children and the young. For the tragic multitude of unskilled workers my Bill will provide appropriate systems of Adult Education; wherein the adult pupil will no longer be trained for speech-making and demagogy by a smattering of 'political and economic science' (though this subject will be included in proper measure), but restored to the craftsmanship he has lost, and to the joys thereof, by due instruction in the manifold arts and crafts of body and spirit, so that, if it comes to the pinch of unemployment, he and his wife between them can raise their own food, weave their own clothes, make their own furniture and find no hour of the weary days hang heavy on their hands."

With the ardour of youth in reckoning on the chickens before they are hatched, my young friend then goes on with the tale of his future political operations, some of them visionary enough. But on the whole he seems to be in earnest with this queer Leisure Party of his, and to have in him, if I may say it of a pupil of mine, the true spirit of constructive citizenship. One principle of great significance he has unquestionably laid hold of. He has seen, with a clearness of vision that argues the coming statesman, that reform in the Labour department of industrial civilization presupposes a parallel reform in the Leisure department, that 'better conditions' in the one are impossible without 'better conditions' in the other, the slavery that obtains in this reflecting the foolery that obtains in that. He shows foresight as well as insight. He has foreseen a time when the increase of leisure, achieved through shortening the hours of labour and raising the wages of it, will cause the fate of civilization to be less determined by what people do with themselves in the few hours when they are officially at work and more determined by what they do with themselves in the many hours when they are officially not at work—a piece of time-thinking that does him credit. His attempt to persuade them to go on working in their

leisure time, but to work skilfully and creatively *then*, wears on the face of it, I must confess, a look of austerity not likely to commend itself to a sight-seeing age, but will be found, on closer examination, to point the way to a life worth living and to be kindly, sensible, and humane. "In the Kingdom of Heaven," he says in the course of a moralizing paragraph too long and too paradoxical to quote, "in the Kingdom of Heaven they neither work nor play; *they do both at the same time*"—a remark which shows that he has sound notions about the nature of Art and of its place in the industrial civilization of the future.

I approve also, for reasons with which the reader is now familiar, his proposal "to attack the labour problem" (his own phrase) from the leisure end of it, and to "solve" it by developing the skill of the people, though I utterly condemn his use of "solve." By spreading the practice of useful crafts among all classes of the citizens something will be done, though not much at first, to diminish the demand for mechanized labour and to ease a little the strain on mass production, which has unquestionably come to stay and which there is no reason to wish entirely abolished. This easing of the strain would increase as time went on. Meanwhile a generation would be growing up whose

acquisition of skill would greatly alter their standards of living; on the one hand, promoting the demand for goods and services of a higher quality, and thereby reacting beneficently on mass production itself, in accordance with the much neglected economic law that he who works skilfully demands that he shall be skilfully worked-for (being a good judge of such things); on the other, building up, in all classes of the community, the silent pressure of a demand for skilled occupation as the one sure pathway to the true "end of man," now more clearly discerned under the illumination which the possession of skill brings to the possessor thereof. With these forces sufficiently operative we may be well content to leave the ultimate fate of mass production on the knees of the gods.

Among the occupations mentioned by Mr. Bertrand Russell as appropriate to the "untrammelled" leisure which the worker will enjoy when the hours of industrial labour have been reduced to four per diem by his particular brand of socialism, I observe that Art has a place. From which we may infer that he with his Labour Party and my young friend with his Leisure Party are not so far apart as superficial indications might suggest. A promising augury for the fusion of the two Parties into one.

XI

AN INDUSTRIAL VERSION OF MORALITY

You will have gathered by this time that one of my main objects in these lectures is to bring into prominence the industrial interpretation of the rights and duties of citizenship. In doing this I am neither excluding nor denying the political interpretation, but asking for a reversal of the order of thought in which "political" and "industrial" are usually taken. Hitherto it has been the custom, with most writers on these subjects, to give the primary place to the political conception of citizenship, and to leave the industrial conception to adjust itself, as best it can, to the political. In distinction from this I would urge that the main lines of the citizen's rights and duties are laid down for him as worker and as worked-for by others. The true nature of his political rights and duties, which are highly important in their proper place, are not to be understood, as they exist in modern times, until we view them in the larger perspective of his industrial character. He is "an industrial individual" in the

first place and a "political individual" in the second.

I think it obvious that the fortunes of our civilization, both material and spiritual, depend in the major degree on the character, ethical and economic, of its industry, and in the minor (but still important) degree on the character of its politics. If our civilization goes wrong, or fails to achieve real value, in the matter of industry, going right in the matter of politics will be no great triumph. Healthy industry will give birth to healthy politics. Whether, *per contra,* healthy politics would ever give birth to healthy industry, seems to me, in any case, highly doubtful; but I would add that, in the present conditions of the world, politics will not become healthy unless a healthy industry makes them so.

I find it helpful to think of our civilization in its entirety just as one thinks of any individual man or woman, as having to "earn its living," to maintain itself from day to day as a going concern by the quality of the sum total of labour involved in the day's work. There is nothing else from which its "living" can proceed. And just as there plainly exists a most intimate connection between the real value of the work by which you or I earn his "living" and the real value of the "living" earned by the work, so, in the case of

industrial civilization as a whole, the sum total of good that it enjoys and the sum total of evil it suffers have their ultimate causes in the good or evil of the general workmanship—so far, at least, as they are due to human action. The low tone, monotony, or other vicious aspect of the individual's daily work will inevitably be reflected by corresponding qualities in the "living" which the work sustains (just as their contraries will be), insomuch that if he is "unhappy" in the one nothing can render him really "happy" in the other. So, too, a civilization that stands on a basis of devitalized work, and earns its living by that, cannot be cured of the attendant misery by any political operations whatsoever, whether constitutional or revolutionary. Nay, the political operations will themselves reflect the general devitalization.

But politics are by no means so futile as these statements, taken without qualification, might suggest. Although devitalized work is now the only means by which millions of human beings can earn their "living," with the consequence that a devitalized "living" is the only kind of "living" they can earn, although the amount of it to which mass production has given rise has grown to the greatest menace civilization has to face, there are still extant in the world

enough good workmen and enough vital work to give us a new and healthier political life.

The first step to this end—a difficult but not impossible thing—is the transformation of the Labour Party (in all countries) into the Party of Good Workmen actuated by the spirit of good workmanship. Millions of men and women, in all ranks of society and of all grades of culture, are only waiting for the first signs of that transformation to throw themselves heart and soul into the ranks of Labour, to make it, in fact, the only "Party" which an industrial age has any use for. As everybody knows, these good workmen, in the endless varieties of their vocations, from artists at the one end to scavengers at the other, are the backbone of industrial civilization; they are the saviours of society; their competence, their skill, their trustworthiness are the sources of its vitality and of whatever hope it has of emerging from its present cloud of miseries. Our political machinery, a priceless possession, will never be put to the uses which our industrial age demands, till good workmen control it and turn it to the promotion of good workmanship all over the world. That is something really worth voting about. No "Labour Party" which understands its own name can be content with less.

As things now are it is quite true, and I would be the last to deny it, that social reform on the large scale is impossible without the intervention of political machinery. Even my fantastic young friend, whom I quoted in the last lecture, proposes to get himself elected as Member of Parliament, so that he may "introduce the Bill." It is to be hoped that there will be many more like him, not only among the young men but among the young women, some millions of whom are now to receive the franchise, but who, as yet, do not clearly know how they are going to vote or what they are going to vote for. I urge them to throw their weight into my young friend's Leisure Party, whose aim will be, you may remember, to furnish every citizen with an equipment in good workmanship, the sure foundation of a life at once personally enjoyable and socially valuable—the only "living" that is worth "earning."

If I am right in giving primacy to the industrial conception of citizenship and making the political conception secondary to that, far-reaching and profound consequences will follow.

In the first place there will follow an enlargement to the international scale of all that citizenship implies —an enlargement which will in no sense destroy the

meaning of national citizenship, but will certainly transform and deepen it. More and more we shall find ourselves compelled to interpret the rights and duties of the citizen as a member of this nation or that in the light of rights and duties that belong to him as a member of a world-wide community of workers; or, to speak more strictly, we shall find that the international and the national aspects of citizenship will reciprocally interpret one another in such a way as greatly to modify the meaning of each. Under the development of international trade and exchange the interests of workers all over the world have become inextricably interlocked, and we may rest assured that as time goes on the interlocking will grow ever closer, not only through the developments of foreign trade, but through the more intimate relations of the manifold cultures of various nations. Even as it is, we have only to inspect the food on our breakfast tables, the clothes on our bodies, the articles in our pockets, the furnishing of our houses, the books on our shelves to satisfy ourselves that the day is not far distant, if not already come, when it will be literally true of every "industrial individual" that he works for all the world and all the world works for him.

At this point there is a startling want of correspond-

ence between the political and the industrial conditions of the modern world, a discrepancy long in existence but now risen to the magnitude and obviousness of a very formidable fact. Politically the world consists of a number of self-contained and independent unit-nations each claiming complete sovereignty in defining the rights and duties of its own citizens. Industrially and culturally, on the other hand, these divisions, in spite of all that protective tariffs or national prejudices have done or can do, are counting for less and less every day; the frontiers are tending to disappear; many are obliterated already; so that every nation, whether it likes it or not, must now consent to be invaded by forces and interests originating in foreign countries. Over the origin of these the government of the invaded country has no control whatsoever, and over the action of them, when they reach its own people, no control that is really effective. Political power stops short at the national frontier, but the demands of men for goods and services, even for the bare necessaries of life, stretch themselves all over the world, while the answering supply is similarly unconditioned. A community which is politically free within its own borders, and entirely safe for democracy there, may yet be dependent for its daily bread on the willingness of for-

eigners, over whom it has no control, to purchase the goods and services it has to offer and to offer their own in payment. Such is the glaring discrepancy between the political and the industrial conditions of the modern world. Politically, the world remains many: industrially, and culturally, too, it is rapidly becoming one.

It follows that the citizen, considered as worker and worked-for in a world-wide community, has vital interests which the localized political community to which he belongs has no means of making good, and is exposed to injuries from which his own government cannot protect him. At the present moment, for example, we are confronted in this country with grave conditions of unemployment which various parties have professed their ability to remove, only to find on trial that they are powerless to do so. The reason of their powerlessness is, of course, that the causes of unemployment in Great Britain, a country deeply involved in foreign trade, originate in large measure in regions where the British Government has no control. The "remedial measures" stop at the frontiers. The industrial conditions, which are the essential conditions of the modern world, are beyond the control of any existing government.

These considerations make it very clear that the "moralizing of industry," whatever that may mean, must begin by taking full account of international conditions. The industrial version of morality must adopt an international vocabulary. The "right" and the "wrong" of which it speaks, the duties and responsibilities it lays down, must have a reference wider than the economic interests of any nation. They must be world-wide. This defines the perspective in which the question I am about to take up should be approached.

If modern civilization is essentially industrial, it would seem to follow that only two lines of action are open to those who would improve or reform it. One would be to improve the industry on which civilization is based; the other, to destroy or supersede industry and find some other occupation for society, such as sightseeing, resting, or meditation.

My own suffrages are frankly given to the former method, partly because I can think of no other occupation, or mode of passing the time, which does not assume the general industry as its basis; and still more because industry seems to me the occupation most congenial to the nature of man; certainly far more so than

" sightseeing," whether it take the form of looking at the beauties of nature and art or that of contemplating the universe in general. Apart from the obvious difficulty of making these into the major occupations of mankind I observe that nature conceals her beauties from those who refuse to exert themselves in her company; she seems to resent being merely stared at by sightseers; while art means very little to people who shun the labour of acquiring any skill of their own. Nature and art alike repose upon industry; both of them, in fact, are industries in high activity, as the time-thinker instantly perceives; and none but the industrious can enjoy them. And the same holds true, a fortiori, of the universe. I cannot believe that the universe exists for the purpose of being " contemplated " by philosophers. It, too, is but another name for the universal industry, and only the industrious can contemplate it profitably. On the whole we may conclude that civilization has not fallen upon calamity by becoming " industrial." " Industrial," which includes " industrious," is precisely what a healthy civilization should be.

This is not to say that Glasgow, with its roaring traffic, as a place for man to live in, is superior to the Garden of Eden, " with the threefold river murmuring

by"; though our first parents, by the way they committed their transgression, showed that they were getting rather bored with a life that gave them so little to do. I am not asking you to fall into admiration of factories and mass production. But I would ask you to believe that Glasgow with all its horrors (and who knows them better than you?) is a station on the road to something far better than its present self, and better even than the Garden of Eden. And the way to that better state of things lies, not through the destruction of Glasgow's industry, but through the improvement of it. I would say the same of industrial civilization in general. Let it retain the industrial character and make the best of it.

To advance on those lines we clearly need an industrial version of morality. I cannot persuade myself that we have it at the present time. We have a political version of morality, rather highly developed, an ecclesiastical version, a military version, a legal version; but not, so far as I can see, an industrial version. We have a state version, a church version, an army and navy version, a law court version, all highly effective in their respective spheres; but a factory and workshop version we have not. Such industrial morality as we have consists of borrowing from the versions afore-

said; it exists in unrelated fragments and is not a native growth of the industrial soil; it defines no industrial ideal and is inadequate for industrial guidance. From the Ten Commandments, for example, it borrows the prohibitions against stealing, lying, and covetousness; all negatively important, but obviously insufficient. In recent times attempts have been made to borrow from the Sermon on the Mount; but the prohibition against laying up treasure is a sad stumbling-block to the capitalists and the formula of non-resistance has no attractions for the trade unions or the Labour Party in general; such precepts are exotic to the industrial climate. The professions are much better equipped than the trades with a moral vernacular of their own. Each has its own flag of honour with "traditions of the service" to correspond. To the military ethic which shoots the deserter of his post and expels an officer for conduct dishonouring to the service, to the legal ethic which decrees and actually secures the incorruptibility of the judicial bench, there is nothing to correspond in the field of capital and labour. I do not say that industry has no morals; if that were so it would cease to exist; but I do say that such morals as it has are hand-to-mouth, haphazard, fragmentary, and borrowed from non-industrial sources. The

labours of Aristotle in creating a political version of morality has no parallel in this field. This spectacle of an industrial civilization which lacks an industrial version of morality I count a strange phenomenon. Let us look at it for a moment in the light of history.

The political version of morality has been long established and extensively elaborated. Plato and Aristotle laid the foundations on which all subsequent thinkers have built. In Plato's "Republic" the coincidence of ethics and politics is complete; for him the best man and the best politician are synonymous terms. On that point Aristotle is less decisive. "The good," he says, "is the one trustworthy measure of all things," but though, in the ideal state, the best man would necessarily be the best politician, he admits that in the actual world this is not always so. In later times the Christian Church, with a strong Platonic tradition behind it, became the chief guardian of morality in the Western world, and when, in the age of Constantine, Christianity was adopted by the State, morality received a still deeper political stamp. In the Middle Ages there arose a fierce controversy, the echoes of which linger on in our own time, as to the relative spheres of authority of Church and State, which led to a sharp distinction being drawn between the duty the

citizen owed to the State and the duty he owed to God, and thus opened the way to a wider conception of civic duty in general. But the political version still held its ground, and in later times the building up of it was continued, with Plato and Aristotle never far out of sight, by Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and many others, until, finally, Treitschke presented it as a *reductio ad absurdum,* and brought ruin on Germany.

Meanwhile, a diversion had occurred in the shape of the Industrial Revolution, and it looked at one time as though the science of economics, to which that event had given a new impetus, would lead the way to the industrial version of morality for which the industrial age was waiting. Efforts in that direction were made, notably by Robert Owen and by the Christian Socialists; but economics soon became too closely entangled with politics to permit of their independent development on ethical lines, and the industrial version of morality remained a voice in the wilderness.

Yet, though in the wilderness, it was not unheard. While the economists were preaching the laws of supply and demand as the basis of national prosperity, and the moralists proclaiming the rule of a phantom named "happiness," and the Christian Socialists dilating ineffectually on the conception of a non-com-

petitive human brotherhood, there were three men, Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris (to speak of this country alone), who were heroically striving to bring the eternal values into actual living contact with the daily work of the industrial age. Competence, excellence, and thoroughness in the work done; valour and mutual loyalty in the doers of it, these were the mother-virtues of their ethic; incompetence, pretence, and slackness were the corresponding vices in the work; cowardice and treachery the corresponding vices in the workers. Such was the industrial version of morality addressed by them to an industrial age. Varying in key, their message in substance was the same; to wit, that man is born a worker, to win his kingdom or to lose it according as he works well or ill; and in all three there was a fierceness in the delivery of the message as of men fighting with their backs to the wall. They spoke the language neither of the Church nor of the State; their message lacked the pious savours of the one and the political garniture of the other; but a profound piety, though not of the official type, informed it, and it was ethical to the core.

For a long time past voices and modes of speech have been current among us which may seem, in the eyes of many, to do duty as an industrial version of

morality. They plead for "equality of opportunity" as the ground principle of a just industrial life, and from that they go on to urge the obligation of better conditions in industry, humane relations between employers and employed, and, above all, for a fair and equitable distribution of the riches won by the common labour. But all these pleadings, admirable as their objects are, fall far short of the industrial version of morality as conceived by the pioneers I have just named. For them the root of the matter was, primarily, no question of the conditions under which work is done, nor of wages received for its performance. *It was the question of the work itself.* Was this good work or bad? Was it, in its totality and several parts, of such a kind that men could look upon it and say: "This civilization of ours, judged by its products, is worth while"? Was it worthy of man, so that man, looking on the work of his hands, could hold himself honoured in his own achievement, as the Creator beheld his own glory when, looking on all he had made, he perceived it to be "very good" and knew that he had done something worthy of God? If these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the work itself being unquestionably judged good, then, but not otherwise, the ground is prepared for all that you may

desire in the way of "opportunity," "conditions," "relations," and "reward." But if the answer be in the negative, the work itself being unquestionably judged bad (like a piece of shoddy, a jerry-built house, a quack medicine, a painted face, or any other profitable imposture), then your "opportunity," your "conditions," your "relations," your "reward" will all be poisoned at the source, they will all be *bad,* and nothing that you can do in the way of political doctoring will make them much better. "Good conditions," "right relations," and all the rest are, in their ultimate causation, the fruit of work well done; bad, of the contrary.

An "industrial version of morality" conceived in these terms differs widely from those proposals for "Christianization" of industry which have now become the stock-in-trade at the annual meetings of religious denominations. It lodges morality in the centre of the world's work, not in the fringes, accessories, conditions, and leisure time of it; makes it the business of the day, and turns the vocation of every man, from hammering and ploughing to carving ivories and painting madonnas, into the field of his social service and the shrine of his religious worship.

In a collection of ancient instruments I was recently shown a remarkably beautiful astrolabe, an instrument

of great ingenuity used in pre-Copernican times for measuring the altitude of the sun and the stars. It was the work of a Mohammedan artificer in India more than a thousand years ago. Round the edge of the fine brasswork there ran an inscription in delicate Arabic characters, of which the translation, as well as I can remember it, was as follows: *"This astrolabe is the work of Hussein Ali, mechanic and mathematician and servant of the Most High God. May His name be exalted throughout the universe!"* The industrial version of morality is all there. "Mechanic and mathematician" betoken the skill and the competence on which it reposes; "servant of the Most High God" the excellence to which it aspires.

When a like inscription has become the trade mark of industrial civilization, but not till then, the "Christianization of industry" will be well on the way to an accomplished fact. The good Ali, I imagine, like many another good man in those days and in these, was a Christian without knowing it.

XII

TRUSTEESHIP

THE "industrial version of morality" has its incarnation, living embodiment, or *avatar,* in a typical individual whom I have named in the last lecture "the good workman." Good workmanship, I have contended, is the foundation of good citizenship, the mother of its virtues, and obviously so if "industrial" truly describes the civilization or age in which we live. Industrial civilization (if there is meaning in the name) stands or falls by the quality of its industry, or workmanship—that is, by the quality of what its members *do* for themselves and for their neighbours in the course of their daily work, the quality of what they *say* to one another in the course of their literary, oratorical, or homiletic activities having little value except in so far as these fine sayings get themselves embodied in exchangeable commodities or in mutual services of a corresponding fineness. The conception of the "good workman" is, therefore, the general frame or ground plan on which our conception of the good

citizen must be built up and articulated. Whatever else good citizenship may be, good workmanship is the foundation of it. The training of the citizen must never lose sight of *that*. Otherwise his accomplishments in the way of "political and economic science" will be a house built on the sand. Nay, the result may be worse. For the literary, oratorical, homiletical activities which reflect an exclusive training in political and economic science, unbased on the rock of foundation aforesaid, are oftener a disguise for bad citizenship than an expression of good.

And now this conception of the good workman calls for further definition.

Familiar images rise before our minds at the sound of the words. We see the medieval sculptor, long numbered with the forgotten dead, carving the invisible back of an oak-leaf in Southwell Minster with the same conscientious care that he bestows on the visible face of it; or some patient artisan whom we have known working for poor wages but scorning to scamp his job; or some woman 'sweeping a room as for Thy laws and making that and the action fine.' Or perhaps it is Hussein Ali that we see, chiselling his lines and figures on the reluctant brass, according to the rules of his "mechanics and mathematics," but not

without an eye to the beauty of them, and calling on the Most High God, as Chief Inspector of Workshops, to examine and approve his work. Such are the images that rise before the mind, all significant symbols, all pointing in the right direction, all suggestive rallying-points for thought. But a wider vision is needed if we are to understand what is meant by the "good workman" of industrial civilization.

As I conceive him, three main elements combine in his make up, each interpenetrating the other two, and in turn interpenetrated by them; *trusteeship* on the moral side, *competent technique* on the scientific side, *skill* on the practical side. Throughout the entire range of specialized occupations to be found in the modern industrial world, from the master of finance to the shoveller of coals, these three elements will be found combined in the person whom I here denominate "the good workman"; trusteeship, competent technique, practical skill. Of the two last I have spoken already; my present subject is the first.

With the conception of the "industrial individual" I shall assume you are sufficiently familiar. I have now to fill it in by adding that the industrial individual, worker and worked-for is, in the moral aspect of him, essentially a *trustee.*

A trustee, I take it, is one charged with certain obligations who, whatever legal penalties may attend his malfeasance, is definitely trusted by others to play his part not only in a manner legally correct, but in a manner personally honourable. In contrast to him stands the traitor, the betrayer of the trust, the worst type of treachery being that which conforms to legal correctness in fulfilling the trust and yet betrays it in the spirit by sophistical dealings with the letter of the law. In the functions of the trustee, no matter how the law may define them, there is always a strictly *fiduciary* element, a something he is trusted to do as one who is under no compulsion to do it other than his sense of what becomes him as a man. As in the army, two soldiers may obey the same word of command, one with sufficient eye-service to escape being shot for manifest cowardice and the other with sufficient valour to win a decoration, so in civic life the difference between the trustee in name and the trustee in reality is immense. The trustee, at the one end, the traitor at the other, represent the two extremes of civic virtue and civic vice—this, perhaps, is the first proposition to be laid down in constructing the industrial version of morality.

It may be said in passing that the industrial version

would correspond with the military version at many other important points. The various industries would be treated as "branches of the Service" each with traditions and a flag of its own. The conception of trustee would dominate and be equally applicable to employer and employed as to officer and private. In the one as in the other, virtue and valour would be closely connected ideas, while desertion, cowardice, corruptibility would be recognized as major crimes; slovenliness and inefficiency as minor ones. In the one, as in the other, honour would not be conferred for mere obedience to the forms of discipline or to the letter of the law, still less for profitable contraventions of them. That "something more," which makes the difference between the nominal and the real trustee, between the eye-serving soldier and the hero, would be required.

In defining the duties of the citizen as a trustee for industrial civilization—I reserve for a moment the question of his "rights"—it is important to bear in mind his double character as worker and worked-for.

As worker, his duties resolve themselves into the general form of seeking a vocation on lines that are socially valuable and then performing the work of it with all the excellence the case admits of. This clearly is what his fellow-citizens trust him to do. Whatever

his employment, trade, or profession may be, it will always contain the distinction between an inferiority that is criminal, a mediocrity that will pass muster, and a superiority that will do him honour. The superiority that will do him honour, and them real service, is what his fellow-citizens trust him for. Involved in this is the duty of equipping himself, by whatever means are available, with the necessary technique for the competent discharge of his vocation.

As worked-for his duty is, positively, to promote good workmanship among his fellow citizens, not only because it is for his own interest, but far more, because it is for theirs; and, negatively, to restrict his demand for goods and services which involve devitalized labour in the production and providing of them; in particular, he will avoid spending his leisure in forms that need the degrading toil of other men to sustain them. His trusteeship will be no less active in the hours of leisure, when he is being worked-for by others, than in the hours of labour when he is working for them. These clearly are duties which no compulsion can enforce upon him. If he performs them at all he will do so of his own good will.

Turning now to his "rights," we find that they resolve themselves in the restatement, from the other

side, of his duties. As worker, he has the right to an occupation which gives scope for the achievement of excellence, and thereby for making himself valuable in his time and station. In a former lecture I have called it "the right to skill." As worked-for, he has the right to good workmanship in all that he buys and pays for, to "real value for his money" as we commonly say, and is definitely wronged when he doesn't get it. He has the right to his leisure, but always on condition that he refrains from making other men the slaves of it; and he has the parallel right to demand that they shall not make him the slave of theirs. If he is a trustee for them in these particulars, they, no less, are trustees in the same particulars for him.

Considering the citizen in this light, as worker and worked-for, the ideal of industrial society assumes a clear outline. It becomes the ideal of an organization, world-wide and world-deep, of reciprocal trustees bound together and vitalized by mutual loyalty in daily work. The League of Nations could be defined in these terms.

Such communities of workers, more or less definitely organized, do already exist both within the nations and internationally. They are to be found on the highest levels of the business world, notably in

banking and mutual insurance, where high traditions of trusteeship, with a firm root in time, are well established; and the co-operative movement, both in production and distribution, has done much to promote them in trade generally. Further examples abound. In our own country the judicial bench, as trustee for the administration of the law, has proved itself incorruptible; a corruptible judge is no longer a danger we have to fear; anyone who will take the trouble to attend a day's pleadings in the High Court of Appeal will see an example of trusteeship in its highest form. Our police courts tell the same story, and will tell it more impressively, I think, with the appointment of more women as magistrates; for women, once appealed to on that side, make admirable trustees—their true function as citizens. In the medical profession a high standard of honour dominates the mercenary interest, which exists, but is not allowed to rule; if it did, the confidence of the public would be forfeited immediately. A good doctor is, and knows himself to be, a trustee for the life of his patient. More remarkable still are the conditions in the realm of science. Intellectual co-operation goes on apace; scientific workers all over the world are tending to become a single community, conscious of immense obligations to mankind.

As this develops, the ideal of service based on veracity, which many a scientific man cherishes in isolation, will become the actuating motive of a mighty group, conscious of itself as the world's trustee for speaking the truth, and a growing bond of union among all nations. For it is a law in these matters that the morality of a community does not develop until, like an army, it becomes conscious of itself as a unitary moral agent.

Such communities of workers already in being, each embodied in its own institution, each governed by its own ideal of excellence and honour in the work assigned it, suggest the lines for the dreamer or idealist in constructing his vision of the future community of mankind. Nay, in some instances, these institutions may be the actual growing points of that City of God. That the community of mankind will ever take the form of a political organization under a single government I have already expressed some reason for doubting. But the examples I have just cited—and I might have given many more—suggest that the ultimate form of human organizations is not necessarily political. It may be that the political form is appropriate only so long as the world's capacity for trusteeship is imperfectly developed, being destined to pass to a secondary place as the fiduciary principle grows strong enough to

stand on its own feet, as, indeed, it already stands in many a promising institution of our social life—in many a university, for example, such as that I have now the honour of addressing.[1] Forms of association other than the political are certainly open to the human race in its widest relationships. Let us not be deceived by the fact that here and now politics make more noise than they. These things don't stand still, and the time-thinker is entitled to his dreams.

[1] The University of Glasgow.

XIII

RIGHTS AND DUTIES

To the conclusion last reached another line of approach may be found through the word "responsibility"—a word that figures prominently in the terms of the Stevenson Foundation.

The reactions of human nature to the idea of responsibility are strangely paradoxical. Men seek it and shun it; love it and hate it; ask to be delivered from it, and are indignant and humiliated when it is taken away from them. They busy themselves in imposing responsibility on others, but rebel when others impose responsibility upon them. This is the standing difficulty in the League of Nations, where a curious conflict may be observed between the eagerness of the nations to set up world-discipline and their individual unwillingness to submit to it—an inconsistency strikingly illustrated by the action of the United States in withdrawing from the League after helping to create it. And in all democratic societies these opposing tendencies, the love and the hatred of responsibility, which

have a deep root in human nature, are a prolific source of tension.

There is even a degenerate version, or *reductio ad absurdum,* of democracy, much in use among demagogues, which interprets the citizen's vote as a licence conferred upon him by the State to impose responsibility on his fellow-citizens while escaping from it himself. A sophist would say, I suppose, that even so, the citizen is still left responsible for searching out somebody, other than himself, to bear the responsibility; nor can it be denied that many chapters in the history of democracy, notably those which deal with taxation, are the record of such a search and of its temporary successes. Yet the deprivation of responsibility is no less hateful to the citizen than the imposition of it. Responsibility for paying the piper, governed by the once operative but now abandoned principle of "no taxation without representation," seems to be the outstanding exception.

And that perhaps may help us to relieve the paradox. The efforts men make to escape from responsibility will generally be found on examination to spring, not from the hatred of responsibility as such, but from desire to change existing responsibilities for others and to be one's own master in determining the form the

new are to take. The "freedom from responsibility," which makes leisure so attractive, and induces many of us to look forward with pleasurable anticipation to the time when we can "retire" from the active duties of our station, comes to that. When that time comes we shall be able to choose our own responsibilities in place of having them chosen for us by the tyrannous social machine—which is evidently what Mr. Russell means by the "untrammelled" leisure which his social system promises to confer upon the mass of the workers. To have no responsibilities at all is, of course, equivalent to having nothing to do, and that, again, is only another name for being bored to death. Civilian soldiers who served during the recent war have, indeed, often been heard to say that the horrors of the time were greatly mitigated by the sense of freedom from responsibility which accompanied the change from civil to military life. I doubt if they do themselves justice. If you ask them what the precise responsibility was that military life freed them from, they will generally tell you that it was "responsibility from having to earn their living," with its attendant worries. But if you question them further, this interesting fact will reveal itself—that the responsibility of "earning their living" had been exchanged for responsibility of another kind,

that, namely, of having to play the man under conditions where a bullet or a shell might instantly close the question of there being any further "living" for them to earn. They had passed from a lower responsibility to a higher one, or, to speak more strictly, to a higher form of the same.

With reasons to back me, but which I can hardly be expected to discuss in the Stevenson Lectures, I will now venture to lay down, as axiomatic, this proposition: *that man is by nature a responsible being,* which is another way of saying that he is a *born trustee.* All systems of education which fail to develop his capacity for trusteeship miss the mark; all forms of government which fail to treat him as a trustee do him wrong. "Responsibility" is the name of that which his nature insistently demands, and which he must and will have. The *right to responsibility* is the outstanding right of the citizen. In the absence of it all his own "rights" amount to nothing. His rights and his duties coalesce at that point. He has duties, yes; but the *right to duty* underlies them all. He is a trustee and under obligation not to betray his trust; but his right to be trusted defines the fundamental duty his fellow-citizens owe to him.

There are certain philosophers who maintain that a

thing is what it does. Whether or no that be good metaphysics, it is certain that we can never understand what anything is unless we also understand what it does. And the same is true, but more obviously, when you are defining a person, or a class of persons. If you define man as a two legged animal, you indicate his manner of locomotion—you tell us something of what he does. No structure can be understood, certainly not a living structure like a man, unless we see the function it performs. The function performed by the citizen is that of *bearing and fulfilling responsibility.*

Moreover, when anything is being defined, it is difficult to say what the thing is without at the same time saying what somebody *ought* to do. If we define man as a being who walks on two legs we imply that he ought to walk upright and not to spend his life in a seated or motionless attitude. If we define the snake as a poisonous reptile, we warn people to be circumspect in the handling of snakes. If we put the label "prussic acid" on the outside of a bottle we virtually say "let no man drink this." If we call a thing good we bid all men respect, support it, and do likewise. If we call a thing evil we bid them condemn, oppose it, and *not* do likewise. The indicative mood of our defi-

nition changes insensibly into the imperative mood of a command, the noun into the verb. All truth, at bottom, is imperative. Lay bare the bones of it and you will find yourself confronted with a command. Truth indicates a direction to be actively taken rather than a position to be passively occupied, an activity rather than a thing, a power rather than a bare existence. This holds true even of social philosophy. Every truth in that department becomes a command as soon as you have spoken it.

In like manner the definition of citizenship, or of a citizen, cannot be separated from the statement of his duties, of what he ought to do. To be a citizen is to be an actively responsible person, a person, that is, who ought to do things, a person with duties. The citizen is, no doubt, a recipient of services from his fellow-citizens, enjoying benefits which the State or the social system confers upon him, the fortunate heir of the social inheritance, a person protected by the law, sitting in security under his own vine and fig-tree, none daring to make him afraid. But this good fortune of his, as the recipient of benefits conferred upon him by his fellows, or as the heir of former ages, measures the service his age demands of him. The greater the benefits conferred upon him, the more extensive

become his responsibilities. His security is guaranteed him not that he may enjoy it in selfish isolation, but that he may have an assured basis for serving the community. His rights are nothing without his duties. At no point do his rights relieve him of his responsibilities; they create them at every point.

His chief right, as I have said, is the *right to responsibility*. In the days when the vote was denied to women did they not resent that condition as a deprivation of their right to responsibility? Responsibility, they said, we must and will have, and in their wrath at not having it some of them went to great lengths. Granted the citizen has the right to enjoy his life as a reasonable being; but over and above that he has the right to be serviceable, to be valuable to his fellow-men, and to be conscious that he is so. The worst wrong you can do him is to place him in a condition where he is of no value to others, where he has no opportunities for service, where he has no duties that are worth doing, where he is so pampered on the one hand, or so impoverished on the other, that he is of no use to anybody. Once more, he has the *right to duty*.

He has the right to it; and not only to duties that are safe and easy and enjoyable, but also to others

which are dangerous and difficult and burdensome. He has the right to risk his life in the service of his fellows and to lay it down for them if he chooses to do so. The right to work, certainly, and not only to work for fair wages, but also to work for no wages at all, if he chooses to do so, as some of the best men will always choose.

Let me give you an instance out of the modern world. There recently died in America Dr. Charles Proteus Steinmetz. He was a pioneer in developing the uses of electricity, a genius in that department, and for many years had been a technical expert in the service of the General Electric Company, one of the great industrial corporations of America. He was reputed to be enormously rich, and many tall tales were told of his shareholdings in the company and of the colossal salary he received for his services. When his will was made public people learned to their astonishment that all the goods he possessed in this world consisted of a workman's life policy for £300, an antiquated car, and a few other trifles. It then turned out that his shareholdings were *nil,* and that he had received no salary at all. By his own act and will he had refused these things. "I will do my work for its own sake,"

he said; "money shall have nothing to do with it." [1] Whether that is an example to be followed I do not discuss, but I do say that Steinmetz was exercising a right which every free citizen possesses, the right to work for no wages at all. I think he belonged to the same denomination as Hussein Ali, "mechanic and mathematician and servant of the Most High God."

The responsible citizen has the right to seek his fortune in a fair field, but has he not also the right to throw in his lot with the unfortunate and the oppressed, where the field is unfair, and to have his fortune counted out to him in the same coin as theirs? He has the right to play the losing game as well as the winning one. He has the right to enjoy happiness —if you will—but has he not also the right to suffer pain, "to gather the spearpoints into his own bosom," like Arnold Winkelried, if his duty points that way? I count this among the most significant rights of man, inseparable from the right to duty and conditioning every other right he can be said to possess—*the right to pain.*

The "ideal social system" is sometimes represented as though it would automatically relieve the citizen of

[1] I take these particulars from the "Boston Herald," October 28, 1925.

his responsibilities, as lifting that burden off his back and bearing it for him. The citizen has only to put his vote into the ballotbox, as he would put a penny in the slot, and the ideal social system will do the rest. We sometimes think that this is just the system that would suit us; but, in reality, none of us could endure it for a day. It would deprive us of our right to responsibility, the last thing a free man will surrender. Surely we shall be nearer the mark if we say that a good social system provides its members with a continual opportunity of exchanging lower responsibilities for higher, of transforming the one into the other. The history of a progressive civilization is the record of an ever increasing Trust and of a growing demand for trustees. When the trustees fail to appear the civilization falls, let its social system be what it may.

A good social system does indeed give us security; but I greatly doubt if our "happiness" is what it secures. We are all hard to please in the matter of happiness, and though we clamour for the "equal distribution" of it, no man could ever tell whether it was equally distributed or not—one of the many drawbacks to making happiness the "end." Standardized varieties of it seldom attract us; we like to put a little of our own individuality into the happiness we enjoy.

But if the social system secured our happiness it would have to standardize it more or less. It could not secure us in the kind, the most important perhaps, which is dependent on our personal peculiarities and likings. There are some beautiful souls for example who can never be happy unless they are helping a lame dog over a stile. There are others, alas, not beautiful, who are only happy when they are boring or tormenting somebody else. The social system could not "secure" the happiness of either of these classes. It could not undertake to furnish the beautiful souls with lame dogs to help over stiles, nor the bores and tormentors with people to bore and torment.

There is a kind of happiness commonly known as "the sweets of life," and, in truth, the contents of a sweet-shop are a very apt symbol of it, both as to its inner nature and its popularity. On recent inquiry as to the trades that now flourish most in America, I was informed that one of the most prosperous was the "candy trade," with the explanation added that "candy" included "chewing-gum." I thought it an interesting social phenomenon as indicating in what directions the winds of human desire are blowing, and could not help wondering whether the "right to happiness" secured by the American Declaration of Inde-

pendence includes the right to a sufficient allowance of these two commodities and of the "sweets of life" they symbolize. On the whole I think we should be well advised not to demand that the social system shall secure our happiness, at least in the gum-and-candy version of it.

These considerations emphasize the truth, otherwise obvious, that trusteeship and responsibility are different names for the vitalizing principle of civic virtue, one and the same in all ranks and classes of the citizens. Either term will remind us that the value of what we get out of our citizenship in the way of benefits is strictly conditioned by what we put into it in the way of service, our rights on the one side involving our duties on the other. Of the two terms I think "trusteeship" is to be preferred to "responsibility" as reminding us of these things the more effectually. It enables us to see our rights and our duties as a single whole, since, when once we have grasped the truth that the fundamental right of the citizen is to be charged with a trust, his fundamental duty can be nothing else than to fulfil it. Moreover, the word is less likely to lead us into error of interpreting "rights and duties" in purely political terms. It reminds us of business at its highest level, of the most honourable

transactions of the industrial world, and brings into prominence the immense and beneficent part these transactions play in the maintenance of society as a going concern from day to day.

And this may act as a salutary corrective to pessimistic tendencies. With the limits of its own business, industry has already developed a capacity for trusteeship which compares very favourably with the like developments in the political field, and when, as sometimes happens, we are tempted to despair of political democracy as an instrument for the unification of mankind, "trusteeship" will serve to remind us that there still remains a large number of fiduciary institutions which industry has evolved and manned with competent trustees, as possible growing-points of a world-wide unity. Voting is not an ultimate category of the universe; but working clearly is; and who that takes a long and deep view of these matters will doubt that, as worker and worked-for, man must ultimately make good his claim to be a citizen of the universe, or, as Hussein Ali would phrase it, "a servant of the Most High God." His trusteeship stands rooted in the field of his working vocation, his voting vocation being secondary to that. By calling it trusteeship rather than responsibility we emphasize this important aspect of

the matter. The religious aspect would be a very proper name for it.

I shall be following the example of my distinguished predecessor in this Lectureship, Sir Henry Hadow, whose last lecture bears the title "De Civitate Dei,"[2] if I venture here a further remark on the topic just touched upon—our cosmic citizenship.

The rights and duties of citizenship present themselves, as I conceive the matter, under three main aspects, political, industrial, and cosmic. Each of us is, first, a citizen of the country in which he was born; second, a citizen of this small but busy planet, the earth; and, third, a citizen of the wide universe. As voter he belongs to his country; as worker he belongs to mankind; as human being he belongs to the universe. He carries rights and duties in each separately and in all together.

These three forms of citizenship are very closely interrelated and interdependent. We cannot understand our duties (which involve our rights) as citizens in any one of the three unless we remember our place in the other two. Our responsibilities as voters in the country where we were born are closely connected with our responsibilities as workers in the in-

[2] "Citizenship," p. 205.

ternational community of producers and consumers; and both are deeply rooted in our responsibilities as human beings. Each acts and reacts with the others, and from their interactions there arises a system of rights and duties extremely complicated, but having an inner unity, infinitely worth while, deep as the universe of time, wide as the universe of space.

The terms of the Stevenson Foundation mention the first two forms of our citizenship with nothing said explicitly about the third—our citizenship in the universe. But something is said by implication when we are bidden to study together the rights *and* the duties of the citizen. The meanings of these two words, right and duty, stand connected in the meaning of the universe. They are words of cosmic significance. Have we any duties? They are duties which the universe requires us to fulfil. Have we any rights? They are bestowed on us by the universe. Were we not, to begin with, human beings and citizens of the universe we should have no rights nor duties whatsoever. There would be no Glasgow to vote in; there would be no earth to work in. Without the cosmic background our political citizenship and our industrial citizenship are incomprehensible or, rather, meaningless.

We human beings are apt to think our race the only

object in creation that really matters. We have developed a kind of class consciousness in presence of the universe. The human race is all-important in its own eyes: nature is there to be ruled by us; her forces were meant to turn our wheels; her materials to be exploited for our enrichment; her laws to provide for our comfort, and the very stars in their courses must be yoked to our waggons. We have still to learn that the human race is tolerated in the universe only on strict condition of good behaviour. If we neglect our citizenship there, or think that we can play fast and loose with the laws that are written there, laws that were not voted into existence by us, those other citizenships will come to grief. This human class consciousness in presence of the rest of the universe is not a good thing. It is a dangerous thing. Unless we bear that in mind our study of the rights and duties of the citizen is not worth while.

XIV

AN EXAMPLE OF TRUSTEESHIP

I HAVE already mentioned Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris as notable pioneers in the attempt to create an industrial version of morality. I now add another name, less widely known, to that short list—the name of Professor Josiah Royce, late of Harvard University, a philosopher to whose friendship and teaching I stand under great obligations.

Royce was a born metaphysician, and is best known by the contributions he made to that formidable department of human knowledge. But in the later years of his life he took up, with great ardour, the difficult task of translating his metaphysics into a social philosophy.

It so happened that his metaphysical system was of a kind that lent itself to businesslike applications, which is more, perhaps, than can be said of metaphysics in general. He called it the "Philosophy of Loyalty," publishing a book,[1] of no great compass, under that

[1] "The Philosophy of Loyalty," The Macmillan Company, New York.

title, which I have often recommended to young men and women in search of what they are pleased to call "a working philosophy of life." I tell my young friends that if they want to develop their argumentative faculty they had better try something else, and I give them the names of several eminent philosophers whose works are suitable for that purpose, but that if they are prepared for an earnest and rather promising experiment under metaphysical guidance, the "Philosophy of Loyalty" will serve their turn better than any other I know of. Some of them, after trying the experiment, have thanked me for my recommendation. Others, alas, have fallen into the argumentative vein, and written letters pointing out that there is a logical flaw in Royce's philosophy, which I think is quite possible. All the same, I repeat the recommendation. Even if the book does nothing more than familiarize a few young men and women with the idea of loyalty, I believe it will do good.

It is not, however, from the "Philosophy of Loyalty," to which I am otherwise much indebted, that I am about to borrow in the present lecture, but from another book, an interesting by-product of the former, which made its appearance shortly before the author's death in the first year of the Great War. It was a

time, you may remember, when the minds of good men were much exercised with the question of putting an end to the recurrence of armed conflicts between nations, and when many schemes were being elaborated for that desirable object, most of which are now forgotten, as perhaps some of them deserve to be. I am inclined to think, however, that the one I am about to mention deserves to be remembered, as a fruitful hint to future workers in that line, though nobody knew better than Royce that universal peace is not likely to result from the automatic working of any scheme, formula, or catchword.

He had long been occupied with a conception, or ideal, named by him "The Beloved Community." This he exhibited as the proper object of the free man's "loyalty," giving it a meaning not fundamentally different from what Platonists have meant by the City of God, mystics by the Communion of Saints, and theologians by the Holy Catholic Church. But these latter conceptions, profoundly significant as he held them to be, seemed to him to lack the scientific equipment and practical technique which would bring them into living contact with the activities of the modern world. He saw that the reconciliation of science and religion, so much talked about, is not to be effected merely by

a theoretical adjustment of their respective principles, but needs also the combination of the great ideals of the one with the accurate, trustworthy, and business-like methods of the other, which is pretty much what I have described as "an industrial version of morality." He began to look about, therefore, for some institution in the business world of to-day where the said combination of ideal aims with a developed scientific technique might be seen exemplified in actual operation. Oddly enough, as some might think, he found the chief example neither in any existing state, nor in any existing Church, but in the very familiar institution known as Mutual Insurance. In this institution, whether in the humble form of a workman's Friendly Society or that of a vast incorporation with world-wide ramifications, he saw a visible, though imperfect, instance of the Beloved Community at work, of the principles it involves, of the loyalties on which it reposes, and of the scientific methods required for their expression. A turn so unwonted to a metaphysical speculation naturally caused considerable surprise, which gathered force when the sequel developed.

The history of Mutual Insurance, as everybody who has studied it will admit, is both an epic and a romance; an epic, in respect of the heroic labours under-

taken and the contradictions endured by the pioneers; a romance, in respect of operations once deemed incredible, but now converted, by actuarial skill, into the commonplaces of industrial life. From the days of Price, the pioneer in constructing reliable tables of mortality, the practice of Mutual Insurance, which has probably done more than anything else towards harmonizing the conflicting interests of industrial society into peaceful and beneficent co-operations, has been gradually built up by scientific toil in the face of difficulties that seemed at first insuperable. At every stage of its earlier progress, wiseacres came forward with a confident prediction that the untrustworthiness of mankind would ruin it. Life insurance, it was said, would fill the land with murder and suicide; the houses insured against fire would presently be burnt down, the ships insured against wreck would be scuttled; the risks to be insured against could never be estimated, and even if they could, neither the insurers nor the insured would play the game honourably. The event has proved that these prophets underestimated the fiduciary capacities of human nature no less than they underestimated the possibilities of science. To-day we can insure our crops against hailstorms, our trade against bad debts, our holidays against wet weather,

and our horse's life as well as our own. And who can doubt that among the disastrous risks to which nations, as well as individuals, stand exposed there are many yet outstanding which this beneficent science will ultimately bring under its control, some perhaps seemingly uninsurable at the moment, but not to be deemed permanently so, with the history of past achievements before us? It is obvious that in Mutual Insurance we possess an ethical principle, combined with a scientific method, that is capable of endless extension, development, and application. And behind all that there lies, for those who are willing to entertain it, the conception of man as a "born trustee," of his natural capacity for the fiduciary function—in my opinion the greatest among the "undeveloped assets" of the human race, and now awaiting development under appropriate education directed to that end.

It is evident that these thoughts were operating strongly in the mind of Professor Royce both immediately before and after the outbreak of the Great War. He had found in Mutual Insurance the example he was seeking of an actual institution where the principle "of bearing one another's burdens," essential in the Beloved Community, and one of the main expressions of loyalty, had been scientifically applied to the

burden of risk, which bulks so largely in the life of industrial communities, and committed to the hands of competent and faithful trustees. Here, then, you have not only the principle of loyalty in actual operation, but the scientific basis to assure the efficient working of it.

Royce had been greatly impressed by the history to which I have just alluded. If Mutual Insurance had already accomplished so much, and against such formidable odds, might it not be destined to accomplish something far greater in the future? Might it not be extended in the interests of international unity? If individuals could insure their lives and their property, was it unthinkable that nations should do the same? If the nations were sufficiently individualized to compete and fight with one another, might they not become sufficiently individualized to insure with one another? If loyal warriors could be found for the fighting operation, might not competent trustees be found for the insuring operation? Might not a list be drawn up of the risks to which nations are subject, such as robbery, violence, earthquake, famine, epidemics, conflagration of cities, and so on, parallel to the like risks now insured against in the ordinary course of social life, and made the subject of insurance contracts be-

tween nations, to the great benefit, both economic and moral, of all parties? And among the risks so dealt with might not the risk of war be specifically included?

To the working out of this novel and interesting idea, Royce addressed himself manfully, and after considerable consultation with experts, not all of whom were sympathetic, finally produced a tentative plan which he thought himself justified in publishing under the title "War and Insurance." [2] The title was, perhaps, a little unfortunate, since it concentrated attention on war as though it were the only insurable risk in question, whereas, in reality, the book was a plea for International Insurance on much broader lines. At that time, however, when everybody was agog with schemes for putting a stop to war, Royce was naturally led to push this special aspect of the matter into the forefront of his argument. This, I say, was a little unfortunate, for even if war in particular should turn out to be an uninsurable risk, as some experts have assured me it is, there are many other international risks to be considered. The principle of International Insurance is not necessarily unsound because of its failure at that particular point. Royce himself, indeed, was anxious to get the matter viewed in the

[2] The Macmillan Company, New York, 1914.

broader light, contending in the course of his book that if a beginning were made on *any* risk of international importance, the principle might be left to extend itself naturally, without deciding in advance all the risks that were insurable and all that were not, so that war might possibly be the last risk to be dealt with, if dealt with at all. As to the scheme propounded in the book for dealing with war, it was put forward as purely tentative and with the utmost modesty, the intention being to stimulate others, who might be in sympathy with the general principle, to improve upon it. First experiments in such cases are seldom successful; like the first attempt at a flying machine, they often result in damage to the experimenters, and it needs some courage to make them. Royce was not unprepared for this; what he hoped for was that his proposal would be found sufficiently suggestive to prompt creative effort in the same direction. For he was fully convinced of the soundness of his general principle, and believed that in due time it would germinate and bear fruit according to its kind.

The interest of the plan for our present discussion lies in the fact that it proposes to find a basis for international unity in the field of " business " rather than in the field of politics, and to make use for that pur-

pose of a principle already equipped with a highly scientific technique, which politics lack, and already secured in the confidence of mankind by its proved efficacy in unifying conflicting interests and converting dangerous into peaceable relationships. "The best teaching of international morality," writes our author, "must take, at present, indirect forms"—a saying well worth consideration, and applicable, I think, to the teaching of morality in general. To teach international morality by laying down its general principles, writing books on the subject, or by any kind of propaganda directly aimed at promoting it, though useful in its place, is clearly not enough. It may be *taught* in that way, but it will never be *learnt,* and so long as other methods of promoting it are wanting, no great advance can be expected from the low level at which it now stands. To get it effectually learnt, a field must be created for its exercise (the only way of learning anything), and placed under the charge of international trustees appointed for the purpose. Suppose it laid down, as a principle of international ethics, that each nation is under the obligation of respecting the property of the others and leaving them unmolested in the possession of it. That would be the direct method of teaching the ethic in question. But it would merely

inform the nations, on the authority of whoever laid down the principle, that they were *not* to do something which for ages long they had been in the habit of doing—a procedure notoriously ineffective. Respect for each other's property will not become an effective virtue until a property exists which belongs neither to this nation nor to that, but to all of them together, and until they have become sufficiently exercised in the just administration of it. This is another way of saying that international unity is to be attained not through negative measures for suppressing divisions or "putting a stop to war," but by the creation of a field or fields for positive co-operation and common ownership under some principle of proved efficacy.

Royce's plan, admittedly tentative, was designed to meet these conditions. He proposed the creation of an International Trust or Fund, to be placed under the administration of International Trustees, and conducted on scientific methods analogous to those which have proved their efficacy in the familiar institution of Mutual Insurance. This International Board (the name he gave it) would be the owner of an international property, formed, after the manner of an ordi-

nary insurance fund, by the contributions of the policy-holding nations, and embodied in world-wide investments so distributed as to be virtually inaccessible to attack. Whatever risks to a nation's life and property might be found internationally insurable would be insured under cover of that fund. Of such risks there would certainly be some. One might imagine, for example, that shipping would be one of them.

Were any plan of this kind found to be practicable, the negative effect of it in reducing the likelihood of war would be very considerable. To whatever extent the risks to a nation's property were covered by a common fund, to which they were all contributors, to that extent they would all be interested in resisting damage to it, or to any part of it, by war; and this would be the more effective if the provision were made, as Royce suggested it should be, that any nation making an unprovoked attack would thereby forfeit whatever rights it had acquired in the fund. To this aspect of the matter Royce devoted considerable attention, though it is not essential to his main thesis. For that thesis, as I have said, was essentially concerned with the building up of an international ethic by extending to the field of international practice an institution, at

once ethical and businesslike, which has proved efficacious, whenever it has been adopted, in creating solidarity of interest.

"International relationships" is one of the subjects which the terms of the Stevenson Foundation require me to deal with. I have already fulfilled that condition to some extent in calling your attention to the fact that the citizen, as worker and worked-for, is the member of a world-wide community of producers and consumers, and that, both as producer and consumer, he is a trustee for the interests of that community. It is in view of this broad fact, and not merely as furnishing specific means for the prevention of war, that Royce's book seems to me worthy of study by all who are interested in the great question of international unity. Mutual insurance is not the only non-political method of working to that end, though none, perhaps, is more immediately available. There are many others, economic, cultural and religious. But mutual insurance has the great advantage of resting on a scientific basis and of having a technique of its own together with a high tradition of honourable dealing, an established record of social beneficence and a trained body of actuarial experts to conduct its business. It ought, therefore, to be of special interest to those who per-

ceive to their sorrow that international unity is but little promoted by the incantations of humanitarian phraseology, such as the "brotherhood of man," and who are on the lookout for more businesslike methods of giving effect to their ideals. Strange, indeed, it would be if a method which has proved so beneficent in every industrial society which has adopted it should have no application to industrial society as a whole. Immense difficulties, no doubt, await the international application, and it may well be that some of them would prove fatal to the particular plan put forth by Professor Royce; but we must not forget that the history of mutual insurance is a long record of difficulties overcome, nor conclude too hastily that it will be finally baffled by those confronting it when world-interests are in question. To predict a future for it in that connection would be no rash prophecy. At all events, constructive citizenship should be awake to the possibilities it suggests.

It is an important, though somewhat sinister fact that the nations of the modern world have very little confidence in each other's politicians, and sometimes, it must be confessed, not much more in their own. Hence the difficulty, which the League of Nations is very familiar with, of getting international business trans-

acted through the agency of purely political persons, such as prime ministers, secretaries of state, diplomats or Foreign Office experts. They are apt to suspect each other's good faith. And the difficulty is increased by the constant change of personnel that goes on in the political department through the fluctuating fortunes of political parties in the homefield. "The French would be much easier to deal with if we could be reasonably certain that the minister who will represent them a month hence would be the same person as the minister who represents them to-day," was a remark once made to me by a worn-out delegate who had just returned from Geneva.

Obviously, the type of public servant needed for the transaction of international business is the type denominated by the word "trustee." Continuity being essential, such agents should be appointed for life (as our judges are), or at least for long periods. Their tenure of office, as international servants, should not be subject to the fluctuating fortunes of electioneering at home, nor to the need of consulting the interests of their party. Such persons, I believe, would be easiest found among those who have received their training on the highest levels of the business and professional world. "For purposes of dealing with delicate and

controversial matters," writes Professor Royce, "it is difficult to find a trustworthy politician, or a trustworthy diplomat, or a trustworthy ruler, or, in cases that involve pressing and passionate issues, an entirely trustworthy and unprejudiced arbitrator. But it is much easier to find, under suitable social conditions, a faithful and enlightened and fairminded trustee. . . . The international board of trustees which my plan contemplates would have no police to guard it, no international army or navy to protect it, no direct interest in international controversies, and no reason for diplomatic relations with any existing powers. . . . I submit that an international board of this kind would be at present a novelty, and that, if some form of international insurance proves to be feasible, such a body might become, in the end, one of the most potent international enterprises on earth."

In a former lecture I submitted the proposition that the doctoring of social evils, admittedly numerous and malignant, is not the primary mission of constructive citizenship. Its mission is, rather, to strengthen, develop, and extend, if possible to the wide world, whatever sound and beneficent social enterprise may be found already in operation. The history of mutual insurance proves it to be one of these. It combines

the three elements which I have put before you as the essentials of good citizenship; trusteeship on the ethical side; a competent technique on the scientific side; skill on the personal side. I name mutual insurance as an example of what trusteeship means in the organized life of society.

XV

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDUSTRY

THE words quoted in the last lecture from Royce's book about the difficulty of finding a trustworthy politician, diplomat, or ruler for dealing with delicate and controversial matters, especially in cases where pressing and passionate issues are involved, raise a question of supreme importance to an industrial age, the question, namely, of the government of industry in general. In whose hands is the governing power to be lodged? No one will deny that the disputes and conflicts that arise in industry, whether between labour and capital, or between the commercial interests of competing nations, have precisely that delicate, controversial, pressing and passionate nature for dealing with which the politician or the diplomat, according to Professor Royce, is not the type of agent the case requires. Yet the fact is patent to all observers that the tendency of industry to pass under political control is gathering strength in many of the more advanced industrial na-

tions, notably our own, to say nothing of the backward —such as Russia. A leading industrialist who recently complained of being "bedevilled by legislation" may not have chosen the most elegant form of language for expressing himself, but he was unquestionably pointing to one of the significant tendencies of the time.

It cannot be insisted on too often that democratic machinery, of the type the modern world has become familiar with, was not originally created for the purpose of controlling industry, still less of owning and managing what are known as the means of production. It was created rather with the idea of leaving industry free to seek its fortunes in its own field unchecked by legislative interference; rather, one might say, for the purpose of protecting industry from the law-maker than of setting a new law-maker over him. This may have been shortsighted; it may be chargeable with all the vices commonly attributed to *laissez-faire;* but the main lines of the democratic machine, as we know it here or in America, were certainly laid down in that spirit and for that purpose. We are now tending to use it more and more for a purpose the flat opposite of that for which it was originally created. Whether State control of industry, in any of its many forms, be

a wise enterprise or not, it was never contemplated by the founders of modern democracy.

The fact that democratic institutions were created for something else, does not, of course, preclude the possibility that they are just what we want for the control of industry, any more than the fact of an instrument being created for poking a fire prevents it from being just what we want for knocking down a burglar. But this a priori possibility begins to disappear on close examination of the said institutions and their manner of working.

For example, it is difficult to see how the management of industry on the national scale could be efficiently carried out so long as the party system remained in force. Industry, whether you take it as a whole or in detail, has a highly developed technique of its own, and were it once to become entangled with the strife for political power, which goes on between contending parties, nothing but ruin would stare it in the face. The method of popular representation, admirably adapted as it may be for securing the liberty of the subject, is ill adapted for dealing with the infinite complexities and the constantly changing fortunes of industry and commerce. To navigate a ship through dangerous seas by a committee of the passen-

gers, or to deal with an epidemic by consulting the patients, or to decide the strategy of a battle by a majority vote of the rank and file are feeble analogies to suggest the confusion that would result if our present democratic machinery were made to carry the whole weight of the nation's industrial fortunes. One of two things would inevitably happen: either the machinery would break down, or industry would go bankrupt. More probably both things would happen together.

Even if the method of popular representation were retained, the basis of it would have to be radically altered. As things now are the citizens vote on a basis of locality, according to the places in which they happen to be living when a general election takes place. But this is altogether out of relation to the interests of the citizens as workers in this industry or in that. In an industrialized State the workers ought to vote not according to the place where they live but according to the trade that they follow, and I observe that in America a group of thinkers, of whom Dr. Felix Adler of New York is one, have been urging for some time that vocational representation, as distinct from the local representation now in force, is the only possible basis for industrial democracy. Whether such a system is practicable may be questioned; it would cer-

tainly be difficult to introduce; and yet there seems no other way in which the management of industry could be made even roughly harmonious with popular representation. Even if it were adopted, the way to a clear issue is not easily seen. You might have a Government in power representing one group of trades and an Opposition representing another; a state of things obviously fraught with the utmost danger to industrial stability.

In spite, however, of these indications to the contrary, it seems probable that, as time goes on, the development of industrial organization will proceed on lines that are less involved with national politics. As the international character of industrial civilization becomes more widely recognized, we may anticipate that the workers of all nations will find more effective means of making good their common interests than those provided by the political machinery of any State. The community of mankind, if ever it is to become a reality on the earth, will probably be a co-operative commonwealth, whose bond of union will not lie in any political government, but in the value of the aim which all are pursuing together and in the mutual loyalties which the pursuit of such an end inspires. For the loyalties of men to one another derive their vitality

from the value of the aim they pursue in common. The example of mutual insurance suggests—and I introduce it for the purpose of suggesting—that the world of our day is by no means lacking in the means of development on these lines.

The management of industrial affairs, both on the technical and the financial side, is characterized in most cases by the demand for *firm and rapid decisions.* The delay which results from the long discussions of party warfare, the feeble compromises in which such discussions often issue, and the " red tape " procedure which accompanies their application, are not only out of relation to the needs of industry, but flatly opposed to them. And this irrespective of whether we view them from the side of the employed or from the side of the employer. Time, which Napoleon declared to be the chief factor in a battle, dominates industry at every point. Labour disputes, in particular, which are tending more and more to become questions of political debate, will not brook the delays of interminable speech-making. While the orators are exercising themselves the unemployed are growing more desperate, the public more restive, and the trade which forms the subject of dispute passes to other countries or dies out. Boswell, discussing education with Johnson, once asked

that great time-thinker what subject a boy should learn first when he went to school. "Sir," replied the sage, "while you are debating which of two subjects your boy shall learn first, another boy learns both of them." And how true it is that while we at home are debating how the wages and profits of an industry are to be divided, another nation gets both of them. I was in Rotterdam not long ago, and I saw that great Dutch waterway blocked with ships carrying coal to Great Britain. "Agree with thine adversary *quickly*" is a rule which should govern every kind of dispute, but is never more needed than when the dispute takes the industrial form, like that of the coal stoppage through which we are now passing.[1] The common notion that these conflicts are to be rapidly settled by an "appeal to the Government" is clearly a delusion; for the "Government" appealed to will immediately become involved in a dispute of its own with the "Opposition," and in the danger of alienating its supporters; the two disputes will then get mixed up; each will delay the settlement of the other; and when at last the settlement comes it will be found to be some sort of politico-industrial compromise out of relation to the original facts of the case; for "these things don't stand still."

[1] 1926.

For dealing with the financial side of industry our political machinery is even more inappropriate. It is, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance that high finance has a nature too difficult and technical to offer a promising topic for parliamentary debate or speechmaking at election time. Few questions of our time have been more deeply fraught with economic consequences to all classes of the community than those involved in the recent restoration of the gold standard. No election turned on it, yet nothing on which the elections did turn was more important. The public were not consulted, for the obvious reason that the public generally were incapable of understanding the matter. Most of the speeches made about it came after the event; which again is fortunate, for there can be little doubt that if the question had been thrown into the arena of public debate and party warfare nothing whatever would have been done in time. It happens, however, that the best democratic governments, notably our own, have behind them a body of financial experts, highly skilled and trustworthy, who form no part of the political machinery and are not at the mercy of electioneering contingencies. They represent, in fact, that very type of fiduciary agent, or trustee, which Professor Royce advises us to seek out and train for the management

of the difficult and delicate business of industrial civilization. It is reassuring to know that the real decision in such matters rests with them. By them we are saved, so far as we are saved at all, from the disastrous delays that would otherwise follow from our present practice of charging a political machine, created for widely different functions, with the control of industry. For delay, in that province, always tends to become disastrous. It is the very devil. The industrialist who complained of being " bedevilled " by legislation used the right word.

It is quite possible, however, that as the general level of education rises, political institutions will themselves develop on fiduciary lines. And that I should say is certain to happen when the discovery is made, as I think it will be, that the skilled trustee appointed for life or for a long period, as distinct from the politician subject to the precarious fortunes of his party, is the kind of agent best fitted to promote co-operation on the field of international relationships. The appointment of such persons in the international field, and the good results seen to follow, will naturally lead to their increased appointment in the national field. A day may come when popular representation will discover its own limits, and voluntarily abdicate, at certain points,

in favour of something better. It corresponds to nothing in the constitution of the universe.

Before closing I will offer you another and a more homely example of trusteeship in action.

I was hearing the other day about a coal-mine where the miners and owners had somehow managed to evolve from among themselves a person known in the mine as "the white man." He had been a working miner, and having won the respect of all parties had been promoted to foreman-manager. His function was, they told me, to act as trustee for both sides in every dispute that arose. Nobody had voted him into that function; he had just arrived at it on merit by a process of natural selection. Yet it was perfectly distinct and recognized by everybody. And the result was, in the language of my informant, that "both sides worked together like a band of brothers." I do not offer this pretty tale as a final "solution of the labour problem." But it indicates the need of something without which no "solution" will be worth more than the paper it is written on.

XVI

QUALITY

We are now in a position to define the task which awaits constructive citizenship in an industrial age. A single sentence will suffice. The task consists in the gradual transformation of industrial civilization from an enterprise in quantity to an enterprise in quality.

Our method, described in a former lecture as time-thinking, has led to that conclusion. Quantity is, primarily, an affair of space, quality an affair of time. Space-thinking asks: "*How much* of this world's goods am I to get?" Time-thinking replies: "Will they be really *good* when you get them?" Quantity is the idol of the market-place; many worship it in these days, and there are prophets of Baal among us who proclaim the worship and priests who furnish it with a ritual. But quality is *spirit,* and they who worship at that shrine must worship in spirit and in truth. The cult of quality is "Christianity in its simplest and most intelligible form."

The simplest and the most intelligible; but not the

easiest. The transformation of industry from quantitative to qualitative is a titanic undertaking; even the Labour Party, to whom, as I have tried to explain, it specially belongs, might well quail before it. But man was created for such things. When God breathed the breath of life into his nostrils, he assigned him the Impossible for his vocation, and the history of civilization, which is one vast miracle, declares man's fitness for that high calling. At this moment there exists in the world enough social valour to transform civilization from an enterprise in quantity to an enterprise in quality. It only needs arousing from the sleep into which it has been hypnotized by catchwords, phrasemongery, and incantations.

It has been said that if man were an entirely lost and fallen being he could never know it. To be *conscious* that in his present condition he is done-for means that enough of the true light remains in man to enable him to see the facts of his case. In the same way the "Downfall of Western Civilization" cannot be the last word about the matter. Our *consciousness* that we are falling is not itself involved in the fall, but stands apart from it and may possibly furnish the means of arresting it. In the same way, too, our *consciousness* that quantity is ruling us betokens that in

the innermost heart of us we are still faithful to quality and know what it means.

Though the broad currents are set in the direction of quantity modern industry has by no means lost its hold on quality. In all our industries (except those, perhaps, which minister to the baser occupations of our leisure) "a remnant remains," and a considerable remnant, of men and women in every rank of labour who are its faithful, devoted, heroic servants—the "good workmen" whom I have characterized as the saviours of society and the hope of industrial civilization, trustworthy, competent, skilled. You may find them in the world of high finance. You may find them planning vast operations in mass production, for there are wide differences of quality in the goods that mass production "produces." You may find them in the inventor's office, in the scientific laboratory, in the scholar's study, in the artist's studio. You may find them driving locomotives, steering ships, laying bricks, cutting coal. To those of my younger hearers who may be looking out for a mission in life I would say: Throw your weight on to the side of these; join their ranks; support their cause. "Strengthen the opposite of that which is too strong." Space-thinking is too strong; quantity is too strong. Their opposites are

time-thinking and quality. Strengthen them. There is no form of social service comparable to that.

But the praise of quality must not be taken as the dispraise of quantity. To describe the King as "the first peer in the realm" is not to inform the other peers that they are nobodies. To say the equator has no existence, except on maps, must not be constructed as "speaking disrespectfully of the equator." Each in its own order and place. Quantity is not the antithesis of quality, any more than the material is the antithesis of the spiritual, though some philosophers would seem to make it so. Quantity has a value of its own which it retains as long as it is content to serve, but loses when it aspires to rule. As a servant the multiplication table is indispensable, as a master its tyranny is pernicious. Between quality and quantity there is a vital relation which amounts to intimacy at certain points. The highest qualities—Truth, Beauty, and Goodness are the common names of them—have a self-multiplying nature. They increase themselves. "Seek quality first and due quantity shall be added unto you"; "seek the 'better' first and the 'more' will come," are working formulæ of the right relation between the two.

This may be called an act of faith. But there is need of an industrial version of faith as well as of

morality. The formulæ I have just quoted may serve as the summary of it. As a line of direction for British industry, in particular, I know of none that can be relied on to yield better results, and greater results, both economic and moral. And it is reassuring to find that the best minds of the business world seem to be fully aware of this. Seek quality first, in obedience to the heavenly vision. The rest will follow.

In a country like our own, when forty-eight million human beings have to be fed, clothed, warmed and lodged from day to day, nobody in his senses would contend that quantity is of no account. There must be *enough* to go round—enough food, raiment, fuel and shelter. "One mark of a good social system," I once heard it said, "is that it provides enough milk for all the babies." Let the stockbreeders look to it, then, by keeping up and improving the *quality of the cows,* for the milk comes from them, the social system yielding none. And so with agriculture in general. "What the land wants," said a farmer addressing a political meeting in my constituency, "is for skilled farmers to take it in hand and politicians to leave it alone." It was a voice appealing for quality (the sure precursor of due quantity) in the vernacular of the world's greatest industry, but easily translated into the dialect

of other industries, whether "bedevilled by legislation" or not. Constructive citizenship should not be deaf to that cry.

It will probably be agreed that all enterprises for the improvement of quality must have their final justification in the improvement of *human beings.* High quality in workmanship is nothing to the purpose unless it leads on to high quality in the workman. Does it make *him* more valuable, not only in respect of what he produces (which it clearly does), but in respect of what he *is*—a more satisfactory person to live with, a healthier person to rub shoulders with, a wiser person to take counsel with, a more beautiful person to look upon, a pleasanter companion in prosperity, a stouter comrade in adversity, a juster master, an honester servant, a better neighbour, a truer friend, a more faithful lover? Does good workmanship incline the workmen to welcome each other's presence in the workshop (which, of course, is the world); does it prompt the cry "the more the merrier," and restrain that other cry, so hard to reconcile with the love of man—you will remember Mr. Hardy's sinister boy—"We are too many: it were better if some of these people had never been born, and a few hanged outright; go to now, let us reduce the population"? In a word, does

good workmanship make the workman more valuable *in himself*, a distinct addition, in his own person, to the total values of the universe, not to be withdrawn from it without loss and damage to his fellow citizens?

I believe it does. I believe the present proposals for reducing the population (a significant phenomenon) are due, less to the fear that the "sweets of life" are not enough to go round, and more to a dim perception of the fact that as things now are a large proportion of these newcomers are destined to become *bad workmen*, and therefore of no value in themselves, no value as comrades, as friends, as neighbours, as lovers, and all the rest.

But before giving reasons for this belief there are one or two surrounding considerations to which I must invite your attention.

In the last lecture I quoted the saying of Professor Royce that "the best teaching of international morality, at present, must be indirect." And I ventured the addition that the indirect method is the best for the teaching of morality in general—morality being one of the many names we have for the *quality* of men. The direct method of improving morality, when it takes the form of verbal instruction in moral principles, whether by literary, oratorical, or homiletical exer-

cises, does not effect very much, unless it be accompanied by actual exercises in the virtues inculcated; otherwise it is taught but not learnt, the sad fate of so much good teaching. The only way of learning anything effectively, so Carlyle assures us, is by doing it, a saying certainly true when morality is in question.

"If you want to train the human mind," an experienced schoolmaster once remarked, "avoid training it; train something else," and when asked what the "something else" might be, he answered, "the body," and then went on to explain in language of great wisdom, that "the body" is an instrument for every kind of creative skill, and by no means the mechanically actuated corpse the materialists make of it. In the same way, if you want to train the conscience, or moral faculty, in an individual, I believe it would be wise to avoid training it directly, at least in the first instance, and to train rather the instruments of which the conscience makes use, notably the senses, the hands, the whole body, equipped with the tools which these organs use in going about their business. Rightly conceiving what the human body is, and remembering that the conscience, apart from the bodily activities which manifest it, is an abstraction, existing like the equator on the "map" only, the training of it should obviously

begin with the training of its instrument, the body, for the achievement of excellence in all its activities and operations. That, the indirect method, should be the basis for the training of the conscience; the direct method, effective as the finishing stage but apt to be futile at earlier stages, being kept in reserve, or cautiously administered, meanwhile. You cannot train a pianist by giving him lectures on music; you must furnish him with a piano and get him busy on the keyboard. In the parallel case of morals the keyboard is the daily work of the citizen as defined by his vocation; let him learn to make what music he can out of that. And if there is none to be made out of it, the thing before him being not a keyboard but a board without the keys—the lot, alas, of millions—have we not here the first reform which the "improvers of the human species" should address themselves to?

Improve the breed by all means; by scientific selection under Mendelian or other formulæ, by enlightened control in a world governed by eugenic experts or, as lately proposed, by State licence to breed, issued to attested graduates in that department; continue these methods till all undesirable strains have been eliminated and none left to people the earth but supermen, moral aristocrats, fully realized personalities, or what-

ever exhibition variety of the human race your fancy may pitch on—it will all be to no purpose unless these choice specimens find on their arrival in the world that something is waiting for them to *do* really worth doing by men such as they. Your "fully realized personalities" will not be content to pass their time in contemplating the fulness of their realization and in admiring one another. To put it very plainly, they will ask for a job; a job that will put them on their mettle; a super-job worthy of supermen; and if none is forthcoming a frightful epidemic of suicide will break out. To use plain language once more, if the quality of human *labour* is suffered to decay, there is an end to our hopes of improving the quality of the "breed." The best thing we can do for posterity is to leave it the heir to a better job than has fallen to our own day and generation. Let us, then, foster the arts, and seek by all available means to bring them into a working partnership with the industries of the land, with the daily work of the people. There are more reasons than the economic for keeping up and improving the quality of our national manufactures. "Seek the better first and the more will be added unto you"—not only more wealth, which is never the chief thing, though it may be a symbol of it, but more *men* of the

right sort—more stout comrades, more good neighbours, more loyal friends, more faithful lovers, more gentlemen, in short—more of that kind and less of the other kind whom we wish out of the way, or possibly hanged, because "we are too many."

In an age when the doctrine of evolution is in all men's mouths (though more, perhaps, in their mouths than in their understanding) it may seem unnecessary to urge the indirect method of improving "the quality of the human species." It has long been familiar under the phrase "improving the conditions" or "improving the environment." This method, which is obviously indirect, most men now regard as more efficacious than the rewards and punishments, whether in this world or the next, which aim directly at improving their souls, or the homiletical activities which denounce the sinner; some ardent believers in evolution going so far as to dismiss the latter methods altogether in favour of the former. On the general principle I believe they are right, always provided that the human factor be included in the "environment," and with exception made for the extremists just mentioned.

That "conditions" and "environment" are responsible for making us the kind of people we are is a doctrine which few of us would accept without some

qualification. We are more willing to accept it as an explanation of our vices than as an explanation of our virtues. We apply it freely and charitably to criminals and blackguards, but seldom to heroes and saints. The vices of slum dwellers are not infrequently attributed to their environment, and with good reason; but, for my part, I should feel that I was greatly insulting the hardbitten children of toil if I set down their virtues, which are quite as conspicuous as their vices, to that cause. The murderer awaiting execution may sometimes be allowed the consolation of reflecting that, but for the "conditions" under which he has lived, he would not have come to his present predicament, and society, which has condemned him to death, may be justly invited to take the same view of the matter; but to inform the recipient of a Victoria Cross that the decoration was due not to him but to his environment would never do. I think also that while most of us are content to have our vices (but not our virtues) explained in this charitable manner by our neighbours, very few of us, and those the meanest, are in the habit of applying it to themselves. When we apply it to ourselves a voice within seems to answer: "It is false." At all events the people who live in the slums are no more the creatures of their conditions, than are those

who live in the precincts of a cathedral or a university. Which may incline some of us to throw the principle overboard. It is precisely because our fellow-men are not creatures of their "conditions" that they are worthy of our respect and of the service we can render them—and we, reciprocally, of theirs.

None the less the doctrine, when rightly understood, is fundamentally true. To understand it rightly, however, demands some effort of thought. What, indeed, do we mean by "the environment" or by "conditions"? In popular expositions of the doctrine I observe that the "environment" is commonly construed in terms of space, the fact that man has an environment in *time* being overlooked. The environment contemplated is that which surrounds and envelops the man in the visible form of physical objects; the general scenery and setting of his life, the clothing on his back, the house he lives in, the town or village in which the house is situated, the food on the table, the furniture, the view out of the windows, the lay-out of the streets, the sewage system, the appointments in the factories and schools, the transport facilities for getting in and out—and so on through an endless list. Improve all these, we are told, duly "distribute" them, and you will improve the man. In addition to that, however,

we must not forget, though we commonly do, that among the most active elements of every man's environment, is the whole body of habits, customs, traditions which he and his neighbours inherit from the past. These conditions operate in time, for the most part invisibly, and are more difficult to change than any of the visible objects in space that I have just enumerated.

The same truth might be indicated by pointing to the fact, again obvious but not always remembered, that the most active and influential element in every man's "environment" unquestionably consists of *his fellow-men*. It is they, more than anything else, who define the "conditions" under which he lives as good or bad. If the quality of his fellow-men is bad, the quality of his conditions cannot be good, and no change of the physical surroundings will make them so.

And that truth, as usual with truth, is two-edged. As other men form the inner circle of each man's environment so each man, in turn, forms part of an inner circle environing others. If my neighbours "condition" my existence, do not I, also, condition theirs? And when the question of improving the conditions arises is the difference more than one in the point of view whether you regard me as operator or operated

on? I am clearly both. There is a reciprocity in these things. And so it must always have been. But whereas, in primitive forms of society, the human environment was comparatively small, and the relations simple between it and the environed individual, now it has become immense and the relations between the two sides correspondingly complex and the reciprocal conditioning correspondingly active.

If, then, we still assert, what I, for one, will not deny, that conditions are paramount and that environment makes men what they are, let us not think only of physical conditions, but remember also the immense and growing importance of the human element and the reciprocity of the relationship. Put me in a paradise of physical conditions with none for my companions but fools, knaves, traitors, quacks, windbags, bores, sneaks, liars, blackguards and parasites, and you make my "conditions" vastly worse than they are at the present moment in this rather draughty lecture hall and with a Glasgow audience before me. Put yourselves in the paradise, with me for the solitary black sheep, and still your environment will not be all that it should be.

These considerations do not weaken the general principle that man is determined by his environment, but

they do give it a dramatic turn which the Darwinian, or the Marxian, statement of it lacks. And they warn us to be circumspect in the application of it, lest it rebound upon ourselves. Social doctrines are seldom rightly understood until they receive the dramatic turn which reveals us to ourselves in the double character of actors and acted-upon. We do well in "living for others," but ill in forgetting that we too are "others" when viewed from their side—a point which superficial benevolence is apt to overlook.

In this connection it is also important that we look very narrowly into the meaning of the phrase "better conditions." Let us restrict ourselves for the moment to the ordinary acceptation of it, as referring to improvements in the physical outfit, such as houses, clothes, food, sufficient space, air, light, warmth, and so on. Popular imagination is apt to conceive of these things as though they were benefits that the citizen is entitled to find ready-made for him and awaiting his arrival on the planet, the business of the social system being to see to it that they are there. I am not prepared to deny this, but only to indicate a further truth which this mode of thinking seems to miss. *All these "conditions" are the products of human labour and*

the only conceivable way to better them is to better the labour which produces them.

I have taken the trouble to ask a number of persons occupied in these studies what exactly they mean by "better conditions." In seven cases out of eight the first item mentioned was, as one might expect, "better houses"—though in one or two the issue was confused by somebody saying "more" houses instead of "better." Now "better houses" may serve as a symbol and summary of "better conditions" in general. We may accept it as typical. How, then, are these better houses to be brought into existence? Obviously there is only one way—that of a higher quality of labour all along the line of those concerned in erecting them—from the Town Planning Committee and the architects (especially them) down to the humblest bricklayer "on the job." And the same holds true of the building materials of which the houses are composed—bricks, mortar, timber, plaster, roofing tiles, glass, iron and lead pipes, and all the rest. At every point of the operation the result depends on the degree of trusteeship, scientific competence, and personal skill that are brought to bear upon it in combination. Improve these, set them to work, and you will get better houses.

Fail to improve them, or let them fall into decay and you will get a future slum—the fate awaiting many a block of " Council houses " erected during recent years, and awaiting it at no distant date.

In actual practice one sees a curious mixture of elements, good and bad. Sometimes good planning, good architecture, good workmanship, but rotten material. Sometimes stupid planning, imbecile architecture, but sound material and workmanship. Sometimes all good together; sometimes all bad together; and so on through the various permutations and combinations. A crew of righteous men and sinners, of heroes and villains pulling confusedly in the same boat, a distracted operation, symbol of an age where the meaning of human labour is understood in patches but not understood at large.

I submit that jerry-building, taking it as a type of low quality labour in general, is a demoralizing operation to all the parties concerned in it, an operation, that is, which lowers their *quality* as human beings. It lowers the self-respect of the workmen and the respect in which they are held by others who look upon their work. It poisons the moral atmosphere. The State which subsidizes it, the planners, architects, contractors, day labourers that carry it out, and the public

that put up with it, are all morally injured. Vices are fostered in all of them which moral educators and preachers will find their resources taxed to overtake, combat, and overcome. The relations between the parties to such work are bad; they have no respect for one another. Conscious that the thing they are engaged upon is something of a swindle their "mutual loyalties" never rise beyond the level proper to a gang of swindlers; and it makes no difference at all whether the thing is done under the "capitalist régime" or under "the rule of the proletariat." That exhilarating sense of the worthwhileness of what they are doing together, so essential to healthy relations between man and man, so essential to industrial civilization as a whole, is wanting. The moral atmosphere becomes depressed, favourable to the incubation of malice, mistrust, and uncharitableness, but unfavourable to good comradeship and generosity among the workers. They are certain to quarrel over the division of the spoils; *nothing can prevent a community engaged in low quality work from doing that.* Many touching stories have been told of honour among thieves, pirate crews, consumptionist conspiracies, and suchlike nefarious combinations against the public weal. But honour of that kind is apt to be shortlived; it does not conform

to the tests of the time-thinker. Time eats into it and collapse comes when the moment arrives for dividing the spoil.

The theme might be endlessly elaborated, were not the truth of it sufficiently obvious in the eyes of all seeing men. Having said what needs to be said about the effect of low quality work in lowering the tone of the community, one might then go on to speak of the effect of high quality work in raising it. And having discussed the effects of both things on the workers, one might then discuss, in chapter after chapter, the effect on those who are worked-for. How good a thing it is, for example, to live in a well-built, well-ordered city; to see all around you, as you look out of your window or go to your daily work, evidences of the skill, the competence, the trustworthiness of your fellow-men. What an education for the inhabitants! What an inheritance for posterity! What a feeling it gives you of the dignity of man! What a desire to enrol yourself in the ranks of the skilled, the competent, the trustworthy! And how evil a thing to live among the contraries, "profitable impostures" confronting you everywhere, in the public buildings, in the houses, in the shop windows; incompetence and rascality (those inseparable twins) shouting at you in

the general ugliness and hugger-mugger, and the very workmen visibly scamping their jobs before your eyes! Against such damning evidence of man's vileness what text of Scripture could persuade you to love him, what philosophy convince you of his heavenly origin? "O my soul, come not into their company," is what you would say.

That the ultimate aim of constructive citizenship is to improve the quality of man himself I have fully admitted. But the question is: Where shall this vast and difficult enterprise *begin?* In what shall we lay the foundations of it? I suggest that we begin by effort to improve the quality of human work, on the lines of skill, competence and trusteeship; that we lay the foundations in that; that all forces—social, political, educational—mobilize themselves to that end, in the assured confidence that improvements effected *there* will be reflected inevitably by corresponding improvements in the human quality of the workers and the worked-for, and in the relations subsisting among them, whether of love, brotherhood, unity, or whatever else be the ultimate principle. This is the indirect method for the training of citizenship in the virtues and valours that appertain to it, leaving the direct method, which mostly takes the hortatory or homileti-

cal form, and is of immense value when not exclusively relied upon or overdone, to come in as a subdued accompaniment and to raise its voice in triumph and drive the nail home at the finish.

In the process of rolling metal sheets it sometimes happens that, owing to some trick of the temperature or fault in the material, a bulge makes its appearance on the surface of the sheet. The question now is, how to straighten it out? The inexperienced might answer, "By hammering on the bulge." But the experienced know that *if you do that you will crack the sheet.* So they hammer all *round* it, beginning as far off as possible and gradually drawing nearer to the offensive spot. Meanwhile the bulge, which they are careful not to touch, slowly diminishes and finally disappears.[1]

"*Avoid hammering on the bulge, but hammer diligently all round it.*" I would commend this as a useful formula for those who conceive it their mission to rectify the dangerous bulges that occur from time to time in our social life, and for guardians of the common weal in general. Through hammering on the bulge many valuable sheets of metal have been cracked.

[1] I owe this illustration to Sir Oliver Lodge, who tells me that it originated in Mr. Herbert Spencer's conversation.

XVII

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATERIAL

Among the many reproaches hurled at and heaped upon our present form of civilization that of being "materialistic" is probably the commonest. The word "materialism" figures prominently in the works of our social pathologists, sometimes as the name of the most malignant "disease" that affects us and sometimes as the summary of the whole lot. If you could cure the age of its "materialism"—for which many prescriptions are offered, some proposing Christianity, some more "bedevilment with legislation"—you would strike at the root of social disease in general and the rest would be easy. To rid the world of this pestilence the whole pharmacopœia of spiritual remedies has been put under tribute and all the more respectable "isms," of which there is a great number, summoned to mobilize themselves for a crusade against it. But I strongly suspect that "materialism" is a catchword.

When you examine the various remedies for ma-

terialism that are now being offered and advertised—for all of them are more or less "in the market"—the interesting fact discloses itself that every one of them rests on a "materialistic" basis. They all invoke the aid of matter, sometimes quite shamelessly. This is obviously so in the case of remedies which consist in improving the physical "conditions" or "environment." But even when the remedies are conceived in "spiritual" terms they involve a free resort to churches, pulpits, schools, lecture halls (such as this), the printing press, the book market, and the use of vocables in general, all of which have a material side, while some of them are very intimately connected with the "material civilization" under rebuke, and could not, in fact, do their business without it. Ask anyone who advocates the "spiritualization of society"—a phrase I have often heard of late—how he proposes to set about it and you will find that he immediately commits himself to some form of "materialism," though it be only that of holding a public meeting or a Copec Conference, for which the railways will be invited to issue tickets at reduced fares and much coal consumed in conveying the delegates to the place of meeting. So long as men's souls are united with their bodies, or their minds in any way connected with their brains, all

denunciations of "materialism" should be made under reserve. Even the motto "*mens sana in corpore sano*" is intensely materialistic.

No doubt the authors of this reproach mean something important by it, but one may be pardoned for wondering what, precisely, they mean. They cannot intend to expel matter bag and baggage and get on without it—even disembodied spirits might find a difficulty in doing that. So long as hundreds of millions of human beings have to be fed, clothed, sheltered, and warmed from day to day extensive dealings with matter will be incumbent on society. We cannot feed those millions on moonshine, nor clothe them in rainbows, nor house them in metaphysics, nor warm them with fine words. The grosser substances are essential. Obviously what these accusers intend is not to abolish matter, but only to keep it in its proper place. Yet even this should not be attempted without clear notions of what the proper place of matter really is. Clear notions on that point are very rare.

What is matter? Philosophers are much at variance in the answers they give to that question, but I am probably on safe ground in defining matter as *something we cannot get on without*—like the wife commemorated in a famous epitaph, "*praesens formi-*

danda, absens lamentanda," which may be freely translated, " difficult to live with, more difficult to live without." Looking more deeply, and risking some disagreement, matter, I think we may say, denotes the first stage in the apprehension of spirit, the stage through which spiritual apprehension must inevitably pass if ever it is to reach the goal. The way to spiritual things lies *through* material things and not *round* them. Spirit, conversely, is matter clearly seen into, rightly used, and *profoundly experienced.* When material things have been transformed by skilful action upon them into " things of beauty and joys for ever," as so many of them may be, spiritual things are before you; and when you behold the beauty and rejoice in it you yourself are spiritual.

I am one of those who believe, as you now know, that the spiritual culture of mankind has its roots and growing points in the common work of the world. By such transformations as I am here speaking of, the daily bread that feeds men's bodies can be converted into the spiritual bread that feeds their souls, and the process of earning the one into the process of cultivating the other. For my part I see no way in which the cultivation of a man's soul can be carried on if the activities by which he earns his living as a material

being form no part of it. "Two men," said Carlyle, in words that cannot be quoted too often, "two men I honour, and no third. First, the toilworn craftsman, that, with earth-made implement conquers the earth, and makes her man's. . . . A second I honour and still more highly: him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread, but the bread of life. . . . These two in all their degrees I honour; all else is chaff and dust."

But are these men really *two?* Consider them narrowly and you will see them as one. They unite in the indispensableness of that which they severally produce and in the consciousness that it is indispensable.

To the statement that matter is what none of us, not even the most spiritually minded, can get on without, I will now add another, and one, I think, that is equally beyond the range of controversy.

The most significant characteristic of matter I know of is *the responsiveness it shows to good treatment.* Whatever the ultimate constitution of matter may be, there cannot be a doubt that, when well treated, no limit exists to the precious things which matter will yield you in return. Ill treated, matter turns into the worst of enemies; well treated, into the best of friends. I wonder that nobody has written a treatise on the

Perfectability of Matter, if only by way of confuting the misguided philosophers who, misled by the nasty tricks it plays on those who treat it ill and overlooking its generous response to those who treat it well, have condemned it as intrinsically evil. The finest music you ever heard results from a beautiful conspiracy, between a bit of catgut and the surrounding atmosphere, to reward the musician who treats them well and to cover him with glory. How they play up to him! Name what noble achievement you may in the arts or in the records of heroism and you will find the good treatment of matter at the bottom of it. I count this responsiveness of matter to good treatment one of the most reassuring facts in the whole range of our experience. Nor do I think any the worse of matter for taking vengeance on those who mishandle it, as it never fails to do. For both things I take off my hat to matter and inwardly thank God that I live in a material universe.

What, then, is this "good treatment" to which matter responds so generously, and what the ill treatment which it never fails to resent and to punish? The good treatment, I answer, is all comprised in three things which I have striven to make you familiar with in these lectures—trusteeship, scientific competence, and per-

sonal skill; and the ill treatment all comprised in their contraries, treachery, incompetence, and unskilfulness. Man, a trustee for the right uses of matter; matter, the generous friend of the good workman and the implacable enemy of the bad; I offer you the first as a definition of man and the second as a definition of matter, humbly commending both to the earnest consideration of theologians, philosophers, physicists, educators of the young, and leaders of the Labour Party.

Our "rights and duties" are too narrowly defined when we restrict them to our fellow-men. They are as wide as the universe; in the substance of the universe they stand rooted; and the eyes of the universe are upon the daily work of every man, to reward or to punish according as his duty to matter, as trustee for the right use of it, is done or left undone. "Mechanic and mathematician and servant of the Most High God." Our duty to matter is another name for our duty to God; all the rights we have in time and space are contingent on our doing it. By a diligent performance of our duty to matter we serve God and our fellow-men; we serve their bodies and their souls; by neglecting it we disserve them in both, we wrong them, we declare that the "love of the brethren is not in us," and all the "social service" we can otherwise

render will not weigh in the balance against the wrong we have done. I believe that all the social "diseases" our pathologists busy themselves in "diagnosing" have their origin not in materialism, as some of them would have it, but in the ill treatment of matter, in wrongs done to her, in vocations incompetently fulfilled, in things mishandled, in jobs scamped; they are the vengeance she takes on her faithless trustees. Make friends of matter and she will receive you into everlasting habitations; make her your enemy and she will plunge you into the abyss.

"Materialism," "acquisitiveness," "competition"—these three reproaches, so plentifully hurled at industrial civilization, all mean pretty much the same, and, no doubt, as I have said, they mean something important. But precisely what? The answer comes from the line of thought we have been following. They all refer to things *in bulk,* to matter in bulk, to property in bulk, to wealth in bulk. All proceed from the obstinate tendency of the modern mind to think in terms of space and quantity, and to forget the everlasting habitations of real value which have their foundations in time and quality. They are the reproaches hurled by space-thinkers on the results of their own space-thinking. The materialism which has no reverence for

matter and no godly fear of it; the acquisitiveness which merely asks for "more"; the competition which turns on the question of who can get the "most"—these do indeed debase and injure us; they are the vices of a space-thinking age. But of the "materialism" which loves matter and fears it, which seeks diligently to transform it into "things of beauty and joys for ever," knowing that it will respond to our effort and be as loyal to us as we are to it—of that materialism we can never have enough, for it is the very root of all that gives dignity to human life. Of the "acquisitiveness" which hungers for real values, and seeks, by creating them, to make them our very own, I would say this—let all men seek to surround themselves with such property and to acquire as much of it as possible. Of the "competition" which turns from the question of who can *get most* and takes up the question of who can *do best*, again I would say, let the world be filled with that "competition"! In the space-world of quantity men lose their individuality and become units; division is the law of it and "the woes of combat" are its portion. Only in the time-world of quality can they unite, co-operate, love one another, and build for themselves "everlasting habitations"; for they live in time. Materialism, acquisi-

tiveness, competition, vices in the one, become virtues in the other.

I submit once more that human culture originates in the common work of man, and develops from that point onward to whatever finer issues may be in store for it. If that be true, what a misfortune it is when the spiritual culture of society, art, literature and religion gets widely separated from common work; when the link is broken which connects the bread of life that feeds our souls with the daily bread that feeds our bodies; when men cease to recognize that the labour of supplying their bodies with the materially indispensable is all of a piece with the labour of supplying their souls with the spiritually indispensable, that both are under the same law of excellence, that welldoing at one end of the process is impossible unless there is welldoing at the other.

When the material and the spiritual get separated in that way—and are they not so separated at the present hour?—our interest in the "good life" inevitably declines. We come to regard it as a thing to discuss and to grow eloquent over; we turn it into a property for book-writers and moralists and preachers to exploit after their kind; and the fine effects we are able to produce by these rhetorical exercises often prevent us

from seeing how little in earnest about the good life we really are. To heal this dangerous breach, to bring material things and spiritual things into closer contact with one another, to re-establish the link between the daily work of the world and the spiritual culture of the world, that is another version, which is yet not another, of the task awaiting constructive citizenship.

"The best things thought and said" by men, which Matthew Arnold declares to be the basis of culture, have to do with what are known as the three absolute values, Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Were all the noble words that have been spoken about these three to be collected we should have before us the very cream of what culture, in Matthew Arnold's sense of it, has produced. But Truth, Beauty and Goodness when held before us as abstractions, in language however fine, are "ineffectual angels." When so exhibited, what we get really interested in is the secondary value of the fine sayings; and often we deceive ourselves at that point into thinking that the Eternal Values themselves have laid hold upon us, when as a matter of fact they have only touched us with their finger tips, only brushed us with their angel wings. There is a grave danger of our culture getting watered down into a very thin and unsustaining beverage. Our real interest in

Truth, Beauty and Goodness does not begin until we are on the way to *creating* one or other of them. Show me a man who is doing a piece of honest work, or one who is making something beautiful that might have been made ugly, or one who is turning out a good article that might have been turned out a profitable imposture, and I know beyond a doubt that the Eternal Values have laid hold of that man, and not merely brushed him with their wings. He may be governing a state, or steering a ship, or writing a book, or composing a sonnet, or laying bricks, but in any case the root of the matter is in him. The Eternal Values are not beautiful phantoms. They are the active principles of human labour. Our culture must give us more than the knowledge of the " best that has been thought and said " about them. It must give us skill to embody them in the visible world. Not to rest content until our trusteeship of matter has got itself outwardly expressed in things true, good, and beautiful for the eye to see, the ear to hear, the touch to handle, the whole man to rejoice in and make use of; not to rest content till by our creative activity we have added one more to the world's inheritance of such things—that is the culture that goes through with its task, the wisdom that completes itself in skill.

Yes, *things*. I would emphasize that word. Things to be seen, things to be heard, things to be touched, handled, made use of, and rejoiced in—goods, articles, commodities, marketable ones, too, and none the worse for being marketable provided the market also has in it the quality of excellence. All of them fruits of that socially valuable occupation which makes us social beings—material things, some of them small enough to be put into shop windows, others so big that whole cities and broad lands and continents are needed for the display of them.

"Things are in the saddle and ride mankind," said Emerson. So indeed they do, and the image aptly suggests the vengeance that matter takes on those who *use her ill*. She turns them into donkeys—not a difficult transformation—and rides them ignominiously. But the remedy is not to be sought in a denunciatory attitude towards matter, which can only bring down upon us a yet more humiliating vengeance. It lies in a realization of the profound truth that man is a citizen of the universe; in other words, a trustee for matter and therefore a spiritual being.

Whether or no it be true, as an ancient philosopher contended, that man makes his gods in his own image I will not now discuss. But it seems certain that he

does so make his pots and his pans, to say nothing of his houses, his factories, his cities, his Glasgows, his visible civilizations in general. I do not mean that he models his pots to the shape of the human figure or puts a speaking likeness of himself on the surface of his pans—though sometimes he does even that. I mean that he makes these things in the image of his soul. They reflect his qualities, his character, his worth as a man; they reflect his attainments in trusteeship, in competence, in skill. Has he faithfully played his part as a *trustee for matter?* Has he asserted himself as a spiritual being in the fulfilment of his duty to that mysterious substance? His pots and his pans give the answer. Does not that great archæologist, Sir Arthur Evans, tell us much to the point about the character of the ancient Cretans by his careful scrutiny of their pots and their pans. Give Sir Arthur a Minoan pot or a Minoan pan and presently you will be learning something about the souls of the Minoans. In like manner, I would say, look at the articles displayed in the shop windows of Glasgow and you will learn something about the souls of the people who live in your city. Look, for example, into the sweet-shops, of which I observe a great multitude, and you will perceive at once that the cult of happiness, in the sugary version

of it, has many devotees among you. Or look into the shops where strong drink is provided. If it be true, as Balzac asserted, that the drinking of alcohol is "the pursuit of the infinite" in its popular form, those shops will tell you that the said pursuit is by no means extinct in your city. In America the pursuit of the infinite, in that form, is prohibited by law—an important clue for those who would study the soul of America, of which, no doubt, the future archæologist will take note. Not by their pots and their pans only, but by their food and their drink, do men reveal the quality of their souls and paint their own spiritual portraits. It was said of Velasquez, the world's greatest master in that line, that he painted the portraits of men not as they existed in space but as they lived in time. The articles in our shop windows do the same. There, if the time-reader looks attentively, he may see the image of contemporary man, of his wants, his desires, his aspirations, his aptitudes, his wisdom, his folly, his virtue, and his vice, visibly displayed.

Yet the truth of the matter does not end at that point. Here, too, we encounter that mysterious law of reciprocity which causes all things human to move in a circle. For if it be true that we stamp our own

image on these things, is it not equally true that they react upon us in kind and stamp *their* image upon us? Have these pots and pans no answering influence on the eyes that see them, the hands that use them, the mouths that drink out of them? Have the cities we build no answering influence on the builders, on the inhabitants, present and to come? If we fill them with ugly sights, foul noises, and vile odours, do they not take vengeance on us by implanting corresponding qualities in our souls; and so with their contraries, punishing us in kind for the one, rewarding us in kind for the other? I think they do.

XVIII

CO-OPERATION

COMPACTS and alliances between human beings, such as marriages, partnerships, federations, trade unions, unions of churches, peace treaties, leagues of nations, "social contracts" (real or imagined)—all these, if they are to yield the fruit expected of them, require assiduous and methodical cultivation. Like the land we cultivate for our daily bread, the good effects of compacts are subject to a "law of diminishing returns," which can only be countered by continuous efforts to maintain the vitality and fruitfulness of the union. The uniting wills, whether in a marriage or in a league of nations, must continue to *will their union,* or it will presently cease to exist, and on the ground where it once existed there will be a crop of weeds. The bonding force of union is *volitional.* Were the "love of man" nothing more than the emotional fondness of human beings for one another we could not invoke it as the reconciling principle of life.

Whatever merits *laissez-faire* may have in other

connections it is certainly fatal to compacts. Left to themselves, with nothing to keep them alive beyond vows, covenants, seals, signatures and suchlike birthday ceremonies and formalities of procedure, they degenerate and perish. Even the statue of Christ erected on the summit of the Andes, as a symbol of perpetual peace between two nations, and the solemn words inscribed on its base, do not relieve the Chileans and the Argentines from the need of exertion in friendship, but exhort them—and all nations, for the matter of that—to exert themselves the more and to acquit themselves like men in maintaining the bond. For, as I have often tried to persuade you, the main difficulty about compacts, whether on the large scale or the small, does not lie in making them, though that is often difficult enough, but in keeping them alive and fruitful after they are made. "Reason," a distinguished writer has recently declared, "is faith cultivating itself."[1] In the same manner, may we not say that social life is co-operation *cultivating itself?* A difficult undertaking.

The difficulty increases not only in proportion to the area covered by the compact, to the number of human wills and divergent interests included within it, but, far more, with the lapse of time. Time is the great

[1] Mr. R. G. Collingwood, in the *Hibbert Journal,* October, 1927.

enemy of compacts. Even when the contracting parties retain their identity, as in marriage, the bond has to be sustained under conditions widely different from those which gave the initial impulse to the union, as many find out. But the difficulty that arises from change of conditions is at least doubled when the *persons* change—when, for example, a treaty made by statesmen of one party has to be kept by statesmen of opposite principles or of no principles at all, or by a generation which has no respect for the engagements of its forefathers.

M. Victor Cherbuliez made the calculation that between the years 1500 B.C. and A.D. 1860 8,000 peace treaties came into existence with an average duration of two years each. Whether these figures are accurate or no the general fact is undeniable that the rate of infant mortality in the treaty-making province stands very high. Even the Social Contract, if we accept Rousseau's account of it, does not seem to have lasted very long; it had fallen, at the time that philosopher professed to discover it, into a state of almost total ruin, so that only traces of it remained extant on the earth. Left to take care of themselves—and that I imagine is why many of them die so young—all schemes of co-operation, all compacts and alliances, from marriage to peace treaties, leagues of nations and

social contracts, tend to become "scraps of paper" or something less. In no department of human undertakings has Time wrought greater havoc. The shores of history are littered with the débris of broken covenants.

Co-operation means, I take it, uniting the manifold streams of human will-power or conscious energy into a single stream directed upon a common object. Two pictures rise before the mind. On the one hand we see a world of human wills largely wasting themselves in the pursuit of cross purposes and in mutual destructiveness—a vicious moral economy, abundantly illustrated in the world as we know it to-day. Over against this, imagination constructs a world of united effort, marching triumphantly, and without waste of force, to the achievement of whatever the common object of desire may be—the co-operative world we hope to create.

This second picture, I believe, would be accepted alike by the individualist and by the socialist, by the religious reformer and by the secular reformer, as a true account of his immediate objective and possibly of his ultimate objective as well. Doubtless they would differ in defining the "common object of desire"; but they would agree that it must be achieved in co-operation. I give you "co-operation," or the union of wills, as the word most likely to prove acceptable to all the varieties of

social idealism for defining their common ground. What else do we mean by the "unity of civilization" or by the "brotherhood of man"? What else is the League of Nations after? What else do the trade unions, and the Federation of British Industries, and the promoters of union among the churches desire?

We may go a step further. A union of wills that appeared only to disappear, a co-operation without promise of continuance and growth, would satisfy nobody. And this is true whether we are considering co-operation on the small scale, as in a marriage, or on the large scale as in a league of nations. How many bitter animosities have their origin in alliances that are unnatural, in co-operations that are ill-conceived! May we not say that such animosities are apt to be the bitterest of all? There is a kind of love that turns rapidly into hatred; there is a kind of union that breeds division and precipitates war.

It is of the utmost importance that the student of society should learn to distinguish these from their contraries. What, he should ask himself, is the secret of longevity in these things and what the cause of early death? He will find, I think, that the longest lived co-operations are those which are consciously devoted to high objects, clearly defined; universities and churches,

for example; while those which have low objects, such as sexual gratification or money-making, are subject to swift dissolution.

Doubtless "'tis better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all." But no one would interpret this to mean that persons whose marriage ends in the divorce court are all the better for having been married. 'Tis not better, but very much worse, to marry and divorce than not to marry at all. In the same way, I suppose, most persons would agree that not to have a league of nations, not to have a union of churches, is better than to have one which cannot sustain itself and presently breaks up. Such break-ups deal shattering blows to the co-operative cause in general.

The picture of "brethren dwelling together in unity" has often been presented in colours which obscure rather than reveal these elementary truths—William Morris' "News from Nowhere" may be cited as an instance in point. The unity is there, snapshotted, so to speak, at a happy moment; but where is the driving and sustaining force of it? Inspiring as such visions often are, this "dwelling together in unity" is impossible unless the "brethren" in question are actively and loyally co-operating in a common work recognized as worthy of their united effort and worthy of them-

selves as human beings. We cannot remind ourselves too often that human unity, if it is to mean anything at all, must be a unity of *wills,* or, to speak more strictly, a unity of continuous *willing*—a force that actuates in a definite direction and not a condition in which men rest, or merely exist side by side, with nothing to sustain it beyond the pleasant feeling of their general fondness for one another. *Dwelling* together in unity does not express what unity really means. It leads the mind to fix too much attention on the domestic side of human life and too little—if I may use the word without being misunderstood—on the *business* side; too much on the intervals between work and too little on the hours when work is going on and men have other relationships with their fellows than that of merely "dwelling" alongside of them as neighbours. It is in these latter hours, in the "business" hours, as I would call them, that the unity of a working civilization has its roots, the fondness of the workers for one another, their right to address one another as "comrade," being derivative from that.

About the "love of man" I shall have more to say in the last lecture; but a word on the subject seems necessary here. Of the many modes that are practised, wordy and otherwise, for generating that eminent vir-

tue I know of none so effectual as *common participation in valuable work*—an important point for those who are interested in the industrial version of morality. The New Testament writer struck the true note when he exhorted his converts to love one another in *deed*.[2] For, in this working world of ours, men are more to one another than mere *neighbours* "dwelling together" in a habitable universe. Essentially they are fellow-workers, or fellow-players, work and play being one in principle when rightly understood. The love that is quickened in that relationship is the love that *lasts*. Just as the love of nature becomes a reality when we learn to exert ourselves in company with her elemental powers—we love her because we discover in that way that she first loved us—and sinks to the level of an affectation when based upon mere sightseeing, so, too, the love of man is essentially an affair between fellow-workers and not between neighbours merely. As a mere spectacle to be gazed upon there is no virtue in our neighbour's existence to kindle our love of him, no matter whether the scene of his goings-on be displayed on the other side of the wall or on the other side of the globe. Love at first sight, the knitting of the bond in the mutual glance of two apparitions sud-

[2] 1 John iii. 18.

denly confronting one another in the field of vision, might seem to prove the contrary; but even that interesting phenomenon, if we attend to the reality of it, is not unconnected with the fact that a co-operative business, of profound significance, has been assigned to the lovers from the foundations of the world—"male and female created he them" and named the honourable transactions expected of them in their male and female relationship. This may be universalized. Without a co-operative transaction, loyally and competently fulfilled, the love of man is a waning and vanishing force.

Co-operation is often presented as a method of economizing energy in the attainment of human ends. And so it certainly is when compared with the opposite condition of disorganized effort. But this statement of its nature will be misunderstood if we take it to mean, as we often do, that human life becomes morally less exacting in proportion as co-operative conditions are attained. It becomes more exacting. To attain co-operation is by no means to give the human will a holiday. It furnishes the will with a new task and challenges the activity of it on higher and more difficult ground, that, namely, of sustaining and continually vitalizing the organized life that has been called into

existence—the service, one might say, of the co-operative principle itself. It implies the continuous self-mastery of the co-operating individuals. A united civilization—co-operation in its widest form—would be a civilization in the highest conceivable state of moral energy. And this energy would not be supplied, and supplied for nothing, from some external source in the general reservoirs of the universe, "laid on" from there like electricity or water power. It would have to be generated by the continual self-affirmation of the wills of the co-operating members and could have no other source.

I submit, then, that we misconstrue co-operation when we think of it as a device for relieving the human will of its tasks, burdens, risks and responsibilities and so leaving the way open to the individual for a life of instinct, impulse and go-as-you-please. We do well, no doubt, in thinking of the benefits co-operation confers upon mankind, of the strife it allays, of the harmonies it creates, of the waste it saves, of the larger production and the fairer distribution of this world's goods. But that mode of thinking, and many of us seem unable to get beyond it, is highly dangerous if unattended by insight into this deeper truth—that co-operation draws its very life from the will-power of the

co-operators, directed upon objects generously conceived and heroically pursued, and collapses when this is wanting. Among the idle, the mean, the dastardly, the self-indulgent and the incompetent co-operation is impossible, except perhaps for brief moments which only give occasion for the treacherous to lay their plots, the cowardly to find excuses for deserting and the incompetent to commit their devastating blunders.

If these qualifications seem too austere I would add that a good co-operator has much in common with a good sportsman. He is out to win for his side; but if they lose he keeps his temper and neither abuses his comrades nor invokes a riot. He cheerfully shares in the losses as well as the gains, being prepared for either, and is staunch in defeat as in victory. Co-operation, in fine, is a function for gentlemen.

Among the efforts now being made to train the rising generation for the co-operative function, I know of none more promising than the great movement originated by Sir Robert Baden-Powell, "the Boy Scouts." It has the marks of a united effort that is destined to last and to grow. Already it has become worldwide and international, and the width of it is supported in the depth of it. It solves the antinomy of work and play, of labour and leisure, at the stage

where such antinomies are apt to be most pernicious—in the life of the young. Playing the man is substituted for playing the fool, and mutual loyalty promoted by common participation in that splendid game. The ideal of service, translated from a moral generality into a skilful occupation, is present throughout, and wisdom is taught by working contact with elemental things. Dark days, wet weather, obstructions, difficulties and contradictions are freely encountered, the manful confronting of them being an essential part of the game. The sportsmanlike spirit, under a businesslike discipline, has here been brought into the service of a moral ideal, and the spirit of youth rejoices in the combination. As a school for loyalty, competence and social good humour—the last of immense importance whenever co-operation is in question—I venture to predict that this movement is destined to play a beneficent part in training the citizenship of the future. That it has been extended to girls as well as boys is a further proof of its vitality and the soundness of its principles. Already the influence of it is beginning to be felt in the direction of educational reform.

XIX

SOCIAL TENSION

THE word tension suggests the image of a cord or string pulled in opposite directions at the same time, which approaches the breaking point as the pull at the two ends increases. Another image suggested by the word is that of a fabric on a loom, the weaving of which can only be accomplished by keeping thousands of threads tightly stretched, and yet not so tightly as to break them. One may say that the fabric results from the tension of the threads. It would not become a fabric if tension were not maintained in the weaving of it.

As applied to human life in general the word is, of course, a metaphor, like most of the words that we use when we try to express the nature of ultimate realities. But this particular metaphor of a thread or string, made effective for its purpose by being tightly stretched, pulled in opposite directions at the same time, and yet not pulled so hard as to break it, and

which can only be woven in with other threads so long as they are stretched in like manner, seems to me an image of great value in helping to understand the nature of social life and, indeed, of human life in general. The inventors of the rack were philosophical torturers. They tortured the very principle of life.

"Thou weavest the ages as a work upon a loom" are words which piety has addressed to the sustaining principle of the universe. They serve to remind us that here, too, in the vast fabric of the universe, we have to do with a system of tensions where the oppositions of the parts are converted into the co-operation of the whole, no thread being loose or functionless, but all kept alive by the very force that threatens to break them. Relax the tension of a living system and you destroy the principle which maintains the fabric as effectively as if you stretched it to breaking point. The system collapses in either case; for the very life is in the tension.

Our consciousness, as we pursue the business of our lives, might be described as a state of tension, a state of holding on to some purpose or other against an opposition, against a pull which tends to loosen our hold on the objective before us and detach us from it. In one direction we are pulled by the desire to accomplish our

purpose, to get the thing done that we have set our hearts on doing; but all the time we are being pulled away from it by a multitude of opposing forces, by the dead weight of other people's indifference to what we are doing, by the obstructiveness of those who get in our way, by the impact of cross purposes that interfere with our own, by our bodily infirmities. The way to our purpose is never a "walk over," but always a process of affirming ourselves against the opposite, of sustaining the tension that opposition creates, our consciousness of this keeping us alive, active, and efficient —able, as we say, to "stand up for ourselves."

This consciousness of tension, of being pulled in opposite directions at the same moment, has presented itself to many minds, not as a principle of life, which for my part I believe it to be, but as the essential evil of life, as a thing the wise man will find means of escaping from. That view of it has formed a basis for pessimistic philosophy, especially in the Eastern parts of the world. Unquestionably, tension has its painful aspect, and the constant presence of it can hardly fail to lead us into pessimism, if we believe that agreeable sensations are the only desirable things in life. But, as I have already tried to persuade you, the whole constitution of man betokens that we are made as much for

the endurance of pain as for the enjoyment of pleasure. Indeed I would go further.

In his admirable book on "Reality," Dr. Streeter of Oxford, who is by no means a pessimist, affirms his belief that pain, and not pleasure, is the fundamental fact of life. For my own part I feel bound to put it differently. The "fundamental fact of life," if I must use that language, seems to me to be neither pleasure nor pain, but *the consciousness of tension created by the co-presence of the two.* In beings who have risen to the level of self-consciousness there is no pleasure that does not carry in it an element of pain, though it be only the fear of its departure, and no pain that does not carry an element of pleasure, though it be only the hope of release. "To be perfectly happy," said Victor Hugo, "is a terrible thing"—terrible because you are conscious that it cannot *last,* that time is eating into it; while to be perfectly miserable, as Pascal so constantly insisted, marks the moment in consciousness when the hope of redemption begins to dawn. Our self-consciousness is both pleasant and painful, and all attempts to make it exclusively pleasant by a paradise of agreeable sensations, or exclusively painful by a hell of unbroken agony, come to nought. Life is unthinkable under either condition. The synthesis of pain and

pleasure is as necessary to the constitution of life as the synthesis of oxygen and hydrogen to the constitution of water.

Yet though I would hesitate in saying with Canon Streeter that pain is the " fundamental " fact, and still more in accepting the inferences he draws from that, I think he is right in emphasizing the importance of pain as an integral factor of our conscious life. Life, whenever you encounter it, even in the lowest of its physical forms, is always pang-born and to some extent pang-sustained. And if that is true of our physical life, it is more obviously true of the life of the intellect, of the imagination, of the heart, of the moral consciousness. " All the great ideals of humanity," says Dr. Felix Adler, " are pang-born." They are the answers which the heroic spirit of man has given to the challenge of suffering, to the challenge of frustration, to the challenge of bereavement, to the challenge of death —to the challenge of pain in one or other of its innumerable forms. Ideals of justice, of liberty, of the common good, of the community of mankind, all have high tension at the heart of them, all are pang-born and pang-sustained. The ideal of social service itself is of the same nature. It originates in the felt contrasts of the social world, in the pain which the spectacle of

those contrasts produces in the minds of good men and women. The spirit of social service is a spirit of high tension. It represents the social will in a state of valorous resistance to a felt opposition. The energy of social service, the courage and the creativeness of it are generated by the obstructions it has to encounter as well as by the good will that inspires it.

The fault that impresses me in all the pictures of Utopia that have come my way, at least with those that have been offered us in modern times, is that of overlooking this essential fact. The authors of these Utopias do not appear to see that, as society rises to higher levels of civilization, the greater becomes the social tension in maintaining the common life at the higher level that has been reached. They depict the ideal society as a perfectly constructed machine which runs of itself like a clock that has been wound up, leaving the members of it free from the tension of life, and with nothing before them but a continued existence of lighthearted irresponsibility. They do not seem to realize that these are conditions impossible for human beings, made as they are, to live under.

Without some interludes of lighthearted irresponsibility life indeed would be intolerable to all of us. But it would be no less intolerable, but far more so, if there

were nothing else in store for us. Human progress is not in that direction. As the level rises the tension increases. As the values of life become greater the risk of losing them becomes more formidable and the duty of guarding them more insistent. Society does not advance by diminishing the responsibility of its members, but by extending the area of it, by awaking the sense of it in all classes of the community, until every citizen, rich or poor, head worker or hand worker, has learnt to regard himself as a responsible trustee for the common good, taking his share not only in the benefits which civilization has to confer, but in the burdens it has to bear and in the dangers of the never-ceasing warfare it has to wage. A high civilization is possible only on the condition that the whole body of the citizens, and not a section of them only, are willing to share in the labour of maintaining it, in the high tensions created by the forces that would pull it down. If we look upon our citizenship as merely entitling us to a share of the good things that happen to be going we are taking sides with the forces that retard the progress of the human race. Progress means that you are extending the sense of responsibility to those who lacked it before, and are deepening it in those who have it already.

If now we raise the question of "How do these social tensions arise, what is the origin of them?" I know no better way of answering, than by calling your attention to a famous controversy—that of the respective functions of "love" and "hate" as operative forces in the life of society. Among modern writers it has furnished Mr. Chesterton with a favourite paradox. In his simile of the arch, kept upright as a whole by the falling tendencies of the parts, he has furnished an admirable illustration of it.

Much has been said about "the supremacy of love" as the master principle of human society. To love, in the last resort, we are told, the "solution" of our "social problems" must be committed. Give love an unimpeded sway, and our social relationships will fall into order, mankind will become united, good will and peace envelop the earth.

This doctrine means greatly and means well. But I have to point out that the unimpeded sway of love is an impossible dream. Love, by its nature, is never unimpeded. When did the course of it ever "run smooth"? The love that *lasts* (and unless it last, what value has it?) is not the love that meets no obstacles, but the love that can triumph over every obstacle it meets. True love anticipates opposition and

defies it—"the Lord do so to me and more also if aught save death shall part thee and me." As a social force, also, it is perpetually engaged in resisting its opposite, the points where it is most active in our social life being precisely those where tension is at the highest. Love, says a Buddhist scripture, drives out hate. So truly it does, but the hate that it drives out is always waiting at the door and seeking to reassert itself. I think we are indulging an illusion when we speak of love as a force which has only to be launched into the world to bear down all before it and establish a kingdom that nothing can assail. It was launched long ago, but the conquests it has so far won can neither be maintained nor enlarged without constant effort of the good will in resisting the forces that oppose it.

As a sentiment, passion, or emotion, love is short-lived, and the binding force of it extremely precarious. Time eats into its passionate manifestations. Love of that kind is a relationship that stands peculiarly exposed to disturbance by accident. In the absence of something beyond itself, on which it can lean for support, and from which it can draw vitality, love is always verging towards a breakdown. Love may drive out hate for a moment, but at a later stage it often

serves to intensify the hatred it has previously driven out, or to inflame a new one, as the history of many an unhappy marriage bears witness. Are not the antagonisms of nations that were once in alliance, or of individuals who once were friends, the most embittered of all? It is a fact, which has often given a theme to great tragedy, that the keenest animosities between human beings are those that arise from friendships that have miscarried, from loves that have been disturbed and wrecked by the impact of unavoidable accident; and the tragedy is all the more poignant when the hate which darkens the last act of the drama began its history as the love which brightens the first.

What the loving relationship requires for its maintenance, in every case, is the presence of some overarching end, some common object of service, in which the lovers may engage together, a *third* something beyond and above them, by the common pursuit of which their interest in one another and their devotion to one another is vitalized and sustained. In the case of a married pair, this "third something" may be the children of their union; in the case of friends it may be a common cause which both of them are serving; in the case of the citizens at large it may be the city, or the state to which they belong, or even the community of

mankind itself. And beyond all these, there are ends of a still higher kind, which religion alone can define for us, but in the absence of which the lastingness of love, as a binding force in society, can never be assured. In every case it is the overarching end, this third something in which the wills of the lovers are united, and not love as a bilateral passion of human beings, that creates lasting fellowships and preserves them from the shock of accident and the corroding influences of time. Short of the overarching end, love is a precarious relationship on the lastingness of which we cannot count. It is either a principle of co-operation or a flame which any wind may blow out. A point to be taken note of by those of us who believe, as I suppose most people who have been brought up in the Christian religion do believe, that love holds the key of social good.

Professor Royce, whom I have already quoted in another connection, was much given to insisting on this, as a guiding principle in social philosophy. I am tempted to summarize one of his illustrations, trivial enough in form, but significant in substance. Just because I love my friend, says Royce, I naturally want to have him as a listener whenever I have anything important to say. And for the same reason he natu-

rally wants me for a listener when he wishes to speak. Now, this, sooner or later, will inevitably lead to both of us *wanting to speak at the same time,* and an irritating collision of cross purposes will take place. That type of accidental collision besets the ways of love at every turn, and when there is no overarching end to reconcile the cross purposes of the lovers, often leads on, through growing stages of exasperation, to a tragic breach. Is it not a fact of immense social significance that closeness of relationship between men and nations, while it facilitates mutual helpfulness on the one hand, increases the likelihood of mutual obstructiveness on the other? When two men are walking side by side they are more likely to get in one another's way than if they were miles apart. The League of Nations must not overlook that.

What, then, are the natural dispositions of men in this matter of love and hate? Does man, by nature, love his neighbour or hate him? Does he want to help him or to hinder him? Does he welcome the presence of his neighbour and rejoice to see him, or does he wish him out of the way and rejoice when he is gone?

Thomas Hobbes, in the seventeenth century, a thinker who had even less sentiment in his composition than most philosophers, held very strongly that

man's natural attitude to his neighbour was, on the whole, a hostile one; more hostile than friendly. Hostility, in Hobbes's philosophy, is "three-fourths of life" for the natural man, and friendliness the bare remainder. The State, according to Hobbes, is an artificial, but necessary, device, which men have set up to guard themselves from the disastrous consequences of their predominant dislike of one another—not a very attractive doctrine, it must be confessed, but one which has left a deep mark on political thought. Hear what he says. "The laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be obeyed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. . . . And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength at all."

A century later we find Rousseau, in France, maintaining the exact opposite. According to him, man, by nature, is a lover of his fellows, disinclined to quarrel, and desirous of harmony; a friendly and peaceable creature. And so he would have remained, were it not for the "bedevilment of legislation" practised upon him by the falsely constructed political state.

Left to himself, man would love his fellows and live at peace with them; it is only through the mistaken interferences of the political power that he learns to hate his brother and lives at enmity with him. In quite recent times, I may remind you, Rousseau's view of man's natural state as peaceable has received support from the anthropological researches of Professor Elliott Smith and Mr. W. J. Perry. These writers argue very forcibly, from evidence they have collected about primitive society, that man is not naturally "a fighting animal," and has only become so under the influence of a perverted civilization. The individual is inclined to peace; but the state is a war-making institution.

Is there any possibility of reconciling these opposites, the one starting from the assumption that man left to himself loves his neighbour and wants to be at peace with him, the other from the assumption that man left to himself hates his neighbour and quarrels with him?

The attempt to reconcile them was made by Immanuel Kant a few years after the death of Rousseau. In a lesser-known pamphlet of 1784,[1] Kant put forward

[1] "Ideen zu einer Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht." —Rosenkranz Edition, Vol. vii.

the interesting, but rather obvious, thesis that by nature man both *loves* his neighbour *and* hates him. According to Kant, man is a being who can neither tolerate his fellow nor get on without him. "Deprive a man of his companion and he finds the world intolerably lonesome." Give him a companion, and sooner or later, by pure accident, perhaps, the two will get in one another's way, find themselves at cross purposes, and enter upon some kind of exasperating dispute.[2]

But Kant is not content with a bare statement of the fact that man, by nature, both loves and hates his fellow. He goes on to develop the meaning of the paradox in a manner which seems to me of high value for the understanding of our social life. He lays great stress on what he calls, in his queer way, "the antisocial sociability of mankind." As social beings, men are naturally eager to form themselves into societies, but no sooner is the society formed than the individuals composing it begin to strain against the bonds which they themselves have created. In every phase of our social life we encounter this polarity, this antagonism. On the one hand society creates facilities for mutual help; but in doing so it also creates facilities for mutual obstruction. There need be no malice

[2] Royce, *War and Insurance*, p. 29.

in the matter. A man who lives in the close relations of society simply cannot help getting in his neighbour's way, nor they getting in his, any more than a motor-car in a crowded traffic centre can help being an obstacle in the way of the other cars which happen to arrive at the same moment. "There are so many of us," and we are all on the move.

The result is social tension, which steadily increases as society advances to higher states of civilization. On the one hand we are building up a highly organized social structure which requires the individual to submit himself more and more to social discipline and control; on the other hand, society is doing its best, by its culture and systems of education, to turn its members into highly developed individuals, who, just because they are highly developed, are the more inclined to assert their own wills, the more alive to their own independence, and the more resentful of the social discipline that would compel them to take their places as obedient units in the general mechanism. Here we have the "anti-social sociability of mankind," the tension that arises through the demands of the highly developed individual who would be his own master, and the obvious demand for submission as an obedient unit to the general will.

At first sight it would seem that we are here entangled in some dark and terrible net. But Kant sees deeper. These tensions, that arise in part from the double tendency to love our neighbour and to hate him, to find him both helpful and obstructive, and in part from the conflict between society's demand for submission and the claim to independence put forth by the highly developed individual—these tensions, says Kant, "are the means that Nature has ordained for drawing out the highest powers of man." In them is generated the energy which forces us to conquer our natural sloth, which vitalizes our inventive faculties, and leads us to push our fortunes into higher realms. They are the driving power of a progressive society. "Man longs," says Kant, "to live in comfort and pleasure, but Nature, who knows better what he was made for, gives him toil and painful strife, so that he may raise himself above the sphere of his sorrows."

With that high thought and deep insight these lectures may fitly conclude. It suggests the immense perspective of our cosmic citizenship, within which the themes we have studied are set and outside of which they are not to be understood. To pursue Kant's principle further would carry me beyond the scope of my

task. In the light of it let us briefly review the ground we have traversed.

Human fellowship has too often been presented as though it consisted exclusively in the common enjoyment of happiness. Of that, of course, it does consist; but not wholly. There will be no human fellowship, no social unity, until men and classes and nations have become more willing than they now are to share the losses as well as the gains, and to stand by one another in evil fortune as well as in good. That is why, in these lectures, I have laid so much stress on social valour as a quality which the training of citizenship should aim at. I agree with those philosophers who tell us that "the common will" is a reality. But I am forced to disagree when they represent this common will as always strong and always wise. It may become weak, confused, distracted, and even cowardly, and is certain to become so when "happiness" is held before the people as the only thing to be thought of and aimed at. To the end of the chapter the pains of social tension will have to be manfully borne. Only thus can we rise above "the sphere of our sorrows."

We are suffering at the present time from the moral anæmia which results from the valuation of life in terms of its pleasures, and we may see the effects of

it in all classes of society. That concession I freely make to those who regard our civilization as "diseased," and I make no other. The common will needs strengthening—strengthening to the point when a life of high tension shall present itself to our minds not as a life to be shunned and run away from, but as a life to be willingly accepted and joyfully embraced—the very life for which man was made and in which alone the satisfaction of his nature is to be found. So far as this change can be effected by teaching, by the dissemination of ideas, the way to achieve it is by bringing forward the ideal of *excellence* as the controlling ideal of our civilization, by making excellence rather than happiness the key-word of our culture and the objective of education, thereby directing the main streams of moral vitality into the daily work of the world, where they will spend themselves, not in fine words, but in getting our task performed, our vocation fulfilled—the industrial version of morality for which I have pleaded.

If these principles are admitted, we shall have a solid basis for our conception of social service. In these days the obligation of social service is recognized by everybody whose moral nature is awake. But social service is very imperfectly understood when we

think of it as though it were an occupation for our leisure time or as though it consisted in the use we make of our surplus money. It includes all that, and I would be the last to say a word against the activities that come under that description. Society has a just claim upon our leisure time and on our surplus wealth. But the root of social service lies, not in what we do when we are off duty, but in what we do when we are on duty, not in the use we make with the surplus when it has been earned, but in the motives of the work by which we have earned whatever we possess, surplus and all. Is that work *good?* Have we striven to make it as valuable as the circumstances permit? Are we giving our fellow citizens good value for their money, or are we exploiting their weakness, their ignorance, their gullibility? Is the article we make and sell, is the service we render, what it pretends to be, or is it merely some sort of profitable imposture? These are the fundamental questions of social service and of industrial morality. I have nothing but admiration for the social service which takes the other form, that of voluntarily devoting spare time and surplus wealth to promoting the public good—time and energy freely given to the arduous work of local government, to the administration of hospitals, to the at-

tack on the slums, to the care of children, to the prevention of disease, to the reformation of drunkards, criminals, and lost women—humanitarian effort in an endless variety of forms, all inspired by a noble idealism, and bearing witness to the existence in the modern world of an eagerness in service to which no previous age can present a parallel.

In a great city like Glasgow, the amount of such work is immense; if we could see it all in a single vision it would overwhelm us with astonishment, and with admiration for the multitude of men and women who carry it on from day to day, unselfishly, heroically, without reward or even praise, and in the face of incessant difficulties, frustrations and discouragements. No one understands what our great cities are, and what they represent, until he has felt the pulse of this great tide of humanitarianism throbbing from moment to moment in the life of the community. Nothing is too good to predict of a civilization which can produce such a phenomenon.

But when we ask where the evils have come from that call out this immensity of heroism to combat them, what is the ultimate source of them all, how shall we answer? I would answer by pointing to a failure in that other and deeper form of social service which lies

inside the vocation of every worker, and which demands of him, as his first duty to his fellowmen, that the service he renders them by his daily work shall be competently and faithfully done. These "social evils" measure the extent to which society has been betrayed by *bad workmanship,* manual, mental and moral. You may think of other causes too, but if *that* cause is not thought of the existence of social evil will be unexplained.

I believe that the ethic of the future will be based on duty done in the common work of the world. That will be the rock foundation on which art, morality and religion will rear their superstructures. Once based on that, there is no limit to what they will achieve. Art will unite with industry, labour with education.

The law of good workmanship is deep as the universe. By making it the law of our lives we become citizens of the universe, fellow-workers with God, who "weaves the ages as a work upon a loom," and out of the infinite oppositions of the parts evokes the beautiful co-operation of the whole—a universe vitalized by the very tension that threatens to destroy it. *In tuas manus, Domine, meam animam commisi.* Let the valiant citizen look for his "socially valuable occupation" in that field, not forgetting that pain, no less

than pleasure, is an essential element of life; that in serving the highest he brings upon himself the opposition of the lowest, and incurs enmities in the very act of cultivating friendships. These tensions spring from our nature as the children of time. Time-thinking has been our method throughout.

Among the time-thinkers of our own race who have turned the light of their wisdom on the questions we have been considering I know of none greater than Edmund Burke. Truly there is none to whom I stand under a greater debt. With words of his these lectures shall close: they seem to summarize what I have been trying to say.

"It is therefore our business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most perfect vigour and maturity, every sort of generous and honest feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the commonwealth; so to be patriots as not to forget that we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendships, and to incur enmities. To have both strong, but both selected: in the one, to be placable; in the other, immovable. To model our principles to our duties and our situation. To be fully persuaded that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious; and rather to run

the risk of falling into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame and without use. Public life is a situation of power and energy. He trespasses against his duty who sleeps on his watch, as well as he that goes over to the enemy."

THE END

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